

# **SUMMARY SUBMISSION PEACE, SECURITY AND THE COMMISSION FOR AFRICA**

*Institute for Security Studies*

## **Scope**

Our recommendations are grouped as follows:

- Early warning as part of conflict prevention;
- From Integrated to Developmental Peacekeeping
- African and UN peacekeeping: strengthening complementarity and contingency

## **Early Warning as Part of Conflict Prevention**

In article 3 of its Protocol, the newly established Peace and Security Council of the African Union is created to anticipate and prevent conflicts, to promote and encourage democratic processes, good governance and the rule of law, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law.

Conflict prevention, in particular in the form of early warning of conflicts remains a stated priority of the organisation, and a critical need in Africa. The proposed Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), one of the five pillars of the PSC, will be tasked with delivering advice to the Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security and recommend best courses of action. On a functional and practical level, it is anticipated that the CEWS will be closely linked with early warning units in each of Africa's five regions, which in turn will depend on national level early warning units and capability for the provision of relevant and timely information as well as response policy options.

However, with the exception of ECOWAS and to an extent IGAD, the other regions do not have integrated or fully fledged early warning capabilities. In addition, and at national level, the vast majority of member states do not have the structures in place (and we suspect, would not want to) that would allow for an integrated national-regional-continental system to be established. We therefore suggest that the Commission support the development of a CEWS that:

- Is collaborative and 'open-source' in nature – rather than solely centralised in Addis Ababa, the CEWS must use, build and learn from existing early warning capabilities across the Continent at both government and civil society levels and move away from a purely intelligence driven, national security focussed approach. Open-source' information is widely and freely

available (at all levels) and therefore it should be the basis for such a system;

- Support and strengthen current civil society early warning capabilities (which have an established record on humanitarian, food security, environmental, small arms, governance issues) as an important asset and an integral part of a holistic and comprehensive early warning capability at national, regional and continental level.

## **From Integrated to Developmental Peacekeeping**

Although 'do no harm' approaches have been gradually incorporated into humanitarian and development assistance, the international community must realise that the inextricable link between security (in the broadest sense of human security) and development require that international assistance (including peacekeeping) be long-term in nature. It is therefore not sufficient to temporarily stabilise situations either through the granting of emergency humanitarian assistance or the deployment of peacekeeping forces (as Operation Artemis in the DRC made patently clear).

Breaking the conflict trap requires a deeper, more sustained and coordinated approach to empowering local actors to move away from logics of war. The artificial 'division of labour' present in many volatile situations by which humanitarian/emergency assistance organisations (WFP, ICRC, MSF, OCHA, ILO) are neatly followed by developmental actors once populations are stabilised and vulnerability is reduced (UNDP, WB, etc) has, in many situations, been seriously detrimental. In many instances, the interval between the end of an emergency humanitarian situation and the beginning of a true development phase (through the adoption of poverty reduction strategies, national development programmes, new constitutions and the like) constitutes the most critical and volatile period.

More often than not, PSOs in Africa (as is the case with emergency humanitarian assistance) are seen as surgical short-term interventions destined to stabilised situations of armed conflict. Yet, in many of their activities (DD&R standing as the most important among these) PSOs are more often than not totally disconnected from the development at national level of options for sustainable futures. The examples of East Timor, Kosovo and closer to home, the DRC, should in this regard provide the international community (as well as Africa) with lessons learned and best practices. In these situations, PSOs were (and are) intimately related to the political process, in instances providing direct support and transitional administration, in other instances serving as the bridge between emergency and long-term development.

Part of the issue here is the problem of conflicting, competing and at times competitive policies on the ground between, for example, EU Member States and the EU Commission and between various UN agencies. Recent examples such as last year's elections in Rwanda (which saw the Commission's Electoral Mission in direct opposition with a number of EU member states), or the current situation in the DRC (where a number of EU member states compete for bilateral influence in a totally uncoordinated fashion, inevitably resulting in a reduction of impact of the EU as an actor) should be taken serious. For all the understandable obstacles to an effective EU FCSP, particularly in Africa where a number of EU member states have deep

historical, economic and cultural bilateral links, the facts on the ground remain that such a disconnect may act as a catalyst and a source of further conflict. To address some of these issues we recommend that the Commission for Africa consider interrogating a number of far-reaching and intrusive measures.

- UN peacekeeping mandates must include a developmental mandate. Practically this implies a 'triple hat' SRSG appointment and appropriate UN Security Council mandate with all the constituent implications for coordination of UN agencies at national level.
- A joint action plan for immediate recovery must be designed and implemented quickly by donors, intergovernmental agencies, NGOs and – to the greatest extent possible – by local actors. This can be done even as a long-term reconstruction strategy (see below) is being developed, and should be adjusted as the latter becomes clear.
- A single, common national developmental vision based on agreed principles, shared points of reference and a common agenda between international and local agencies/actors for recovery and reconstruction is essential and should be managed at national level. The development and maintenance of this common visioning should be driven through by intensive community interaction to build a social consensus on the development future of the country concerned. This common national vision should be based upon a common and integrated needs assessment - essential for effective and efficient program design and implementation, but should not be confused with the political process itself.

### **African and UN peacekeeping: Strengthening complementarity and contingency**

Many regard the ASF as one day becoming the 'first port of call' for emergency situations in the African Continent, after which the United Nations (UN) will assume responsibility and take over ASF-led PSOs (the case of Burundi, where the AU's AMIB was recently replaced by the ONUB, is often cited). Proximity to conflict-prone areas and ultimately national and regional security interests of African countries (and consequently the self-explanatory need for African ownership) motivate the drive for African interventions in the Continent's hinterland. Yet, the considerable cost involved in large multi-faceted PSOs and the lack of financial, logistic and human resources needed, will necessarily limit the ability of the AU to maintain ASF-led PSOs for long periods of time. The expectation is therefore that the United Nations will come in and replace these African led missions and the latter will often be much smaller and limited in scope than perhaps predicted in the various AU framework documents – the operative principles here are those of contingency and complementarity.

In this regard, we recommend that the Commission pursue the following:

- The need to further review UN doctrine for intervention to ensure concrete action for intervention in cases of humanitarian catastrophe. This review of UN doctrine should provide for a mechanism to configure regional standby

forces, such as the ASF, as components of UN armed forces within a global security architecture.

- Investigation into the establishment of a mechanism that allows regional deployments endorsed by the UN Security Council, especially those aiming to create conditions for the subsequent deployment of UN peace operations, to gain access to the Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) at the UN Logistics Base (UNLB) at Brindisi, Italy.
- The mandates assigned by troop-contributing countries to national contingents must be compatible with the overall mandate and mission of the peace operation. For instance, national contingents should not operate with a Chapter VI mandate in missions with a Chapter VII mandate. Consequently, contingents should have appropriate corresponding capacity for mandates assigned by the UN Security Council.
- Given the fact that in Africa many of the ceasefire and peace agreements are brokered by the AU, Regional Organizations and Regional Peace Initiatives, the mandates of UN peace operations in Africa should enjoin the leadership of the missions to collaborate/consult with these regional institutions within formal frameworks and not on ad hoc basis.

Within the framework of external initiatives aiming at building African capacities for peace support operations, external assistance should focus on the priority areas identified in the ASF non-paper, namely:

- Establishment of crucial structures of the ASF, namely its Planning Element (PLANELM); the ASF brigade HQs; Command, Control, Communication and Information requirement assessment; the completion of a continental framework for logistics support of the ASF and/or commitment to deliver donor-held equipments and logistics for peace operations; and support to the development of continental training scheme.
- Strategic air- and/or sea-lift.
- Mission logistical sustainment.
- Funding for reimbursement of troop and equipment commitments by member states.