



African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework

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List of Abbreviations

4Rs: Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction	IGAD: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ADB: African Development Bank	IMF: International Monetary Fund
APSA: AU/NEPAD Peace and Security Agenda	IMTF: Integrated Mission Task Force
AU: African Union	IOM: International Organisation for Migration
CAP: Consolidated Appeals Process	MAP: Millennium Africa Recovery Plan
CCA: Common Country Assessment	MDGs: Millennium Development Goals
CHAP: Common Humanitarian Action Plan	NEPAD: The New Partnership for Africa's Development
COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	OAU: Organisation of African Unity
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration	OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
DPKO: United Nations Department of Peace-keeping Operations	OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo	OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DSRSG: Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General	PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
EAC: East African Community	RC: Resident Coordinator
EC: European Commission	SADC: Southern African Development Community
ECHA: United Nations Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance	SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States	UNECA: UN Economic Commission for Africa
ECOMOG: ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group	UNCT: UN Country Team
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States	UNDAF: UN Development Assistance Framework
EU: European Union	UNDG: UN Development Group
HC: Humanitarian Coordinator	UNDP: UN Development Programme
HSGIC: Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee	UNHCR: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
IASC: Inter-Agency Standing Committee	UNICEF: UN Children's Fund
IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	WFP: World Food Programme
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross	
IDP: Internally Displaced Person	
IFI: International Financial Institutions	

Key Concepts

Complex Emergency: a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict, and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency.

Conflict Prevention: diplomatic, military and development actions intended to prevent disputes from arising between parties, prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

Development: long-term initiatives aimed at supporting national objectives such as achieving socio-economic goals, e.g. reducing poverty.

Emergency Relief: action to provide immediate survival assistance to the victims of crisis and violent conflict. The main purpose is to save lives by providing short-term humanitarian assistance in the form of water, sanitation, food, medicines and shelter.

Peacebuilding: action to identify and support measures and structures that will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Peace Enforcement: action, mandated by the United Nations (UN) Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorising the use of force to protect non-combatants and humanitarian aid workers, and/or to enforce compliance with internationally sanctioned resolutions or agreements.

Peacekeeping: a field mission, usually involving military, police and civilian personnel, deployed with the consent of the belligerent parties, to monitor and facilitate the implementation of cease-fires, separation of forces or other peace agreements.

Peacemaking: the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute.

Reconstruction: the long term process of rebuilding the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a society emerging from conflict by addressing the root causes of the conflict.

Recovery: action aimed at restoring the capacity of the internal actors to rebuild and recover from crisis and to prevent relapses by linking emergency relief programmes with development, thus ensuring that the former is an asset for the latter.

Rehabilitation: action aimed at reconstructing and rehabilitating infrastructure that can save or support livelihoods. It overlaps with emergency relief and is typically targeted for achievement within the first two years after the conflict has ended.

Transition: the period following the signing of a peace agreement and the transition from an appointed interim government and before democratic elections take place.

Executive Summary

1. The African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework was developed through a broad consultative process facilitated by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Secretariat. The policy framework sets out an African agenda for post-conflict reconstruction which aims to, among other things, address the nexus between the peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. The framework intends to encourage an overall state of mutual consistency among the policies and programmes of, on the one hand, the African Union/NEPAD, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Member States, civil society and the financial and private sector in Africa, and on the other hand, the various international institutions, agencies, governments, NGOs and private contractors that constitute the external actors in the post-conflict reconstruction system. This policy framework provides a common platform for the diverse range of actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction systems to conceptualise, organise and prioritise policy responses. It is aimed at facilitating coherence in the assessment, planning, coordination and monitoring of post-conflict reconstruction systems by providing a common frame of reference and conceptual base for the broad range of multidisciplinary, multifunctional and multidimensional actors that collectively populate these systems.
2. This policy framework seeks to further the objectives of the AU/NEPAD with regards to post-conflict reconstruction as agreed upon at the second meeting of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee held in Abuja in March 2002. NEPAD envisions achieving these objectives by facilitating and coordinating activities at a strategic policy and an operational level that will support post-conflict reconstruction efforts and that will compliment the political, peacemaking and peacekeeping actions undertaken by the African Union.
3. Post-conflict reconstruction is understood as a complex system that provides for simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, avoid a relapse into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. Post-conflict reconstruction is ultimately aimed at addressing the root causes of a conflict and to lay the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace. Post -conflict reconstruction systems proceed through three broad phases, namely the emergency phase, the transition phase and the development phase; however, they should not be understood as absolute, fixed, time-bound or having clear boundaries.
4. The composition of each post-conflict reconstruction system is determined by the interaction of the specific internal and external actors present, the history of the conflict and the processes that resulted in a peace agreement. Post-conflict reconstruction systems have five dimensions: (1) security; (2) political transition, governance and participation; (3) socio-economic development; (4) human rights, justice and reconciliation; and (5) coordination, management and resource

mobilisation. These five dimensions need to be programmed to simultaneously, collectively and cumulatively develop momentum to sustainable peace.

5. While there are processes, phases and issues that can be said to be common to most countries emerging from conflict, one should recognise the uniqueness of each conflict system, in terms of its own particular socio-economic and political history, the root causes and immediate consequences of the conflict, and the specific configuration of the actors that populate the system. Further, as most intra-state conflicts in Africa are interlinked within regional conflict systems, country specific post-conflict reconstruction systems need to seek synergy with neighbouring systems to ensure coherence across regional conflict systems. Complex post-conflict reconstruction systems need to be flexible enough to respond rapidly to setbacks in one area or to changed circumstances in another.
6. The nexus between development, peace and security have become a central focus of post-conflict reconstruction thinking and practice over the last decade. The key policy tension in the post-conflict setting appears to be between economic efficiency and political stability. The need for, and benefits of, improved coherence is widely accepted today in the international multilateral governance context. It is recognised, on the one hand, that coordination is crucial to achieve coherence in the complex multidimensional post-conflict reconstruction environment, yet on the other hand, there seems to be no consensus on who should coordinate, what should be coordinated and how coordination should be undertaken. Thus, one of the crucial prerequisites for a coherent post-conflict reconstruction system is a clearly articulated overall strategy against which individual programmes can measure their own plans and progress.
7. There is a need to bring all the current strategic planning and funding processes together into one coherent overall country level strategic framework so that the political, security, humanitarian and development aspects of the overall post-conflict reconstruction system are synchronised and coordinated. Such an overall strategic framework needs to be linked to a monitoring and evaluation system so that the various dimensions, sectors and programmes that make up the system can adjust their plans according to the feedback received from others on progress made or setbacks experiences elsewhere in the system. An overall country level strategic framework will assist in coordinating the various constituent elements of the post-conflict reconstruction system around a common country strategy.
8. Externally driven post-conflict reconstruction processes that lack sufficient local ownership and participation are unsustainable. External actors should systematically develop the capacity of the internal actors and facilitate the scaling-down of their own role and the scaling-up of the role of the internal actors. Internal actors should be involved in assessment, planning and monitoring processes to the greatest extent possible. As the situation improves the participation of the internal actors should increase until they eventually take full ownership of this function. Moreover, there is a need to synchronise the rate of delivery by the external actors with the capacity for absorption of the internal actors. This entails programming those elements of the assistance package that

are not aimed at emergency relief and recovery over a longer term, and directing more of the assistance initially to building the capacities that would be required to absorb downstream assistance. Further, the needs of 'special needs groups' must be factored into planning and programming. Special needs groups are those groups or categories of internal actors that require programme responses that cater for their specific needs, such as: women, children, youth, the disabled, the elderly, ex-combatants, female ex-combatants, child soldiers IDPs, refugees, single-parent households, victims of sexual violence, HIV positive, and others.

9. In implementing this policy framework, the AU/NEPAD should undertake policy advocacy to inform and educate the broadest possible range of stakeholders about the existence and implementation of this framework. The AU/NEPAD should develop principles, standards and indicators for monitoring and evaluating post-conflict reconstruction efforts by internal and external actors. The AU/NEPAD can play a role in generating knowledge on post-conflict reconstruction and the implementation of this policy framework through lessons learned and best practices studies, specific country studies, projects aimed at generating standards and indicators, and studies focussed on the role and responsibilities of internal and external actors. The AU/NEPAD should support the work of RECs and the Member States in post-conflict reconstruction. The AU/NEPAD can also facilitate the mobilisation of resources for post-conflict reconstruction through, for example, facilitating actors in identifying programmes which are un- or under-funded at the regional and sub-regional level, developing monitoring mechanisms that can track funding, and support capacity building efforts that is aimed at improving internal capacity to source and manage resources. In particular, the AU/NEPAD should develop a funding facility that can be used to undertake, at short notice, multidisciplinary and multi-agency assessments and evaluations. The AU/NEPAD may provide a facilitation role with regards to mobilising resources for programmes that fall within the ambit of this policy framework.
10. The policy framework suggests that an AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit would be crucial in facilitating the implementation of this policy framework. It should seek to undertake advocacy; develop post-conflict reconstruction programmes; assist stakeholders in the processes of policy formulation, planning and evaluation; promote research on issues of common interests, and develop a monitoring and evaluation process.

Introduction

1. One of the key strategic objectives of the African Union (AU) is to promote the emergence of an African society built on the principles of rule of law, good governance and human security. The AU has identified as one of its priorities, the establishment of a peace and security management system comprising several elements: the Peace and Security Council; the Panel of the Wise; a Continental Early Warning System; the African Standby Force; the Military Staff Committee; and the Peace Fund. The key challenge for the continent is to operationalise these institutions and to develop the necessary policy mechanisms that will ensure that the institutions in the peace and security cluster are interconnected with the rest of the programmes of the AU/NEPAD and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), so that together they will have a system-wide impact on the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. This policy framework aims to contribute to this effort by addressing one of the remaining gaps in the African peace and security architecture, namely the nexus between the peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.
2. This policy framework sets out an African agenda for post-conflict reconstruction. It is intended to encourage an overall state of mutual consistency among the policies and programmes of, on the one hand the African Union/NEPAD, RECs, Member States, civil society and the financial and private sector in Africa, and on the other hand the various international institutions, agencies, governments, NGOs and private contractors that constitute the external actors in the post-conflict reconstruction system. In this context, the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework can be understood as the effort to ensure that the peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction systems in Africa are directed towards a common objective.
3. Each country's transition from conflict to peace should be informed by its own particular circumstances. Each specific post-conflict reconstruction system emerges in response to that conflict system's specific set of circumstances and it will thus be unique in its composition, prioritisation, timing and sequencing. At the same time, there are recurrent phases, dimensions and processes that are common to most, if not all, post-conflict reconstruction systems. This policy framework is an attempt to identify those common phases, dimensions and processes prevalent in the African experience.
4. Post-conflict reconstruction systems require an overarching strategic planning process that sets out the overall vision, determines priorities, identifies milestones and negotiates an appropriate network of responsibilities among the various internal and external actors that collectively make-up the system. This policy framework is intended to provide a common platform for the diverse range of actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction systems to conceptualise, organise and prioritise such policy responses. In this context the policy framework is intended to facilitate coherence in the assessment, planning, coordination and monitoring of post-conflict reconstruction systems by providing a common frame of reference and conceptual base for the broad range of multidisciplinary, multifunctional and multidimensional actors that collectively populate these systems.

Aim

5. To develop a post-conflict reconstruction policy framework that will ensure that the peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of any given post-conflict reconstruction system in Africa is directed towards the common objective of consolidating the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace and development.

Background

6. Africa's future depends on its capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflict. The continent has for the past 40 years been torn apart by inter-state, intra-state, ethnic, religious and resource conflicts. Not less than 26 armed conflicts erupted in Africa between 1963 and 1968 affecting the lives of 474 million people representing 61% of the population of the continent and claiming over 7 million lives.¹
7. Whilst the end of the Cold War led to many of its proxy wars in Africa coming to an end, the security vacuum left in its wake was filled with a new phenomenon of small scale civil wars that have caused more people to die in Africa over the last two decades than anywhere else on earth. For instance, in a study released in April 2003 the International Rescue Committee estimated that 3.3 million people have died as a result of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The 1994 Rwanda genocide claimed more than 800, 000 lives whilst in neighbouring Burundi, over 250, 000 people have died since 1993 because of civil war. Africa has the highest number of refugees (approx. 3,5 million) and internally displaced persons (approx. 13 million).
8. African conflict systems have not only killed millions of people, it has also displaced, maimed and traumatised many millions more, whilst sowing the seeds of future hate and division in the process. These conflicts have disrupted Africa's fragile post-colonial socio-cultural, political and economic systems and destroyed most of its transport and communication infrastructure and health and education services. In the process it has damaged the environment which, in turn, has contributed to further cycles of resource related conflicts. The cycle of conflict has severely undermined both African and foreign investor confidence, further weakened indigenous economic development, and increased dependence on foreign loans and assistance.
9. These conflicts have spurred a new commodity in the form of small-arms, created safe-havens and rear bases for international terrorism, and have encouraged the growth of African and international criminal networks that are involved in narcotics, the arms trade, illegal diamonds and other precious commodities, illegal logging, human trafficking and prostitution. In many cases resources that could or should have been spent on development has instead been diverted to funding conflicts, with some African governments spending US\$ 1 million a day or more on the prosecution of war.
10. These developments have resulted in a growing recognition, within African and beyond, that peace and development are interdependent. Without peace there can be no sustainable development, and without development it is impossible to establish enduring peace. As a result, the focus of international conflict management has increasingly shifted from peacekeeping, which was about ensuring the absence of violence, to post-conflict reconstruction and

peacebuilding, which has to do with managing the transition from violent conflict to sustainable peace and development.

11. In practise, however, successful conflict resolution has proven more elusive than we would generally like to believe. Research undertaken by Roy Licklider over the period 1945 to 1993 suggests that about half of all peace agreements fail in the first five-years after they have been signed². Independently the World Bank estimates that there is a 50% chance that a peace process may fail, and the stakes are even higher when natural resources are at stake³. The UN estimates that in Africa, the failure rate may be as high as 60%⁴.
12. There are many reasons why some peace processes are not sustainable. Some relate to the motives of the parties to the conflict, some relate to the distorted incentives of conflict entrepreneurs and spoilers whilst others are associated with shortcomings in the support provided by the external actors. This policy framework seeks to identify and address a number of these key failures in the African context.

The Policy Framework Development Process

Consultation Process

13. The African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework was developed through a broad consultative process facilitated by the NEPAD Secretariat. Following internal NEPAD conceptualisation, the Secretariat embarked on a wide consultative process with a broad range of post-conflict reconstruction stakeholders. This process included consultations with numerous academics, policy makers, international civil servants, development partners, civil society representatives and officials from governments and intergovernmental organisations from both the African continent and beyond.
14. Through this process the Secretariat identified a core group of researchers whom it commissioned to write conceptual issue papers on the five dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction: security; political transition, governance and participation; socio-economic development; justice, human rights and reconciliation; and coordination, management and resource mobilisation. External assessors were then commissioned to review and evaluate the appropriateness of the concept papers.
15. This process culminated in a continental workshop convened in October 2004 in Johannesburg where AU/NEPAD Member States, African civil society and a number of Africa's development partners had the opportunity to consider the conceptual issue papers and to deliberate on how the issues they raised should be reflected in this policy framework.
16. Once the first draft policy framework was written by an expert working group it was systematically shared with a wider circle of stakeholders. At every phase of the process another draft version of the policy framework was produced that incorporated the feedback received during the previous stage in the process. Once the consultation phase was exhausted the final proposed policy framework was officially submitted to the NEPAD Secretariat.

NEPAD Vision and Objectives

17. NEPAD recognises that “peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development.” The African Union Commission (AUC) and NEPAD structures are tasked with the responsibility of providing support services to the AU, the African leaders and country members of the AU in realising the implementation of the overarching socio-economic goals of NEPAD⁵; to reduce poverty, place countries on the path to sustainable development and improve development performance. NEPAD, as a programme of the AU, has a responsibility to foster these pre-conditions of sustainable development throughout the continent, in particular, in countries emerging from conflict.
18. The objective of NEPAD in terms of post-conflict reconstruction was laid out at the second meeting of the HSGIC held in Abuja in March 2002. The HSGIC specifically requested the NEPAD Sub-Committee on Peace and Security to: “support efforts at developing early warning systems at continental and regional levels, including the development of strategic analysis and database systems; support post-conflict reconstruction and development in all affected countries, including the rehabilitation of national infrastructure, the population as well as refugees and internally displaced persons, with a special focus on sustainable programmes of disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation; support efforts to curb the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons in Africa; support efforts to promote democracy, good governance and respect for human rights through appropriate policy and institutional reforms; and, assist in resource mobilisation for the African Union Peace Fund”⁶.
19. For purposes of achieving the above mentioned objective, the NEPAD Strategic Plan 2004-2007 further elaborated on its strategic goals in terms of peace and security: supporting the AU and the RECs; supporting national focal points; coordinating and harmonising the efforts of external actors; addressing the security needs in post-conflict countries; supporting efforts towards justice and reconciliation; furthering the economic and social well-being of the citizens of post-conflict countries, and working towards good governance and equalising citizen participation.
20. NEPAD envisions achieving these strategic goals by facilitating and coordinating activities at a strategic policy, and an operational level. In this regard, the NEPAD Secretariat’s Mission statement is: “To provide a platform to harness relevant knowledge for informed policy formulation and provide coordination services to the countries of the African Union for the development and implementation of NEPAD programmes through expertise, technology and organisational institutional support”⁷. NEPAD is uniquely situated to develop support mechanisms for post-conflict reconstruction efforts and to compliment the political, peacemaking and peacekeeping actions undertaken by the AU.

The Relationship between the AU/NEPAD and the UN

21. UN General Assembly Resolution 57/7 of 2002 endorsed NEPAD as the strategic framework for cooperation for UN programmes on the continent. At

the 4th Regional Consultations of the UN Agencies Working in Africa, held in October 2002 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, it was decided that the UN System would support NEPAD Action Plans on a regional level by establishing thematic clusters to serve as an operational framework to support NEPAD and as a reporting mechanism⁸. Amongst others, a Governance, Peace and Security cluster, and a sub-cluster on Post-Conflict and Humanitarian Response was established.

22. In February 2003, following consultations on peace and security issues between the NEPAD Secretariat and the AU Commission, the AU-NEPAD Peace and Security Agenda (APSA) was adopted and endorsed by the NEPAD HSGIC. It consisted of the following eight priorities:

- Developing mechanisms, institution building processes and support instruments for achieving peace and security in Africa;
- Improving capacity for, and coordination of, early action for conflict prevention, management and resolution including the development of peace support operations capabilities;
- Improving early warning capacity in Africa through strategic analysis and support;
- Prioritising strategic security issues as follows:
 - Promoting an African definition and action on disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reconstruction (DDRR) efforts in post-conflict situations;
 - Coordinating and ensuring effective implementation of African efforts aimed at preventing and combating terrorism.
- Ensuring efficient and consolidated action for the prevention, combating and eradicating the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons;
- Improving the security sector and the capacity for good governance as related to peace and security;
- Generating minimum standards for application in the exploitation and management of Africa's resources (including non-renewable resources) in areas affected by conflict;
- Assisting in resource mobilisation for the African Union Peace Fund and for regional initiatives aimed at preventing, managing and resolving conflicts on the continent⁹.

23. This common AU-NEPAD peace and security agenda forms the basis for interaction with relevant partners and stakeholders. This policy framework seeks to increase dialogue with multilateral and developmental partners, such as the UN regarding post-conflict reconstruction efforts and also increase African ownership and participation in terms of programme development.

The Post-Conflict Reconstruction System

24. For the purposes of this policy framework, post-conflict reconstruction is understood as a complex system that provides for simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, avoid a relapse into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace.

25. Post-conflict reconstruction starts when hostilities end, typically in the form of a cease-fire agreement or peace agreement. It requires a coherent and coordinated multidimensional response by a broad range of internal and external actors, including government, civil society, the private sector and international agencies. These various actors undertake a range of interrelated programmes that span the security, political, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions of society and that collectively and cumulatively addresses both the causes and consequences of the conflict and, in the long-term, establishes the foundations for social-justice and sustainable peace and development¹⁰. In the short term post-conflict reconstruction is designed to assist in stabilising the peace process and prevent a relapse into conflict, but its ultimate aim is to address the root causes of a conflict and to lay the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace¹¹.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Phases

26. There seems to be a general agreement that most post-conflict reconstruction systems proceed through three broad phases, namely the emergency phase, the transition phase and the development phase. These phases should not be understood as absolute, fixed, time-bound or having clear boundaries. Some countries that form part of a regional conflict system may be in different phases of post-conflict reconstruction. Similarly, different geographic, ethnic, language or religious regions or groups within a country emerging from conflict are likely to be in different phases. Any phased approach should also allow for considerable overlap in the periods of transition between phases. Planning or analysis based on these phases should thus take into account that these phases are not based on causal or chronological progression, but are determined by a wide-range of complex feedback and reinforcement mechanisms.

27. The **emergency phase** is the period that follows immediately after the end of hostilities and has a dual focus, namely the establishment of a safe and secure environment and an emergency response to the immediate consequences of the conflict through humanitarian relief programmes. The emergency phase is characterised by the influx of external actors usually in the form of a military intervention to ensure basic security, and by humanitarian actors responding to the humanitarian consequences of the conflict.

28. If there is still a high degree of instability, the military intervention may take the form of a stability operation. Such stability operations are likely to be undertaken by one of the sub-regional brigades of the African Standby Force or a coalition of the willing. Once the situation has been sufficiently stabilised, or if it was relatively secure from the onset of the cease-fire, the military force could form part of a multi-dimensional peace operation deployed by the AU or the UN.

29. The humanitarian actors will typically include various elements of the UN System, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a wide range of humanitarian donor agencies and NGOs. The emergency response will be coordinated by UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) supported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). If a UN peace operation is deployed the HC is likely to be one of the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSG).

30. Preparations will be underway for medium-term rehabilitation and recovery and longer-term development actions and it is likely that some form of needs assessment process will be undertaken during the emergency phase, often culminating in an international donor conference. Internal actors are typically pre-occupied with basic survival and the re-organisation of their social and political systems. As a result external actors often play a prominent role during the emergency phase but they should nevertheless seek every opportunity to involve and consult with internal actors. Depending on the situation the emergency phase typically ranges from 90 days to a year.

Table 1: Goals within each element during the three phases of post-conflict reconstruction ¹²


	Emergency Phase	Transition Phase	Development Phase
Security	Establish a safe and secure environment	Develop legitimate and stable security institutions	Consolidate local capacity
Political Transition, Governance, & Participation	Determine the governance structures, foundations for participation, and processes for political transition	Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
Socio-economic Development	Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	Establish foundations, structures, and processes for development	Institutionalise long-term developmental programme
Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation	Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	Build the legal system and processes for reconciliation and monitoring human rights	Established and functional legal system based on accepted international norms
Coordination and Management	Develop consultative and coordination mechanism for internal and external actors	Develop technical bodies to facilitate programme development	Develop internal sustainable processes and capacity for coordination

31. The **transition phase** derives its name from the transition from an appointed interim government, followed by, in the shortest reasonable period, some form of election or legitimate traditional process to (s)elect a transitional government, constituent assembly or some other body responsible for writing a new constitution or otherwise laying the foundation for a future political dispensation. The transitional stage typically ends with an election, run according to the provisions of the new constitution, after which a fully sovereign and legitimately elected government is in power.
32. The transitional phase focuses on developing legitimate and sustainable internal capacity. The focus shifts from emergency relief to recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Programmes include efforts aimed at rehabilitation of basic social services like health and education, rebuilding the economic infrastructure, short-term job creation through labour intensive public works, and establishing mechanisms for governance and participation¹³. The security sector is likely to be engaged in transforming the existing police, defence and other security agencies so that they can become representative of the communities they serve and so that they are re-orientated to their appropriate roles in the post-conflict environment.
33. The relationship between the internal and external players should reflect a growing partnership and a gradual hand-over of ever-increasing responsibility to the internal actors. There should be specific programmes aimed at building the capacity of the internal actors. The transitional phase typically ranges from one to three years.
34. The **development phase** is aimed at supporting the newly elected government and the civil society with a broad range of programmes aimed at

fostering reconciliation, boosting socio-economic reconstruction and supporting ongoing development programmes across the five dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction highlighted in the next section.

35. The peace operation, and especially the military and police components, is likely to draw down and withdraw during the early stages of this phase. In the case of a UN peace operation there will be a transition of responsibilities to the UN Country Team and internal actors. The roles and responsibilities of the external actors will change from a post-conflict reconstruction posture back to a more traditional development posture in the latter stages of the sustainable development phase, in other words, the internal actors develop the capacity to take full responsibility for their own planning and coordination, and the external actors provide technical assistance and support.
36. The post-conflict sustainable development phase typically ranges from four to ten years, but the country is likely to continue to address conflict related consequences in its development programming for decades thereafter.
37. The transition from one phase to the next is usually determined by the degree to which various conditions within each phase are met and the level of engagement required by the various actors at each level. However, these transitions are not linear and therefore programmes undertaken in one phase are likely to continue for a period into another phase.

Figure 2: Phases and Activities of Post-Conflict Reconstruction¹⁴



The Dimensions of a Post-Conflict Reconstruction System

38. Each post-conflict reconstruction system is determined by the interaction of the specific internal and external actors present, the history of the conflict and the processes that resulted in some form of peace agreement. Although the specific configuration of the post-conflict reconstruction system will be unique, it is possible to identify a broad framework of dimensions, phases and issues that appear to be common to most post-conflict reconstruction systems. There seems to be general agreement that post-conflict reconstruction systems contain the following five dimensions: (1) security; (2) political transition, governance and participation; (3) socio-economic development; (4) human rights, justice and reconciliation; and (5) coordination, management and resource mobilisation. A broad range of programme areas within each dimension is provided in Table 2.
39. The **security** dimension is responsible for ensuring a safe and secure environment that will enable the civilian humanitarian actors to undertake emergency relief, recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration operations which will prepare the ground for full-fledged reconstruction programmes. In the transitional phase the emphasis gradually shifts to security sector reform aimed at the development of appropriate, credible and professional internal security services. Programmes include security sector review, reform and transformation; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); small arms reduction strategies, and enhancing regional security arrangements.
40. The **political transition, governance and participation** dimension involves the development of legitimate and effective political and administrative institutions, ensuring participatory processes, and supporting political transition. Aside from facilitating elections, programmes include strengthening public sector management and administration; establishing a representative constituting process; reviving local governance; strengthening the legislature; broadening the participation of civil society in decision-making process, and building the capacity of political parties and civil society for effective governance while giving former rebel groups a chance to turn themselves into viable political parties if they so wish. There is typically a focus on engendering a culture of rule of law based on existing or newly formulated constitutions, by supporting justice sector reform and related institutions. The transition phase should focus on the need to ensure plurality and inclusiveness, dialogue and the participation of all constituencies and stakeholders. During the development phase it is important to encourage and develop broad-based leadership at all levels; to build a shared purpose for the nation; to develop national capacity in terms of skills, mobilisation of resources and reviving national infrastructure; to promote good political and economic governance; develop checks and balances to measure progress; and finally, to institute a culture of long-term assessment of the impact of post-conflict reconstruction activities and programmes.
41. The **socio-economic development** dimension covers the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic social and economic services as well as the return, resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of populations displaced during the conflict including refugees and IDPs. This dimension needs to focus on an approach that ensures effective dynamic linkages between activities related to the provision of emergency humanitarian needs and longer-term measures for economic recovery, sustained growth and poverty reduction. It is also crucial that balance is struck on the relationship

between social capital and social cohesion at all stages of the post-conflict reconstruction process. Programmes to be implemented in this dimension include emergency humanitarian assistance; rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of physical infrastructure; provision of social services such as education, health, and social welfare; and enhancing economic growth and development through employment generation, trade and investment, and legal and regulatory reform.

42. The **human rights, justice, and reconciliation** dimension is concerned with ensuring accountable judicial systems, promoting reconciliation and nation building, and enshrining human rights. Programmes include justice sector reform and establishing the rule of law; promoting national dialogue and reconciliation processes such as truth and reconciliation commissions, and monitoring human rights. A point often raised is the need to make definitions of human rights, justice and reconciliation accessible to all through the use of local languages and include these concepts in school curricula. A system, which accommodates both restorative and retributive justice, is recommended for Africa, which focuses on African values and includes African traditional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Post-conflict reconstruction programmes within this dimension should also ensure creating an environment conducive to peace, justice and reconciliation; increasing the involvement of women at all levels; reparations, and providing participatory processes which include vulnerable groups. There is the need to rebuild trust and cross cutting social relationships which span across religious, ethnic, class, geographic and generational cleavages in war-torn societies. This is an investment in social capital which underlies the ability of a society to mediate everyday conflicts before they become violent conflicts, and through building state-people relationships it advances social cohesion.
43. **Coordination, management and resource mobilisation** are cross-cutting functions that are critical for the successful implementation of all the dimensions and the coherence of the post-conflict reconstruction system as a whole. All these dimensions are interlinked and interdependent. No single dimension can achieve the goal of the post-conflict reconstruction system – addressing the consequences and causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on its own. The success of each individual programme in the system is a factor of the contribution that this programme makes to the achievement of the overall post-conflict reconstruction objective. It is only when the combined and sustained effort proves successful in the long term that the investment made in each individual programme can be said to have been worthwhile.
44. Coordination entails developing strategies, determining objectives, planning, sharing information, the division of roles and responsibilities, and mobilising resources. Coordination is concerned with synchronizing the mandates, roles and activities of the various stakeholders and actors in the post-conflict reconstruction system and achieves this through joint efforts aimed at prioritisation, sequencing and harmonisation of programmes to meet common objectives.

Table 2: The Dimensions of a Post-Conflict Reconstruction System¹⁵

Security	<p>Providing a Safe and Secure Environment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Control of belligerents - Territorial security - Protection of the populace, including returnees, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) - Protection of key individuals, infrastructure and institutions - Small arms reduction strategies - Police customs - Border patrol - Intelligence services
	<p>Security Sector Governance, Reform & Transformation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Armed Forces - Non-military security forces
	<p>Disarmament, Demobilisation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRR)</p>
	<p>Regional Security</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regional security arrangements

Political Transition, Governance and Participation	Support the Peace Process and Oversee the Political Transition
	<p>Democratisation and Participation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political parties (formation, training) - Civil society (development, enabling environment) - Media (public information, training, professionalism/ ethics) <p>Elections</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Planning, assistance, and execution - Monitoring - Citizen outreach
	<p>Governance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National constituting process (National dialogue, constitution) - Transitional governance - Capacity building and strengthening the public sector and civil service (revenue generation, training, infrastructure) - Legislative strengthening - Local governance - Transparency and accountability - Policy development
	Conflict Prevention and Dispute Resolution

Socio-economic development	<p>Humanitarian Assistance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Food security - Public health - Shelter - Refugees/IDPs -
	<p>Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reconstruction</p>
	<p>Physical Infrastructure</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Roads - Ports - Airports - Electricity - Telecommunications -
	<p>Social Services:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Health - Education - Social Welfare - Population Registration
	<p>Economy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic strategy and assistance - Physical Infrastructure - Employment generation - Restoration of productive sectors - Markets - Legal and regulatory reform - International trade - Investment - Banking and finance

Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation	Human Rights <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capacity building - Monitoring
	Truth & Reconciliation Commission Processes
	National Dialogue, Nation Building & Confidence Building <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Social cohesion and social capital
	Justice Sector Reform/Rule of Law <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Law enforcement - Judicial system - Laws - Corrections - International courts and tribunals
Coordination, Management and Resource Mobilisation	Strategic policy level <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Integrated coordination mechanism - Consultative mechanisms - Capacity building and strengthening of national coordination - Coordination between internal and external actors - Mobilisation of resources
	Management and implementation level <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Technical bodies (translate frameworks into programmes)
	Resource Mobilisation

Key Programme Implementation Issues

Uniqueness vs. Universality

45. Whilst there are processes, phases and issues that can be said to be common to most countries emerging from conflict, the uniqueness of each conflict system, in terms of its own particular socio-economic and political history, the root causes and immediate consequences of the conflict, and the specific configuration of the actors that populate the system, should be recognised. Each post-conflict reconstruction programme should be designed to meet the specific needs of the system it is meant to serve. This does not imply that programme design should ignore best practises and the institutional memory generated by other post-conflict reconstruction experiences. Rather, it should be extremely cautious when successful programmes are imported from another experience, and serious consideration should be given to how it should be adjusted to take into account the particular circumstances and dynamics of the specific system where the programme will be applied.

Regional Conflict Systems

46. Most intra-state conflicts in Africa are interlinked within regional conflict systems, for example, the Great Lakes, Nile Basin or Mano River. In the Mano River conflict system, for instance, some combatants in Liberia are holding on to their weapons because they anticipate that the disarmament process in Cote d'Ivoire may be more lucrative. Others have found a livelihood in exporting conflict and are selling their services anywhere within the regional conflict system. They will continue to contribute to instability in the region if not successfully disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated. A good practise that has emerged thus far is the initiative by the three UN peace operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire to coordinate their policies and to cooperate in logistics and related matters. Country specific post-conflict reconstruction systems need to seek synergy with neighbouring systems to ensure coherence across regional conflict systems.

Complex Programming

47. The current organisational structures (bureaucratic), cultures (hierarchical), financing (risk-averse) and evaluation criteria (focussed on short-term outputs rather than long-term impact) of most external actors are not compatible with the needs of a complex post-conflict reconstruction system. As a result the programmes undertaken by most external actors often lack the flexibility, patience, creativity and responsiveness required to have a meaningful impact on the beneficiaries they are intended to assist. Individual agencies are constrained by their clearly defined mandates. As a result donors and relief agencies often become victims of their own mandate driven behaviour, which disconnects them from the larger post-conflict reconstruction system of which they are part and which their specialised contribution is meant to serve.

48. There is thus a need to balance the benefits of specialisation with the need for an integrated and coherent overall effort. If not, these specialised

programmes are unlikely to discount the effect other programmes and the system as a whole is having on the beneficiaries. It is logical that the overall system is likely to have a far greater influence on the beneficiaries than any individual programme. Whilst specialisation has important benefits, the nature of post-conflict reconstruction systems necessitate that individual programmes be part of an integrated or interconnected system-wide response.

49. However, post-conflict reconstruction has not yet developed its own distinct intellectual and institutional identity and form, and as a result it lacks the depth of experience, specialisation and clarity that exists in the peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and development paradigms. As a result, in most post-conflict reconstruction settings these paradigms co-exist side-by-side instead of coming together to form an integrated post-conflict reconstruction system. Integration, in this context, does not refer to institutional fusion, but rather to policy cohesion and programme synchronisation. The collective and cumulative effect of such cohesion across all the dimensions, sectors, and ultimately individual programmes that make up the post-conflict reconstruction system result, over-time, in a positive momentum towards social justice and sustainable peace and development.
50. Complex conflict systems have not responded well to traditional linear conflict management approaches, that is to say, interventions that are premised on a chronological or sequential strategy that proceed in clear phases from conflict prevention to peace making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It is now recognised that even under 'ideal circumstances', for example where all hostilities have ended, post-conflict processes do not necessarily proceed chronologically in sequential phases from a state of violence to eventual sustainable peace. Complex conflict systems are fluid and progress is registered unevenly in different dimensions and in different geographical areas or among different language, religious or ethnic groups. The non-linear character of conflict systems needs to be factored into the design and structure of the post-conflict reconstruction system.
51. The various dimensions of the post-conflict reconstruction system – political, security, socio-economic and reconciliation – need to be programmed to simultaneously, collectively and cumulatively develop momentum to sustainable peace. This implies that complex post-conflict reconstruction systems should not delay responding to root causes until the immediate consequences of the conflict have been addressed. Nor should development initiatives be delayed until security can be guaranteed for it may be a critical ingredient in securing a stable environment.
52. The new realisation that some of the programmes that were sequenced in the past could, depending on the specific circumstances, yield better results when undertaken concurrently, have resulted in more pragmatic cross sectoral cooperation, and have increased the need for joint planning, coordination and monitoring. Complex post-conflict reconstruction systems need to be flexible enough to respond rapidly to setbacks in one area or to changed circumstances in another. This can be achieved through richly interconnected coordination and monitoring processes that would distribute feedback throughout the system so that programmes can adjust their own plans according to setbacks or successes elsewhere in the system.

Strategic Coherence

53. The nexus between development, peace and security have become a central focus of post-conflict reconstruction thinking and practice over the last decade¹⁶. The key policy tension in the post-conflict setting appears to be between economic efficiency and political stability. The need for, and benefits of, improved coherence is widely accepted today in the international multilateral governance context. Coherence, in this context, can be understood as the effort to ensure that the peace, security and development dimensions of an intervention in a particular crisis are directed towards a common objective¹⁷.
54. Although approximately twenty countries have experienced some form of post-conflict reconstruction intervention over the last decade, no generic coordination model has yet emerged that can be further developed and refined for future interventions¹⁸. One reason why coherence has proven so elusive is the lack of a shared understanding of the role of coordination¹⁹. Some external actors see coordination as a vehicle to bring order among the many different agencies whilst others resist coordination because they associate it with losing control over their own independence²⁰. The common refrain is that everybody wants to coordinate but no one wants to be coordinated. Whilst it is recognised, on the one hand, that coordination is crucial if we want to achieve coherence in the complex multidimensional post-conflict reconstruction environment, on the other, there seems to be no consensus on who should coordinate, what should be coordinated and how coordination should be undertaken.
55. The lack of coherence between programmes in the humanitarian relief and development spheres and those in the peace and security spheres have been highlighted by various recent evaluation reports and best practice studies²¹. For example, the Joint *Utstein* Study of peacebuilding, that analyzed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway over the last decade, has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level, what it terms a 'strategic deficit', as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding²². The *Utstein* study found that more than 55% of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy.
56. Thus, one of the crucial prerequisites for a coherent post-conflict reconstruction system is a clearly articulated overall strategy against which individual programmes can benchmark their own plans and progress. The overall post-conflict reconstruction strategy is the strategic direction of the operation, taken as a whole, as produced by the cumulative and collective planning efforts of all the programmes and agencies in the system. There is a need to bring all the current strategic planning and funding processes together into one coherent overall country level strategic framework so that the political, security, humanitarian and development aspects of the overall post-conflict reconstruction system are synchronised and coordinated. Such an overall strategic framework needs to be linked to a monitoring and evaluation system so that the various dimensions, sectors and programmes that make up the system can adjust their plans according to the feedback received from others on progress made or setbacks experienced elsewhere in the system²³.
57. An overall country level strategic framework will assist in coordinating the various constituent elements of the post-conflict reconstruction system around a common country strategy. Such coordination should aim to achieve meaningful cooperation across the analytical, planning, operational

management and evaluation functions of the various agencies and organisations that populate the system. Strategic coherence should be fostered through collaborative assessment and planning processes that produces and maintain a common country strategy. The common country strategy should be monitored and adjusted on an ongoing basis.

58. Some elements of the post-conflict reconstruction system, such as the members of the UN System, will naturally be more cohesive than others, but there should be an overall drive towards greater synergy and synchronisation among all the internal and external actors in the post-conflict reconstruction system. This does not necessarily imply that the various constituent elements have to be operationally integrated although such integration should not be ruled out wherever it is relevant and can add value.
59. Common strategies are built on mutual respect for the mandates and roles of the various actors that populate the system. The principles of any one sector, for instance humanitarian assistance, should never be subservient to any other. The various actors need to achieve a functional level of dynamic (as opposed to passive) coexistence that ensures that their respective programmatic efforts will have a positive cumulative impact on the conflict system as a whole.

The Relationship between Internal and External Actors

60. Internal actors are considered to include the parties to the conflict, the government, political parties, civil society and the private sector of any given country emerging from conflict. External actors include donors, foreign governments, multilateral bodies such as the UN, AU, EU and International Finance Institutions (IFIs), foreign contractors, international organisations such as the ICRC and the IOM, and NGOs that are engaged in a particular country's transition²⁴.
61. It is widely recognised that externally driven post-conflict reconstruction processes that lack sufficient local ownership and participation are unsustainable. They cause resentment and fail to integrate the underlying socio-cultural belief systems that shape the worldview of the internal actors. The relationship is further complicated by the unequal power balance between internal and external actors, where the latter is empowered by virtue of being the benefactor. Achieving a balanced and meaningful partnership between external and internal actors is thus one of the critical success factors for any post-conflict reconstruction system.
62. However, even when external actors have adopted policies that encourage local ownership and participation, they typically find it difficult to identify credible internal actors with whom they can enter into a meaningful partnership. External actors report that they often fail to identify credible internal partners because of ambiguous constituencies; conflicting claims of ownership and lack of capacity (in, for example, education, language skills, time, and institutions).
63. External actors also blame their own institutional cultures that emphasise output rather than impact. The pressure to rapidly respond, achieve planned outputs and to disburse funds in a fixed time-frame often result in external actors compromising on the time and resources invested in achieving meaningful local ownership. Consultations undertaken under pressure, for instance during rapid needs assessments, often serve to legitimise pre-

conceived perceptions rather than add value by incorporating the independent opinions, analysis and prioritisation of the internal actors. External actors often fail to recognise that true sustainability necessitate that the internal actors should own the problems as well as the solutions.

64. In the immediate aftermath of conflict internal actors are typically unorganised and in disarray. A community emerging from conflict usually has to cope with a political, socio-cultural and economic system that has been severely disrupted by the conflict experience. Internal actors are likely to be largely pre-occupied with basic survival and coping mechanisms. In many cases, the educated and experienced administrators, managers, academics and professionals have left the country, and some of those that have remained may be excluded from the post-conflict reconstruction effort as they are associated with the former discredited regime.
65. In this context the internal actors often feel intimidated by the momentum, scope and depth of the external intervention. They may be overwhelmed by the pressure to respond to all the assessments, proposals and plans generated by the influx of external actors. They often are intimidated by the education, experience, organisation, scope and resources of the external actors. They have to rapidly adapt, not only to their own changed environment, but also to a new externally driven paradigm with its own vocabulary, actors and mandates. As a result the internal actors often feel that they have lost control over their own destiny. New leaders emerge as some internal actors gain prominence because they are better able to master the relationship with the external actors. However, this is typically as a result of some time spent outside the country which often also means that these internal actors lack a credible local support base.
66. The problems associated with the internal/external actor interface have made their own adverse contributions to many failed post-conflict reconstruction processes in the past. Cumulatively these interface problems result in differences in the respective analyses, by internal and external actors, of what constitute the root causes of conflict, its immediate consequences, where the priorities lie and how best these causes and consequences can be addressed. The problems associated with the interface between internal and external actors should thus receive particular attention in any post-conflict reconstruction system.
67. This policy framework's emphasis on internal actors is based on the recognition that development processes cannot succeed without internal actors taking ownership of the post-conflict reconstruction process²⁵. The principle of local ownership and participation is widely acknowledged and appears in most policy documents and codes of conduct, but in reality it has proven difficult to implement.
68. To improve this situation the external actors should systematically develop the capacity of the internal actors and facilitate the scaling-down of their own role and the scaling-up of the role of the internal actors. Internal actors should be involved in assessment, planning and monitoring processes to the greatest extent possible. As the situation improves the participation of the internal actors should increase until they eventually take full ownership of this function.

Aid Harmonisation

69. Newly formed interim, transitional or elected post-conflict governments are overwhelmed when confronted with the task of having to engage, or in some cases take the lead, in coordinating the external actors involved in the post-conflict reconstruction system. World Bank and UNDP research found that aid coordination, reporting and evaluation systems associated with absorbing aid generates considerable human resource and administrative costs for the recipient country²⁶. They estimate that if a typical African country manages 600 projects, this would translate into 2,400 quarterly reports a year submitted to different agencies in different formats; approximately 1,000 annual missions, appraisals and evaluations, each of which will require meetings with key officials and official responses²⁷.
70. Absorbing post-conflict reconstruction assistance implies re-directing scarce high-end human resources to managing the relations with external actors that would have otherwise been available to provide services to the people of the country. Foreign assistance is critically important for these countries emerging out of conflict, but it should be recognised that it does have unintended consequences, including absorbing high-end human and administrative resources that could otherwise have been directed to serving the local community.
71. These costs can be reduced through improved coordination and enhanced resource managing systems and processes, aimed at streamlining the interface between the internal and external actors and limiting the impact on the host bureaucracy. The Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonisation goes some way to address this dilemma in the development paradigm. It specifies four main principles of harmonisation: recipient countries coordinate development assistance, donors align their aid with recipient countries' priorities and systems, donors streamline aid delivery and donors adopt policies, procedures and incentives that foster harmonisation²⁸.
72. This policy framework endorses the Rome Declaration but notes that in its present formulation its direct applicability is limited to the development phase of post-conflict reconstruction. Creative ways need to be found to apply the spirit of the Rome Declaration to the emergency and transitional phases as well.
73. Aid conditionalities that link assistance with specific external political or security priorities, for instance the 'war on terror', distort the relationship between internal and external actors. Incentives to foster objectives such as good governance and democratisation may be coherent with the overall goals of the post-conflict reconstruction system but should be directed at fostering accountability between a government and the people it serves rather than making internal leaders accountable to external actors.
74. As the post-conflict reconstruction system moves through the transitional phase and into the development phase the internal and external actors should establish processes that provide for the external actors to be accountable to their beneficiaries. One such process at the national level should occur through parliament but creative ways should be sought to replicate the process at all levels. This will empower the internal actors, generate impact feedback for the external actors and foster long-term systems of accountability in the country.

Synchronising Delivery & Absorption

75. External actors should ensure that their combined and cumulative effect on the internal actors is positive, consistent and delivered at a rate that can be absorbed. If the ultimate aim of the post-conflict reconstruction system is sustainable peace and development then the overall strategy and the pace of its implementation should reflect the optimal balance between delivery and absorption. The legacy of violent conflict typically results in the internal actors having a much lower capacity to absorb assistance than the external actors anticipate. Post-conflict reconstruction programmes are typically planned at the outset as intense three to four year interventions and the bulk of the money theoretically available for these programmes is made available in the early stages of the process. Although well intended, the result is that large amounts are spent on programmes that the internal actors simply cannot absorb.
76. Instead, there is a need to synchronise the rate of delivery by the external actors with the capacity for absorption of the internal actors. In general, this translates into programming those elements of the assistance package that are not aimed at emergency relief and recovery over a longer-term, and directing more of the assistance initially to building the capacities that would be required to absorb downstream assistance. The World Bank has suggested that internal actors are best placed to absorb programmes in year 4 to 7, in other words towards the end of the transitional period and the beginning of the development phase. The short-term high-impact approach currently favoured is not conducive to sustainable post-conflict reconstruction and ultimately results in higher costs to both the internal and external actors.

Special Needs Groups

77. The needs of special needs groups need to be factored into planning and programming. Special needs groups are those groups or categories of internal actors that need programme responses that cater for their specific needs, such as: women, children, youth, the disabled, the elderly, ex-combatants, female ex-combatants, child soldiers IDPs, refugees, single-parent households, victims of sexual violence, HIV positive, and others. In some cases generic programmes can cause even greater vulnerability for special needs groups if steps are not taken to mitigate against such consequences, whilst in other cases a special focus on a specific group can have a disproportionate impact on the overall situation. Programmes focussed on the special needs of women in the post-conflict environment impact on household livelihood, family health, education, and so on, and thus tend to have positive effects far beyond the initial target group. Similarly, effective DDR programmes that successfully reintegrate ex-combatants into society impact not only on the security dimension, but on the socio-economic development and reconciliation dimensions.

Diaspora

78. The potential role of the Diaspora in post-conflict reconstruction environments should not be underestimated. The financial contributions of Diaspora can be

used for positive development or can be diverted to potential “spoilers” intent on maintaining the conflict. Remittances to Africa are a major source of foreign currency for low-income developing countries. The World Bank’s Report “Global Development Finance 2005: Mobilising Finance and Managing Vulnerability” notes that remittances to developing countries increased by US \$10 billion (8 percent) in 2004, reaching a total of US \$126 billion. Remittances to many smaller states form a significant share of that country’s GDP. The Report further found that 15 percent (US \$80 billion) of all remittances sent to developing countries in 2002 went to African countries, which represented 1.3 percent of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa and 2.2 percent of GDP for the Middle East and North Africa. Programmatic planning for post-conflict reconstruction efforts should consider how best the potential positive influence of the Diaspora can be harnessed and channelled towards initiatives that will complement development initiatives and stimulate pro-poor economic growth.

79. The dataset of the World Bank Report only reflects officially recorded remittances. Flows through informal channels are believed to be extensive. Less than two-thirds of African countries, and only one-third of sub-Saharan countries report remittance data. Weak financial systems and regulation policies often result in funds flowing via informal means to undesirable “spoilers”. The World Bank estimates that in many African countries the addition of informal flows is of such a magnitude that net flows in fact far exceed foreign direct investment. Ensuring that positive reform of financial policies and regulations is part of an overall post-conflict reconstruction programme is thus vitally important to mitigate the role of “spoilers” and encourage the divergence of remittances for development projects.

Policy Implementation

African Union/NEPAD

80. **Policy Advocacy:** The African Union/NEPAD should inform and educate the broadest possible range of stakeholders about the existence and implementation of the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework. They should engage and lobby both the internal and external actors in any given post-conflict setting, and participate in or initiate forums where this policy framework and its implementation can be discussed among the various stakeholders engaged in any given country emerging from conflict.
81. **Mutual Monitoring & Evaluation:** The AU/NEPAD, in consultation with other stakeholders, should develop principles, standards and indicators for post-conflict reconstruction. Once developed and accepted the AU/NEPAD could facilitate initiatives, in conjunction with development partners, to mutually monitor and evaluate the degree to which internal and external actors in specific post-conflict settings are aware of and have implemented such principles and standards. A mutual and inclusive evaluation process based on predetermined standards and indicators can serve as a meaningful tool to stimulate dialogue among internal and external actors. The AU/NEPAD and RECs can assist African Member States that are emerging from conflict, especially those already in the development phase, with establishing national monitoring and evaluation systems. Although most external actors commit themselves to alignment behind national strategies and programmes, very few, if any, are subject to evaluation by internal actors or recipient countries.

Mutual evaluations will further strengthen the symbiotic internal/external actor relationship and it will encourage transparency and build mutual trust. They could pay attention to issues such as the alignment of external assistance to the priorities and needs identified by internal actors, the degree to which national ownership is supported by relevant capacity building initiatives, and other relevant elements highlighted in this policy framework²⁹.

82. **Knowledge Management:** The AU/NEPAD should play a leading role in the generation of knowledge related to post-conflict reconstruction in general, and the implementation of this policy framework in particular. This should include lessons learned and best practices studies, specific country studies, projects aimed at generating standards and indicators, and studies focussed on the role and responsibilities of internal and external actors.
83. **Support to REC and Member States:** The AU/NEPAD should support the work of RECs and the Member States in post-conflict reconstruction. For instance, the AU/NEPAD could facilitate processes aimed at supporting dialogue between internal and external actors and among internal actors. The AU/NEPAD could help to identify capacity building needs, and could facilitate mobilising resources. The AU/NEPAD can also promote dialogue among African countries in transition from conflict to peace. Such exchanges may prove to be valuable learning processes as some of these countries have similar structural conditions and experience similar constraints³⁰.
84. **Resource Mobilisation:** The AU/NEPAD should undertake to facilitate dialogue between internal and external actors, especially when it comes to identifying programme areas that are unfunded or under-funded at the regional or sub-regional level. The AU/NEPAD can facilitate in the development of monitoring mechanisms that can track funding, and it can support capacity building efforts aimed at improving the ability of internal actors to identify, resource, manage and report programmes according to internal standards. In particular, the AU/NEPAD should develop a funding facility that can be used to undertake, at short notice, multidisciplinary and multi-agency assessments and evaluations.
85. **Technical Facility Fund:** A technical facility fund should be established to assist transitional countries in the building of capacity for internal actors. Often, the necessary, qualified human resources needed to drive the reconstruction effort can be found in the Diaspora. Transitional countries should receive support from a technical facility fund to help secure qualified individuals from the Diaspora to assist with reconstruction efforts.

Regional Economic Communities

86. RECs should develop their own capacity to implement this policy framework. They should consider how this policy can be integrated with related regional programmes and what additional capacity, if any, they would need. RECs can also encourage Member States to incorporate this policy framework into national peace, security and development policy instruments. RECs should undertake to host events aimed at educating Member States and civil-society on the framework and stimulate sub-regional initiatives aimed at implementing and monitoring this policy framework.

Member States

87. AU Member States are the primary vehicles through which this policy framework will be translated into action. This could be pursued in a variety of ways, including, amongst others, in the case of countries emerging from conflict, the following:

- Encourage the private sector to invest in post-conflict reconstruction initiatives for without peace, economic investment ventures remain vulnerable;
- Develop processes that facilitate national dialogue to respond to social, economic, political and governance challenges of the country;
- Initiate an environment for civil society to play a complementary role in post-conflict reconstruction through enabling legislation and policies;
- Support efforts encouraging involvement of the diaspora in post-conflict reconstruction initiatives with specific reference to funding, investment and the exchange of technical/professional skills;
- Facilitate public information on the peace process and the role of external partners;
- Create conditions conducive to public-private sector partnerships; and
- Incorporate regional integration objectives in the national reconstruction effort.

Private Sector

88. The private sector should be encouraged to join government and civil-society in a tri-partite Public-Private-Civil Society partnership. The private sector can contribute to the implementation of this policy framework by:

- Adopting trade practices that encourage the development of local entrepreneurship,
- Adopting procurement policies that favour local industry and agriculture revitalisation,
- Maintaining and inculcate business practices that establish good corporate governance,
- Encouraging private-public partnerships,
- Supporting programmes that address the root causes of conflict, and
- Participating in the development and consolidation of the role of civil society in economic development.

Civil Society

89. Civil society covers an infinite range of disciplines and functions and can make a critical contribution to post-conflict reconstruction in almost every sphere of society. Civil society should undertake research that can contribute to a better understanding of the root causes, triggers and consequences of conflict. Civil society should also help to set up or feed into early warning systems that can identify possible outbreaks of violence and they can play an important role in conflict prevention at all levels of society. Civil society can

make a positive contribution in the policy development process, and can support or undertake capacity building programmes through training and education interventions. Civil society is a key enabler in building social capital that is needed to sustain fragile peace processes and is a key service provider in relief, rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction programmes.

External Partners

90. International organisations, donor partners, governments, regional groupings and the international civil society, all play a critical role in post-conflict reconstruction systems, and can support the implementation of this policy framework through:
- Entering into a dialogue with the AU/NEPAD and other African stakeholders to discuss the policy framework and its implications for their work;
 - Integrate those aspects of the policy framework on which agreements have been reached into their own programming and policy frameworks; and
 - Implement specific programme interventions aimed at achieving some of the objectives set forth in this policy framework.

Institutional Arrangements

AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit

91. The function of the NEPAD Secretariat would be to offer institutional and organisational support to the AU Commission, RECs, affected Member States and development partners in facilitating the implementation of this policy framework.
92. At a strategic policy level, an AU/NEPAD Post-conflict Reconstruction Unit would seek to undertake:
- Advocacy (dissemination of policy guidelines to all relevant stakeholders);
 - Validation and adoption process (secure continental support for the policy framework);
 - Conceptual and methodological development of post-conflict reconstruction programmes (establish protocols and policy guidelines for activity preparation);
 - Assist stakeholders in the processes of policy formulation, planning and evaluation;
 - The promotion of research on issues of common interests, and
 - The development of a monitoring and evaluation process and the issuing of annual reports.
93. At the operational level, the AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit would be guided by the APSA and would seek to encourage and facilitate:

- An increase in dialogue forums and the dissemination of “best practices” from countries that have already undertaken post-conflict reconstruction programmes (consultative policy and implementation dialogue);
 - Promote dialogue to align post-conflict reconstruction programmes with the wider desired integration outputs at a regional and sub-regional level;
 - Facilitate activities that encourage greater coordination among internal and external actors in the affected countries, and
 - Encourage resource mobilisation activities to support countries undergoing post-conflict reconstruction.
94. In order to monitor and facilitate the implementation this African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, the AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit would need to develop the capacity to effectively manage policy, programme support, information management, resource mobilisation and monitoring and evaluation functions.

Resource Mobilisation

95. The exact cost of financing a post-conflict reconstruction system is difficult to calculate due to the large number of financing mechanisms involved and differing definitions of what qualifies as post-conflict reconstruction. It has been noted that there is typically a gap between policy commitments and financial resources available for post-conflict reconstruction. A number of policy options have been suggested in response to this challenge. One response has been to develop a new category of transitional assistance aimed at bridging the gap between traditional humanitarian emergency relief and long-term development assistance. Another is to expand relief and to start development earlier, while yet another is to pool resources from a variety of sources for an expanded post-conflict reconstruction agenda. Country specific responses will depend on the unique confluence of internal and external actors, and especially the donors and financial institutions, in each post-conflict reconstruction system.
96. AU/NEPAD may provide a facilitation role with regards to mobilising resources from these stakeholders for programmes that fall within the ambit of this policy framework. This may include provisions for an African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Fund that would enable AU/NEPAD, in partnership with Member States and participating donors, to establish a facility through which pooled funds can be allocated to needs that are not being met through existing funding mechanisms, for example, in the realm of capacity building for internal actors.
97. Resource mobilisation may also include garnering diplomatic support for projects. This may entail facilitating support for programmes from Member States, RECs, international and regional funding institutions and donor partners.
98. While the emphasis tends to be on financial resources, human and technical resources are key prerequisites for successful post-conflict reconstruction interventions and programmes. Using African and international networks and databases, AU/NEPAD may facilitate the deployment of appropriate African experts to provide short-term technical assistance, and assist in identifying

and facilitating projects aimed at strengthening the indigenous capacity of internal actors to manage their own post-conflict reconstruction systems.

99. Resource mobilisation may also take the form of 'domestic resource mobilisation' where AU Member States, can be assisted to gain transparent and accountable control over their own strategic natural resources so that these resources can be utilised to support post-conflict reconstruction programmes within their own countries.

Policy Review

100. Post-conflict reconstruction systems should be supported by a monitoring and evaluation system that not only provides feedback on individual and overall progress, but also encourages programmes and agencies to participate in the overall coordination process by requiring them to report on the steps they took to synchronise their plans and operations with the others in the system and the overall objectives. In this way the evaluation process becomes normative by encouraging and rewarding behaviour that enables coherence, and by discouraging and sanctioning behaviour that inhibits coordination.
101. This policy framework encourages the development of monitoring and evaluation systems that goes beyond measuring outputs to focus on the degree to which the beneficiaries have absorbed and benefited from them, and how this has contributed to the overall post-conflict reconstruction objective. The success of each individual programme, and of the agencies that undertake them, is a factor of the contribution the programme makes to the achievement of the overall post-conflict reconstruction strategy. If the peace process fails and the conflict resumes, the time and resources invested in each individual programme have been wasted, even if a particular programme has achieved its own outputs and objectives. It is only if the combined and sustained effort proves successful in the long term that the investment made in each individual programme can be said to have been worthwhile.

Endnotes

¹ African Union Commission. 2004. Strategic Plan of the African Union Commission: Volume 1: Vision and Mission of the African Union. Addis Ababa, p.15.

² Licklider, R. 1995. "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1945-93" in *American Political Science Review*, Vol 89, No3. pp. 681-690.

³ "World Bank Study Says 50-50 Chance of Failure" in *The Washington Post*. 26 November 2002.

⁴ UNDG/ECHA Working Group. February 2004. *Report on Transition Issues*. United Nations. p. 14.

⁵ NEPAD. 21 March 2004. *2004 – 2007 Strategic Plan*.

⁶ *Ibid*

⁷ *Ibid*

⁸ UNECA. 8 July 2004. Sixth Regional Consultations Meeting: *UN System Support to NEPAD at the Regional Level*.

⁹ NEPAD. 21 March 2004. *2004 – 2007 Strategic Plan*.

¹⁰ JICA. *Peacebuilding in Southern Africa*. ACCORD report commissioned by JICA, 2004.

¹¹ Peacebuilding is the most widely used term to describe post-conflict reconstruction operations, but in America 'nation building', and more recently from a Pentagon perspective, 'stability operations', is also used.

¹² Association of the U.S. Army & Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 2002. *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework*. Washington D.C.

¹³ *Ibid*

¹⁴ The diagram is based on a table in the paper presented by Ms Barabara Barungi at the *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Workshop: Towards a Strategic AU – NEPAD Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa*, held in Johannesburg from 13-15 October 2004.

¹⁵ The table was compiled from a variety of sources, in particular from the Association of the U.S. Army and Centre for Strategic and International Studies, *op cit.*; and the workshop report on the workshop hosted by NEPAD. 13 – 15 October 2004, *op cit.* The workshop report provides detail on the various elements of post-conflict reconstruction providing valuable recommendations for policy development in post-conflict reconstruction within these elements

¹⁶ Uvin, P. 2002. "The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms", in *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, Vol 1, No.1, p.5.

¹⁷ Henry Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue's. February 2003. Report: *Politics and Humanitarianism: Coherence in Crisis?*.CHD, p.4.

¹⁸ . Various coordination models are currently being explored. DPKO and OCHA is experimenting with the 'integrated missions' concept. The UNHCR and the World Bank has developed the 4Rs framework. Another such initiative is the multi-sector inter-agency recovery framework approach, which is being piloted in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. This involves UNCHR, UNDP, World Bank and the respective National Governments. Another interesting development is the recent report on Children and armed Conflict submitted by the UN Secretary General to the Security Council which marked the first time that a proposal is being considered for establishing a comprehensive monitoring and compliance mechanism to ensure the protection of children in situations of armed conflict. In this report an action plan is outlined for the establishment of such a coordinated mechanism of various bodies and actors.

¹⁹ Van Brabant, K. 2001. "Understanding, Promoting and Evaluating Coordination: An Outline Framework", in Gordon, D.S & Toase, F.H., *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, Frank Cass, London, p.141.

²⁰ Strand, A. 2003. *Who's helping Who? NGO Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance*. Doctoral Dissertation. Department of Politics, University of York: New York, p.14.

²¹ Dahrendorf, N. 2003. *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change*. King's College: London; Porter, T. 2002. *An External Review of the CAP*. OCHA: New York; Summers, M. 2002. *The Dynamics*

of *Coordination*. Thomas, J. Watson Jr. Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper #40. Providence; Stocken, N. 2002. *Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan*. Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). Kabul: Afghanistan; Donini, A. 2002. *The Politics of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda*, Occasional Paper #22. Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies. Brown University: Providence; Reindorp, N. & Willes, P. 2001. *Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience*. A Study commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Overseas Development Institute (ODI). London; Duffield, M., Lautze, S. & Jones, B. 1998. *Strategic Humanitarian Coordination in the Great Lakes Region 1996 – 1997*. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): New York.

²² Smith, D. 2003. *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: the Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding*. PRIO: Oslo. p.16.

²³ De Coning, C. 2004. *Coordination is Not a Four Letter Word: Towards Coherence between Peace, Security and Development Dimensions of Peacebuilding Operations*, paper delivered at the 17th Academic Council of the United Nations (www.acuns.org) Annual Meeting. Geneva: Switzerland. 30 June – 2 July 2004.

²⁴ Peacebuilding Forum Conference. 7 October 2004. Conference Document: *Building Effective Partnerships: Improving the Relationship between Internal and External Actors in Post-Conflict Countries*. New York, p.2.

²⁵ *Ibid*

²⁶ OECD Review. 1999. "Aid Co-ordination and Aid Management: A Role of UNDP" (1996), in *UNDP and Aid Coordination and the Role of the World Bank*. World Bank.

²⁷ Van de Walle and Johnston (1996), quoted in Mizrahi, S. 2000. *Aid Reform: A Review of Aid Coordination Mechanisms. Club du Sahel. SAH/REFA (2000)3. 15 December 2000*.

²⁸ Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, see <http://www1.worldbank.org/harmonisation/romehlf/>

²⁹ Peacebuilding Forum Conference. 7 October 2004. Conference Document: *Building Effective Partnerships: Improving the Relationship between Internal and External Actors in Post-Conflict Countries*. New York. [Proposal seven].

³⁰ Peacebuilding Forum Conference. *Op cit.*. [Proposal four]

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Annexure 1: Internal and External Roles in Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa

External Actors*	Political	Security	Emergency Relief	Reconstruction
Donor states	Bilateral and multilateral political and material support	Supporting UN or AU peacekeeping forces	Bilaterally and through UN, ECHO, ICRC, NGOs	Bilaterally and through UN, EU, WB, IFI, NGOs
United Nations	Security Council, DPA, DPKO, SRSG	ECPS UN Peace Operations	ECHA OCHA, WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, etc.	UNDG UNDP, WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, etc.
European Union	EC EU	Stability Operations, e.g. Artemis	ECHO (and through support to UN Agencies and NGOs)	EU support to UN Agencies and NGOs
NGOs	Conflict prevention and resolution	Training, de-mining, etc.	Independent or as agents for UN, EU and donors	Independent or as agents for UN, EU and donors
IFI	Fund human rights, conflict prevention and resolution			Macroeconomic assistance
World Bank	Assessing economic impact of peace proposals	Support DDR & SSR	No relief, but increased role in monitoring during conflict and in providing non-lending services	Flexible range of lending and non-lending services working toward normalisation
Internal Actors				
Local and National Government	Interim & Transitional Governments Constituent Assembly Elections	Security Sector Reform New Defence Force New Police Services New Internal Security Services	National, provincial and local government provide relief services and enabling environment for external actors	National, provincial and local government identify, prioritise, coordinate and facilitate reconstruction with external support
Political Parties	Responsible campaigning and intra-party conflict management			
Civil society **	Facilitate community participation, advocacy, social capital	Facilitate and support reintegration and rehabilitation processes	NGOs participate in assessments, provide services and support relief efforts	Participate in setting priorities, provide services and support reconstruction efforts
Private Sector	Campaign contributions, lobbying, support	Provide services	Provide services	Provide services, support, sponsor reconstruction efforts

* The information on external actors was based on a table in World Bank (1996) and presented in the paper prepared by Ms. Barbara Barungi for the workshop, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Workshop: Towards a Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa*, hosted by the NEPAD Secretariat from 13-15 October 2004. The table has been adapted and modified for the framework document.

** Civil society in this context includes the community leaders; religious, youth, women and special needs groups, professional associations, NGOs, academia, non-profit media, etc.