

Peace and Security in Africa
**Beyond the African Union Charter,
Peace, Security and Justice**

Edited by Annie Chikwanha

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Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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Acronyms

APFO	Africa Peace Forum
AFRICOM	African High Command
AHSI	African Human Security Initiative
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	The African Union
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FPTP	First Past the Post majoritarian systems
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAHRIT	Southern Africa Human Rights Trust
UNAMID	United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur
UPEACE	University for Peace Programme in Africa
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding

Executive Summary

One of the overarching objectives of the African Human Security Initiative (AHSI) is to build the capacity of an expanded membership of African organisations in conducting research on security issues on the African continent. The AHSI is composed of organisations that took the initiative to emphasize human security in Africa. To achieve this major objective, the AHSI organised an international conference on the theme 'Peace and Security in Africa: Beyond the African Union Charter: Peace, Security and Justice' in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 21-23 February 2008.

The **goals and objectives** of the conference were to:

- Identify some of the most urgent threats to African and international peace and security
- Examine whether the new threats to peace and security can be addressed within the African Union (AU) Charter Framework
- Analyze the role of regional and international organisations in contributing to Africa's peace, security and justice in relation to the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC)
- Make recommendations on appropriate mechanisms for addressing threats to peace and security on the continent

The **themes** that were explored were:

- Causes of conflicts in Africa
- Violent conflict as a key obstacle to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
- Peacebuilding in Africa, transitional justice in post-conflict African societies, and social construction in times of war
- Governance, conflict management, conflict resolution and the role of aid agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs)
- The role of women in conflict prevention, management, resolution, and peacebuilding through democratic governance
- The influence of international law in peace agreements and mediation processes, human rights and conflict management

Over the course of the three-day conference, stakeholders deliberated on the challenges, threats and prospects for achieving human security and building peace in Africa. In order to achieve the MDGs and promote economic growth and development, Africa must strengthen its ability to protect human security and build human capacity. Unfortunately, violent conflicts

continue to undermine human security; they pose a major threat to the achievement of the MDGs in many parts of the continent. Analysis of civil strife in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi, reveals that war and violent conflict have retarded development; conflict has had pernicious societal effects, including extensive damage and loss of human life, infrastructure and natural resources. Furthermore, the sovereignty of states continues to be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights. Such is the case in Darfur, where peace remains an elusive dream and conflict continues with no meaningful solutions in sight.

Despite these continued challenges, Africa has notable examples of successful peacebuilding experiences in which both the AU and the international community have come together to build peace in war-ravaged societies. A good example is the DRC, which is slowly approaching democratic stability following the 2006 elections. Such peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts contribute not only to ending conflicts but also to advancing development and human security more broadly.

Africa faces the challenge of effectively responding to current human security threats, as well as foreseeing and combating emergent threats to human security. Currently, there are frameworks in place to promote peace and security in Africa, including that of the AU Charter. However, a major issue is how to strengthen the capacity of the AU to fulfil its mandate and implement protocols, charters, and conventions more effectively. As such, it is imperative to examine whether the AU's PSC has the capacity to deal with present and emerging conflicts and threats to human security or if we need to look beyond the AU Charter to counter such threats effectively.

A general consensus emerging from this conference is that new and emergent challenges to peace and security on the continent require Africa to move beyond the AU charter, beyond elections and constitutionalism, and beyond conflict resolution. To build a culture of peace, there is a need for a paradigm shift from non-interference to interference, including tackling the 'invisible veto' head on. As one participant noted, it is important to ask why the AU goes against the adage, 'In Africa, you do not ask your neighbour if he needs help when his house is on fire; you just come in to extinguish it'. At a time when conflicts continue to cause irreparable damage to human security and development on the continent, we must critically interrogate whether the issue of sovereignty provides justification for inaction.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Some of the key recommendations that emerged from the conference were:

- Establish within the AU and the United Nations (UN) measures to address non-compliance with established protocols and conventions
- Develop policy priorities across Africa that will ensure effective, accountable, and inclusive governance of institutions and institutionalise democracy at the national and local levels through free, fair, participatory, and inclusive elections
- Strengthen the legitimacy of the state by setting up proper checks and balances in the political system. Respect constitutionalism, the ability of the Parliament and the judiciary to check on the executive, devolution of powers, and the ability of regional authorities to counterbalance central power. Ensure the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary
- Give the International Criminal Court a clear mandate to prosecute rape as a war crime
- Implement in full, the UN Security Council Resolution 1325
- Support and strengthen women's organisations in their peace-building efforts by providing adequate and sustained financial and technical support for them
- Strengthen the protection and representation of refugees and displaced women by paying special attention to their health, rehabilitation, and training needs
- Increase women's participation in political, social, and economic processes through training, awareness raising, campaigns and quota implementation
- Promote local civil society organisations as leading actors in addressing post conflict reconstruction processes
- Provide necessary capacity building support systems to regional and sub-regional organisations so that these organisations can effectively fulfil their responsibilities based on the established frameworks
- Strengthen and support civil society to:
 - i. Continue to advocate accountability and inclusive governance institutions in all countries
 - ii. Lobby the AU to set an agenda for peace education at all levels of the educational system
 - iii. Create an advocacy plan and lobby the AU to adopt the political, social and economic policies necessary to help achieve the MDGs
 - iv. Push for an urgent policy from the AU on electoral violence, and
 - v. Work to encourage governments to democratise resources to enable all citizens to benefit from them

Workshop Proceedings

PRELIMINARY SESSION

Opening Remarks

Chair: Ochieng Adala, Africa Peace Forum (APFO) Ambassador

WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION

Dr. Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

Dr Jakkie Cilliers welcomed conference participants and proceeded to outline the work of the AHSI and its involvement with the African Union in strengthening peace and security in Africa. He explained that AHSI, an initiative that ISS launched a couple of years ago, is currently working on a project that seeks to complement the formal New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development/Africa Peer Review Mechanism (NEPAD/APRM) process.¹ ISS first initiated AHSI1, which was a regional programme that used the system of peer review to monitor the extent of compliance of eight African countries' commitments to democracy, good governance and civil society participation. However, it was evident that insufficient attention was given to providing security for ordinary Africans. Hence, the second phase of the African Human Security Initiative (AHSI2), which is a follow-up to AHSI1, uses the peer review concept to focus on the criminal justice system in five selected countries identified for APRM review. Through local partnerships, AHSI2 aims to encourage research on security issues in order to facilitate the work of the PSC of the African Union.

In conclusion, Dr Cilliers challenged conference participants to reflect upon the tragedy in Kenya, where more than 1,000 people perished in post electoral violence. This incident, he stated, demonstrates how fragile democracy was in a country that had been championed as 'a beacon of peace and stability in East Africa.' He cautioned that Kenya is not unique and many other African countries face similar challenges, including key NEPAD members. Due to the presence of persistent challenges and the lack of magical solutions, greater commitment is required to promote sustainable peace and security in Africa.

AHSI PARTNERS

The AHSI partners were introduced as:

- 1) **Human Rights Trust of Southern Africa (SAHRIT)**. Founded in 1996 and headquartered in Harare, Zimbabwe, SAHRIT operates in the area of human rights, governance, training and capacity development.
- 2) **West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)**. WANEP is engaged in conflict management and peacebuilding, serving as a focal point and organizing body for 12 national networks in West Africa. WANEP also works with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
- 3) **Africa Peace Forum (APFO)**. APFO works in peacemaking in the Great Lakes Region and lobbies on the issues of small arms and light weapons. It also works with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on conflict and early warning networks.
- 4) **University for Peace Africa Programme (UPEACE)**. The mission of UPEACE is to build continent-wide capacity to prevent conflict and promote sustainable peace and development through education and training. UPEACE is a new member of AHSI and shares the objective of creating a continent-wide human security profile.
- 5) Two other partners, the **Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA)** and the **South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA)** were absent with apologies.

Following the introduction of AHSI partners, Mr Kenneth Mpyisi, Director of the ISS Addis Ababa office, welcomed participants and highlighted some of the topics to be discussed during the conference. He underscored how the conference corresponds with the overarching goals of AHSI and ISS, and encouraged participants to engage in open, frank and constructive debates.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Lt. Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo (retired)

In his keynote address, Lt. Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo reiterated the 'deep longing for peace' by Africans by quoting Albert Schweitzer, who said:

In the hearts of people today there is a deep longing for peace. When the true spirit of peace is thoroughly dominant, it becomes an inner experience with unlimited possibilities. Only when this really happens ... when the spirit of peace awakens and takes possession of men's hearts, can humanity be saved from perishing.

Conflict and violence, stated Lt. Gen. Sumbeiywo, are not ingrained traits of Africans. Indeed, there are unlimited possibilities for peace. In the pursuit of peace, continuous and engaged dialogue and the exchange of ideas, experience, and knowledge are thus vital.

He directed the attention of the participants to the founding Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Charter (ratified over 40 years ago). The charter has been the reference point in determining whether threats posed by particular African countries have warranted forcible responses by the PSC or by threatened states. Although the main threats were highlighted by the drafters of the Charter, responses to these threats have not been adequate, and the continent today is hardly more secure than it was then. There are new and potential threats to Africa that are exacerbated by the fact that other countries and individuals benefit and profit from the chaos in Africa. Among the vital questions that Africa faces today is whether the AU structures and processes can be improved so that the AU can have legitimacy and effectiveness in responding to conflicts. Lt. Gen. Sumbeiywo also emphasized the need for a paradigm shift from non-interference to interference in violent conflicts. 'In African tradition', he stated, 'you intervene to put out the fire in your neighbour's house'. So why should Africans have the 'invisible veto' in the AU to block intervention when neighbours are in crisis situations?

Lt. Gen. Sumbeiywo also reflected on the challenges peacekeeping missions face: inadequate funding, lack of equipment, logistical shortcomings, and unclear mandates, amongst others. The underlying cause of these obstacles in African peacekeeping is the lack of clarity as to who should finance peacekeeping efforts. He also posed a question: does Africa have the capacity to deal with both pre- and post-electoral violence? He noted that elections have become major sources of conflict and there is no mechanism in the AU to deal with issues of post-election violence. It is imperative, he stated, to ensure political inclusion and participation, to re-evaluate whether electoral systems are suitable to the political and social dynamics of the countries in which they operate, and to establish mechanisms within the AU framework to address the legitimate concerns of aggrieved parties in election processes.

As a way forward, Lt. Gen. Sumbeiywo offered the following recommendations:

- Identify some of the most urgent non-traditional threats to African and international peace and security and discuss which reforms are required to address these threats
- Examine whether these new, non-traditional threats to peace and security can be addressed within existing regional and sub-regional Charters
- Analyze critically how marginalized voices can contribute to peacemaking efforts, taking gender issues into consideration, and
- Analyze the role of regional and international organisations in contributing to Africa's peace, security and justice and how their roles can better contribute to the work of the AU PSC.

In conclusion, he emphasized that peace can only be attained if we construct norms that espouse tolerance, respect, justice,

and peace and if we uphold the sanctity of human life and human dignity.

Lt. Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo gave a brief account of the election-related conflict in Kenya, examining the pre-election mood, post-election violence, and the efforts to resolve the conflict. During the pre-election period, there were subtle signs of violent clashes and hate speech. Some citizens wanted to vote for the opposition because they desired change, while others wanted to vote for the status quo. The Kenyan Electoral Commission's lack of transparency in the announcement of results triggered the subsequent violence. Once the violence erupted, the security forces mismanaged their responses. In response to the violence, a number of negotiations were begun by concerned citizens in Kenya, including people in the business community, women and youth groups. In spite of these efforts, the violence continued, mainly because of the deep structural issues within the Kenyan political system.

Discussion

The discussion following the keynote presentation focused on the post-election Kenyan crisis. Participants noted that the fundamental causes of the Kenyan situation can be traced to three key areas, namely:

- Unresolved ethnic divisions in Kenya
- Uneven distribution of land, and
- Pervasive poverty.

In light of what happened in Kenya, participants noted that the AU, through its PSC, needs to develop a new framework. This framework should be fundamentally different from the current framework, which is based on the principle of non-interference. The new framework should include provisions for active intervention in cases where a member state faces security threats from internal or external sources. This will require a major paradigm shift from the current, principle that is based on the respect for sovereignty.

The lack of institutional capacity within regional organisations in Africa has been a major impediment to addressing regional conflict. The African Union has not been actively engaged, even in serious crises such as the one in Kenya. Kenya had previously shown some stability and progress, so the AU should have taken a decisive position at the outset of the Kenyan crisis.

Participants also noted that part of the problem in African conflicts is the convenient replacement of coup d'états with vote rigging, a practice that has disenfranchised voters and created conditions for uprisings and instability in African countries. This practice was a major contributing factor to the crisis in Kenya. According to Lt. Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo, the meagre resources available in Kenya, combined with the lack of employment opportunities and sustainable livelihoods, have intensified the struggle and competition for survival. He noted that women, for example, have been forced to actively participate in this struggle, including participation in militia groups, which is an unprecedented phenomenon in Kenya. For Lt. Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo, such developments have been a major contributing factor to the violence in Kenya.

PLENARY SESSION 1

Causes of Conflict in Africa

VIOLENT CONFLICTS: A KEY OBSTACLE TO ACHIEVING MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS; WHERE IS THE EVIDENCE?

Dereje Wordorfa

The objective of Dereje Wordorfa's presentation was to detail how violent conflicts pose a major obstacle to the achievement of MDGs. One such MDG is the reduction of poverty by half by the year 2015. Wordorfa noted that although research has not been able to illustrate a conclusive relationship between poverty and conflict, many have argued that pervasive poverty is both a cause and consequence of conflict. According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reports and the Human Development Index (HDI), out of 32 countries characterized as having 'low human development', 22 have experienced violent conflict.

In sub-Saharan Africa, violent conflict and related political instability and insecurity, has hampered progress toward the MDGs in a number of countries. For example, the DRC, Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, and Liberia are unlikely to achieve the MDGs partly because of violent conflict and abject poverty. Rebuilding societies after violent conflict requires time and puts enormous stress on these countries' limited resources.

To date, progress toward achieving the MDGs has been hampered by a lack of financing, large debt burdens, and the lack of political will amongst African leaders. There has been no significant increase in aid targeted at supporting MDG programmes. Notwithstanding these challenges, it is worth noting that some African countries have made significant progress toward the achievement of the MDGs, including a significant reduction in the proportion of people living below the poverty line. For example, since 1999, the proportion of people living on a dollar per day in Africa has declined from 45.9% to 41.1%. Many countries have made notable progress in some MDG areas, such as in reducing malnutrition, improving primary education enrolment and completion, and reducing the prevalence of malaria, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis infections.

In conclusion, Wordorfa offered the following recommendations for African countries aiming to achieve the MDGs:

- Embrace conflict resolution and peace-building strategies for all stakeholders
- Put in place conflict prevention and early warning systems

- Pay attention to post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building
- Increase efforts to pull countries out of violent conflict, and
- Strengthen initiatives and efforts by regional and sub-regional institutions in peacebuilding processes

IN PURSUIT OF THE MDGS IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES IN AFRICA: AN UPHILL CHALLENGE AND POLICY LESSONS

Kojo Asiedu

Kojo Asiedu began his presentation by discussing how single-party governments or militarized governments have long been sources of conflict in Africa. When government strongmen control a country's institutions, and when government policies tend to favour certain cultures and ethnic groups, there is a high likelihood that conflict will be violent. Asiedu provided the example of the oil-rich Niger Delta as a place where failures in development and environmental governance have resulted in an unfair distribution of national wealth and resources. Though the region has thus far generated more than \$360 billion in natural resource revenues, the Niger Delta communities remain among the poorest in Africa.

According to Asiedu, the decline in the HDI indicators for a majority of African countries in the 1990s and early 2000s can be attributed to two major factors:

- 1) The spread of HIV/AIDS and a decline in life expectancy, and
- 2) The decline in productivity and destruction of infrastructure during violent conflicts.

Notwithstanding the underlying motivations for group mobilisation and group participation in violent conflict, Africans can and should draw some lessons that will help them reduce the human and economic costs of conflicts. These include:

- Developing mechanisms such as subsidies and food rationing to avoid price hikes and food insecurity and to improve the diet of people in war-affected regions
- Promoting food delivery through schools and clinics to help promote school attendance and reduce incentives for children to be recruited into militia groups or prostitution

- Combating inflation and cushioning citizens against the effects of spiralling prices. In Mozambique, for instance, price liberalisation led to massive increases in the price of essential commodities such as maize, cooking oil and sugar
- Securing foreign exchange resources
- Designing policies, both national and international, with a view to securing the financing of productive imports by keeping open and assisting export markets and providing aid and loan support for such imports, and
- Designing specific national policies with a view to ensuring import controls and ensuring that available foreign exchange resources are used to acquire essential goods such as medicines and agricultural inputs.

Asiedu concluded his presentation with a discussion of the MDGs. Country reports show that achieving the MDGs remains a challenge for many countries in Africa, mainly because of a lack of supportive and enabling environments, and the absence of necessary social and economic investments. The situation, he stated, is particularly grim in sub-Saharan Africa, where abject poverty and protracted conflicts are entrenched. Mozambique and Uganda, for instance, have averaged per capita income growth of more than three per cent but continue to lag behind in their MDG targets.

Discussion

Following the presentation, the discussion focused on the following questions:

- Can countries in conflict achieve the MDGs?
- What strategies can countries in Africa employ to secure the necessary resources required for the achievement of the MDGs?
- If donors are reluctant to provide financial support in pursuit of the MDGs, what measures should African governments take in order to change this situation?

There was consensus that the major challenge most African countries face in the attainment of the MDGs is conflict. Currently, most African countries perceive development and security as separate issues. In reality, security and development cannot exist without each other. In order to appropriately address the security and development threats in Africa, countries should design appropriate, context-specific strategies. Such strategies might include the following:

- The creation of viable plans and the development of strategies for conflict prevention
- Strengthening sub-regional and other continental institutions in conflict areas to build sustainable peace
- Prudently identifying and utilising Africa-derived resources for peace-building activities, and relying less on international aid. While the AU has been trying to bring peace to Somalia and Darfur, for instance, these efforts have failed because of resource constraints
- Promoting changes in terms of aid and trade in the policies espoused by donor countries. The international community

should support the development efforts of African countries by meeting their commitments to post-conflict reconstruction efforts, and

- Increasing the role of CSOs in exerting pressure on donor communities in order to scale up the required resources needed to meet the MDGs.

THE CORRELATION BETWEEN RESOURCE WARS: THE WAR ON TERROR AND INSECURITY IN AFRICA

Dr JJ Asongu

Dr JJ Asongu argued that there is a direct correlation between the United States' global 'war on terror', resource wars, and insecurity in Africa. Dr Asongu began by critically reviewing America's war on terror in Africa, its variants, its historical foundations, its functional perspectives, and the way it has been designed to serve the occupation and militarisation of strategic natural resources, such as oil fields in the continent. He argued that American imperialism is alive and strong and is fostering endless resource-induced wars around the world.

Drawing on the Middle East's experiences, Dr Asongu asserted that America's foreign policy is predicated on its national economic interest. America's insatiable thirst for resources, along with its predisposition to use force to attain such ends, he argued, is a direct threat to Africa, especially African states that might want to challenge this system. He cautioned American allies in Africa to be wary of America as a friend, mentioning that America knows no permanent friends and threatens the peace and security of Africa both directly and indirectly. He pointed to the US African Command (AFRICOM), which he stated was created to secure Africa's strategic role as a major oil supplier to the United States and as a challenge to the increasingly important role of China in Africa.

Further dangers posed by the US's policy in Africa include the perceived right of the US to launch preventative war (even though this right is denied to other countries), as well as the American focus on non-state organisations like al-Qaeda to the neglect of state terrorism. Dr Asongu offered the situation in Darfur as an example of how foreign powers have allowed what is actually a government-backed terrorist regime to commit genocide against its citizens. He pointed to the need for scholars to continue to examine this aspect of insecurity in Africa, as well as the poverty-crime nexus, which leaves many Africans with a feeling of insecurity as they carry out their daily activities. Only a 'war' on poverty, he stated, could bring true peace, security, and economic prosperity to Africa.

While the presentation did not focus on how Africa could free itself from the impending security threat, Dr Asongu suggested that a true African nationalism could provide the answer. This nationalism is defined as a sense of pride in one's country and the ability to identify the country's strategic resources and preserve them from foreign control. This, Asongu asserted, entails taking advantage of the forces of globalisation to become a vital or competitive player in the world economy. It is only through such

nationalism (exemplified recently by countries like China and India), that the American 'war machine' can be brought under control and African countries can enjoy true peace, security, and economic prosperity.

Discussion

The discussion focused on the need for African countries to wage a 'war' on poverty, hunger and disease as a way to circumvent and undermine terror and terrorist activities. Participants were of the view that Africans should develop tactful and nationalistic mindsets following the American approach, where every American citizen is nationalistic and seeks to promote the interests of America. As AFRICOM was established by the United States to protect American geo-political and security interests, rather than African security interests, Africans should in turn develop nationalistic and patriotic feelings to protect the interests of the continent. Africans should also be very cautious when they establish bilateral and multilateral relations with other countries.

A representative from the Africa Center of the US Embassy in Ethiopia countered Dr Asongu's description of AFRICOM. She stated that while AFRICOM is sometimes perceived as a new American body with strategic and extractive interests in Africa, it is, in reality, simply a reorganisation of existing efforts in order to improve their functionality and coordination and cut down on bureaucracy. She stated that AFRICOM is presently quite weak in its capabilities and harbours no imperialist intentions in Africa.

Western Theoretical Perspectives on the Causes of Conflicts in Africa Romain Malejacq

According to Romain, Western theoretical perspectives and explanations on conflict in Africa have been primarily focused on socio-political and economic causes of conflict. This approach to understanding African conflicts has influenced Western policies and reactions to conflict in Africa. Historically, most conflicts in Africa were described as 'barbaric' and 'irrational' and the West did not generally seek to understand the underlying causes of these conflicts. By the end of the Cold War, there was a paradigmatic shift in explaining the causes of conflict in Africa. Arguments became increasingly based on the theory of democratic peace and the premise that African countries experienced violent conflicts because they were not democratic.

Since then, according to Romain, there has been a much more holistic, multidisciplinary approach to understanding the causes of violent conflicts. For example, while anthropologists examine and explore the underlying cultural causes of conflicts, political economists offer structural explanations based on the ability of states to provide public goods to their citizens. He noted that it is important that these varying explanations be interrogated to clarify explanations of violent conflicts on the continent. In addition, Africans must engage each other through research to come up with their own credible explanations based on empirical evidence. Widespread dissemination of such research findings will provoke informed debate and help in the design of appropriate policies to address African conflicts.

PARALLEL SESSION 2

Peace-building in Africa

PARALLEL SESSION A: NATURAL RESOURCES AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Chair: Tony Karbo, UPEACE Africa Programme

The Natural Resource Conflict Nexus: Bringing Back Politics

Chrysantus Ayangafac

Ayangafac's presentation was focused on the natural resource-conflict nexus and the theoretical and conceptual perspectives on the relationship between the two. To launch his presentation, Ayangafac posed some questions for reflection, including:

- Do natural resources initiate conflicts?
- If natural resources are indeed the source of conflicts, how do natural resource conflicts manifest themselves?
- What type of resources influence conflict? and
- What effect do resources have on the duration of conflict?

At a time when there is an increase in energy prices and growing interest by the West, China, and India in Africa's natural resources, Ayangafac argued that a discussion on natural resources and conflict in Africa is timely and important. In light of the interest of foreign powers in Africa's natural resources, critical questions should include:

- What does this interest in natural resources mean for Africa?
- How can Africa as a continent, as well as individual African states, take advantage of and benefit from foreign interest in its resources?
- Most importantly, how has this interest in Africa's natural resources influenced domestic politics? How has it affected, or how does it have the potential to affect, the continent's domestic institutions?

Ayangafac went on to highlight the importance of examining natural resources and conflict within the context of post-conflict reconstruction and development. In the cases of Sierra Leone and Angola for example, the termination of war has not brought about a significant shift in the way natural resources are managed.

In examining the causal relationship between conflict and natural resource abundance, Ayangafac argued, we need to

widen our assessment of explanatory variables. The most important variable that has been neglected to date is the issue of ownership. For instance, in most African countries, the rents of oil are concentrated within the state apparatus. The state serves as a means of accumulation and, subsequently, competition among the elite becomes intensified in order to capture the state. As a remedy to avoid elite competition in the capture of the African state, Ayangafac suggested the need to begin to think about innovative ways to involve different constituencies that are interested in the oil sector not just for rent-seeking and extractive purposes but for using the exploration and production of oil for the benefit of all citizens. Africa needs a social class with a strong moral sense based on a fair and equitable distribution of resources. There must be minimum standards pertaining to the management of natural resources.

Discussion

The discussion centred on issues of accountability and transparency, which may help to encourage respect for property rights and the ownership of natural resources by local people. Due to lack of accountability and transparency, it was noted that the interests of multi-national corporations are often protected by the elites of states at the expense of the state's citizens. In response to some of the contributions by conference participants, Ayangafac proposed a shift from statistical analysis to a more focused policy analysis on the resource-conflict nexus.

Circumscribing Conflicts in the Resource-endowed Niger Delta Communities of Nigeria

Akeem Ayofe Akinwale

According to Akinwale, violent conflicts have persisted in the Niger Delta communities of Nigeria despite efforts by successive governments and international organisations to broker peace in the region. Akinwale stated that while Nigerian governments have tried to integrate various ethnic communities, these efforts have largely failed because of the incessant conflicts in the region. One of the major factors contributing to the lack of peace in the region, he asserted, is the pervasive perception by local communities of the Nigerian government's inability to satisfy their basic human needs. As an example, approximately 96 per cent of all government revenue comes from the Niger Delta region. However, many of these communities are still poor and do not feel they are receiving a fair share of the resources coming

out of their territory. Some of the other factors contributing to conflict in the region include:

- Internal and external factors: collusion between foreign investors and local elites
- Poverty and ignorance
- The rise in youth militancy
- Structural barriers, and
- Divergent interests of state elites and local leaders.

In conducting his research, Akinwale found divergent opinions among stakeholders regarding conflict resolution mechanisms in the Niger Delta. While government officials and multinational oil companies were optimistic about the mechanisms for conflict resolution, youth activists and labour leaders were pessimistic about the possibility of lasting peace in the region.

In conclusion, Akinwale identified poverty, underdevelopment and the misguided policies of multinational companies as the major causes of conflict in the Niger Delta region. To address the conflicts in the region, Akinwale noted that holistic approaches and strategies would ensure a fair distribution of oil wealth, and would also eradicate the elites' corrupt practices.

Electoral Systems and Electoral Violence in SADC

Bertha Chiroro

Bertha Chiroro discussed electoral systems in the African context and how electoral systems can serve to either mitigate conflict or exacerbate electoral violence. She posed a number of questions, including:

- Do African countries have the capacity to deal with electoral violence? and
- What would be the most appropriate systems for countering electoral violence?

When designed on the basis of representation and inclusion, Chiroro noted, electoral systems can contribute to building social harmony and peace, and promoting stability. However, when segments of the population, such as certain minority or ethnic groups, are excluded from the system, electoral-related violence may result. She stated that 'when countries carry out democratic elections in which there is an agreeable electoral system and an accommodative political culture, elections need not shed a drop of blood.'

Chiroro explained that there are three major types of electoral systems:

- Proportional Representation (PR) systems
- First Past the Post (FPTP) majoritarian systems and
- The Mixed systems.

While noting that the prospects for a stable and peaceful political system are not determined by an electoral system alone, she asserted that the results a system produces can contribute to stability in a number of important respects. For instance, PR

systems are, theoretically, believed to bring about more qualitatively democratic free and fair elections than FPTP majoritarian systems, where the contest is a 'do or die' affair and the 'winner takes all'. Contextualizing the issue within the southern Africa, she said her findings suggest that the elections of PR systems in the region have produced significantly higher levels of fairness and political stability than they have in majoritarian systems.

According to Chiroro, elections serve an important role in the process of democratisation and conflict management, especially in countries that have emerged from armed conflict. In post-conflict societies, competitive elections have become one of the instruments used not only to promote democracy but also to consolidate a fragile peace. Given that electoral systems and election administrations can contain incentives and disincentives for violence, Chiroro underlined that the choice of an electoral system is one of the most important institutional decisions for any new democracy, especially in post-conflict societies. Aspects of elections such as voter registration can serve as a source of conflict and violence if voters are excluded from the voting process. The post-election phase can also be very dangerous if the losers do not accept the results. The losers might do this if they perceive the elections as not being free and fair, or because of political violence and intimidation. In such cases, any suspected impartiality by the electoral management body can lead to high levels of violence when the results are announced. To deal with electoral violence, countries must have an institutionalised dispute settlement system, such as an independent electoral commission.

Since electoral violence is one of the new threats to human security, Chiroro stated, efforts are needed to ensure that political inclusion and participation are embedded within the electoral system design. Further, it is imperative to examine whether electoral systems are suitable for the political and social dynamics and contexts of different countries. She called for the careful, conscious and deliberate design of electoral systems as part of the peacebuilding process. When designing and implementing electoral systems, she noted, it is also important to leave open the possibility of reforming the system when unforeseen negative consequences arise. To emphasise her point, she referenced the Kenyan election catastrophe, which happened at a time when many thought that all the arrangements and institutional requirements of a democratic election were in place.

When electoral systems and electoral administrative systems are not properly and unanimously agreed upon, there is greater potential for violence. Chiroro asserted that four institutional factors must be in place before countries can hold credible, democratic elections. These include:

- An agreed-upon electoral system
- A competitive party system
- An uncontested constitutional system, and
- A credible election management system.

Elections, Chiroro reiterated, can add value to the constructive management of conflicts, help mitigate violence, and serve as a major precondition for democratisation and its consolidation. 'Free and fair' elections are an important step towards the

institutionalisation of democratic norms and rules, depending on the functionality and the operationalisation of the electoral system and the electoral administration. Trust in political institutions is a step on the road towards stable and non-violent political systems. Electoral system design is as important as the reform of legal codes and constitutional reforms to the legitimisation of the post-conflict regime.

In conclusion, Chiroro stated that electoral conflict could be avoided if we take these steps:

- Institutionalise electoral dispute settlement systems to deal with conflicts
- Set up independent electoral commissions
- Establish party liaison committees, electoral courts (such as in South Africa), and conflict management panels to handle disputes, and
- Strengthen the implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.

Flawed electoral institutions, Chiroro noted, generally produce flawed electoral results and, in doing so, the benefits of elections are lost. When elections are marred by violence as a result of vote rigging, poor electoral administration and general disaffection in governance institutions, voters lose confidence in the electoral process and the value of elections to democratisation is lost.

Discussion

The discussion focused on the need in Africa to institutionalise electoral systems that are fair and inclusive. Since elections in Africa often fall victim to manipulation and politicisation, independent electoral commissions are vital for stopping the manipulation before it starts or investigating it afterwards. While there is no agreement on the definition of 'independent,' 'independent' can be measured by how the electoral body works with every group or political party's stamp of approval. The people on the ground are the judges of efficiency and the credibility of electoral commissions. Courts work effectively only when institutions of governance are credible.

When Combatants Become Judges: The Role of Ex-Combatants in Gacaca Courts and the Effects on the Reintegration and Reconciliation Processes in Rwanda

Richard Bowd

Bowd's presentation focused on post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Rwanda and issues of transitional justice. Bowd began by giving an overview of the Rwandan genocide. The genocide, he stated, culminated in an estimated 800,000 dead, 130,000 detainees in the national prison system, 2,000,000 Rwandan refugees, 700,000 returning Rwandan expatriates, and 650,000 alleged participants in the genocide. During the genocide, government structures were destroyed, property was looted, the economy was bankrupted, and infrastructure such as roads, schools, hospitals, police stations, prisons and courts was all

destroyed. The genocide, according to Bowd, also resulted in significant damage to the judicial system. A large number of lawyers, judges and prosecutors were killed or exiled due to the genocidal policy of deliberately targeting Tutsi and moderate Hutu elites.

In 1994, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 955 to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Organic Law No. 08/96 followed in 1996 and established:

- Specialized chambers for genocide crimes in the civil and military courts
- Confession procedures and guilty pleas for genocide suspects, and
- The categorisation of genocide defendants.

The ICTR concentrated on Category 1 defendants, which encompassed those engaged in planning, organizing, instigating and supervising the genocide.

However, the Rwandan judicial system continued to face challenges in dealing with its large caseloads, particularly of non-category 1 offenders. Officials estimated that, due to the diminished capacity of the Rwandan judicial system to deal with its large number of caseloads, it would require over 200 years to try the cases of all those in detention for alleged complicity in the genocide. To overcome this problem and to address the demands of the Rwandan population for justice, as well as to encourage unity and reconciliation, the government established the Gacaca court system in 2002. Bowd identified four main aims of the Gacaca system, including:

- 1) Revealing the truth;
- 2) Speeding up genocide trials;
- 3) Ending the culture of impunity; and,
- 4) Reconciling Rwandans.

An informal, grassroots legal system based on traditional conflict management approaches, the Gacaca court system operates at the cell, sector and district levels. At each level there are 19 Gacaca judges, known as '*Inyangamugayo*', who sit in judgment on those accused of genocide-related crimes. *Inyangamugayos* are civilians who are elected by the community and are trained to a minimum legal level standard before sitting as judges. The open public trials of the Gacaca system depend on popular participation and witness testimony by community members.

Bowd noted that ex-combatants have become increasingly involved in the Gacaca system through their reintegration into the community and have been influential in the system and the reconciliation process. He emphasized that the Gacaca court system promotes restorative justice rather than retributive justice because it involves a collaborative process between genocide victims, perpetrators and the community at large. By offering reduced sentences, or sentences that mostly involve community service, the Gacaca courts encourage confessions from perpetrators.

Bowd stated that some of the main advantages of the Gacaca court system are:

- The confession process serves to negate denial of the genocide and builds the foundation on which victims and perpetrators might be reconciled. The confession process can contribute to justice and reconciliation by disclosing the truth, providing information as to the whereabouts of victims' bodies, thus enabling a dignified reburial, and providing an arena where perpetrators can seek forgiveness
- The Gacaca courts dramatically speed up the trials of genocide suspects; they stop impunity and restore the population's trust in the justice system
- Gacaca courts make significant contributions to eradicating the culture of impunity and ensuring the punishment of the guilty
- Gacaca courts encourage transparency and promote a return to the period in which Hutus and Tutsis lived side by side in relative harmony, sharing the same land, language, religion and culture, and
- The Gacaca process adds a further dimension to the justice provided by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Rwandan national courts because of their restorative nature.

However, Bowd noted that the Gacaca system has been challenged for a number of reasons. These include:

- The legal competence of the trial judges
- The impartiality and independence of Gacaca courts
- Susceptibility of the courts to government influence, and
- The lack of sufficient right to appeal in the original proposal.

The Gacaca courts, Bowd stated, have also been heavily criticized because war crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front are not tried by Gacaca, thus delivering a 'victors' justice' in which 'Hutu will remain killer and the Tutsi victim'. Bowd asserted that many of these criticisms are based upon valid arguments and it would be folly to argue that the Gacaca system is perfect. However, despite its imperfections, 83 per cent of Rwandans have confidence in the Gacaca process, including, interestingly, 87 per cent of Hutus and 75 per cent of Tutsis.

Bowd stated that his research reaffirms that Gacaca courts are, in fact, augmenting the reconciliation process in Rwanda and having many of their desired effects. In two of the three villages in which Bowd's Participatory Rural Appraisals exercises were conducted, Gacaca was recognised as a key mechanism for engendering trust, forgiveness, collective responsibility, social cohesion, unity and reconciliation.

Discussion

The discussion centred on the role and competence of the Gacaca judges and the impartiality and independence of the Gacaca courts. During the discussion, issues were raised regarding witness intimidation in some communities and the daunting challenge regarding witness memory and how such memories can be incorporated in the justice system.

Bowd responded by saying that while the Gacaca court system is not perfect, without such a traditional justice system

it would not have been possible to try all of the 650 000 people who have been tried in the Gacaca system or to release the 130 000 people who would have likely instead faced more than a decade in prison without a formal trial. There is still significant scope, he said, to reform the Gacaca process. However, overall, he believes the Gacaca system is a positive development in Africa and should be recognized as such.

PARALLEL SESSION B: GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF AID AGENCIES, NGOS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Chair: WANEP Murtala Touray

Towards a Better Conflict Management Framework: The Role of National, Regional and Continental Organisations

Aderito Machava

In his presentation, Machava sought to examine the root causes of conflict and violent conflict in Africa, as well as the main achievements, gaps and weaknesses of the continent's current conflict management systems. According to Machava, the root causes of conflict range from the colonial legacy, the legacy of the Cold War, poverty, illiteracy, poor governance, ethnicity and ecological disasters. Poverty, exclusion and inequality and the effects of globalisation, he argued, should be viewed as 'trigger factors' of conflicts in Africa.

In order to address conflict-related challenges in Africa, Machava stated, it is essential to establish conflict management frameworks at the national, regional and continental levels. When putting in place conflict management frameworks, it is imperative to first analyze the root causes of conflict and differentiate between root causes and proximate causes of conflict. At the moment, there is a tendency to attribute conflict to ethnic problems. Frameworks must be comprehensive and identify innovative ways to bridge the divide between conflicting groups. In countries with ongoing violent conflicts, such frameworks are especially important and provide an opportunity to promote economic and social development in the country more broadly.

Machava stated that one of the primary challenges is that regional organisations, the African Union, and national countries lack the necessary capacity to effectively implement conflict prevention and peacebuilding frameworks. Such bodies are expected to formulate and implement effective capacity-building programs that focus on conflict prevention and conflict resolution skills.

Machava recommended that the following improvements:

- Greater involvement by grassroots organisations in conflict management because these groups are equipped with the important local knowledge that helps to resolve conflicts
- Strengthen and improve the capacity of various actors at the national, regional, and continental levels to maintain peace,

manage conflict, and promote political, social and economic stability

- Provide necessary capacity-building support systems to regional and sub-regional organisations so that these organisations can effectively fulfil their responsibilities based on the established frameworks
- Identify ways to strengthen internal democracy, particularly in countries where the state acts more for private interests than for the public good, and
- Establish a network of conflict management networks at the national and regional levels to provide an opportunity to share experiences and knowledge that will be important when ‘scaling up’ conflict prevention and management activities across the entire continent.

Machava also added that the AU must assume a more proactive role in dealing with those issues that are likely to lead to the escalation of conflict.

Beyond the Orthodoxy of Post-conflict Reconstruction in Africa: The Institutionalisation of Global Civil Society

Oladiran Afolabi

In his presentation, Afolabi presented an agenda for the institutionalisation of global civil society in Africa’s post-conflict reconstruction policy framework. He began his presentation by discussing the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of ‘global civil society’, noting that the concept of global civil society is explained and understood in different ways. Global civil society, he asserted, needs to play a role in all phases of post-conflict reconstruction activities and programs and be enabled to initiate, monitor, evaluate and initiate a balanced, participatory post-conflict reconstruction process. However, while global civil society can play an important role in post-conflict reconstruction, it should build upon, and not come at the expense of, African-derived solutions.

Afolabi went on to argue that in examining the African Union (AU)’s policy frameworks for post-conflict reconstruction, significant importance is ascribed to supportive external actors, such as international institutions, agencies, governments, NGOs and private contractors. This situation, according to Afolabi, creates over-reliance on what he calls ‘an externally driven post-conflict reconstruction process’. He added that such processes lack sufficient local ownership and participation.

In involving global civil society in post-conflict reconstruction, the following points should be considered:

- Global civil society can influence different key actors in the effort to prevent conflict
- Global civil society can provide important support to national governments
- Local civil society can and should be the leading actor in addressing post-conflict reconstruction processes
- Local civil society must work together with global civil society, and

- There should be African-derived solutions to African problems.

War Termination, Inclusive Identity and Post-conflict Elections in Côte d’Ivoire

Lucien Toulou

Toulou gave a brief background of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, focusing on its preparedness for elections. Toulou argued that while many stakeholders feel that Côte d’Ivoire is ready for elections, it appears that the necessary groundwork may not be in place for credible, democratic elections. Elections should, he stated, be the crowning moment of the peace process. However, in Côte d’Ivoire, political alliances at local and international levels are very complicated and political actors have different local and international supporters and alliances based on their individual interests and agendas. There is currently a lack of compromise among political actors, and it is unlikely that the president will plan an election if he is likely to lose it. This brings into question the party’s commitment to a lasting solution to the problems it faces and to the peace process. If parties have shallow agendas, he argued, this may jeopardise the peace process.

Toulou also discussed the election-related challenges that Côte d’Ivoire faces, many of which are technical in nature. The two elections held in 1995 and 2000 were carried out according to strict regulations. According to the 1995 electoral law, only individuals born to two Ivorian parents are qualified to vote. However, as immigrants who are living in Côte d’Ivoire often acquire names similar to those of native Ivoirians, it has proven difficult to identify native Ivoirians from immigrants. This poses an obstacle to the voter registration process. Furthermore, based on the new constitution, in order to run for the presidency, an individual’s parents must both be Ivorian by birth, which is a rule that came about because one of the rivals is Burkinabe by birth. The issue of identity and of who is or is not Ivorian is a major cause of conflict in the country.

Discussion

The discussion centred on the obstacles to conducting free and fair elections in Côte d’Ivoire, and whether there is a genuine readiness among political parties to bring about a stable political system. The discussion also questioned support from the international community for a lasting peace.

Although the Ouagadougou Accords placed a high level of importance on the conduct of elections as a solution to the problems in Côte d’Ivoire, the preparation for these elections has been fraught with challenges, including technical issues relating to voter registration and balloting.

Another challenge to the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire is the issue of disarmament. There is a dispute between the government and the rebels, with the government demanding immediate disarmament while the rebels asking for identification to be carried out prior to disarmament. Conducting the elections without the proper disarmament raises security problems. The problem of identity cards also poses a significant issue because almost 40 per cent of the country’s identity documents were destroyed

during the war. Due to all these problems, it would be difficult to hold the elections in June 2008. There seems to be a strong desire, however, to proceed with the elections as scheduled in spite of these challenges.

Armed Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa: Internal or Internationalised Responsibilities? Sierra Leone as a Case Study

Oscar Mateos

Mateos discussed the root causes of armed conflict in Africa in general and used Sierra Leone as a case study to analyse the historical, social, political and economic dimensions of the conflict and its actors. He argued that the causes of war cannot be attributed to a single factor, although issues such as diamonds, natural resources, and international interventions are often discussed as the primary causes of conflict in Sierra Leone. While in resources have indeed been a major contributing factor to conflict Sierra Leone,, Mateos stated, the political system also has a history of excluding many sectors of the society from political and economic activities in the country. When people are denied economic resources, he asserted, conflict can be expected. It is essential to look at the many multi-faceted dimensions of conflict.

Mateos expressed his appreciation for new approaches adopted by the international community, intergovernmental organisations, donors and international NGOs. These are focusing on development interventions to counteract conflict. However, he expressed his concern that such organisations and institutions have failed to understand the “the deep-rooted dynamics that

underlie conflict on the continent”. He cited the Sierra Leone post-conflict reconstruction process as a case in point.

Discussion

The discussion centred on the issue of resources as a cause for conflict, although it was noted that other sources of conflict should also be examined in order to develop a lasting solution. Though there are signs of economic growth and recovery, this does not mean that inequality in the country has diminished. This must be taken into consideration because pervasive inequality could incite future conflict.

To date, post-conflict processes have been largely guided by external processes, even, at times, to the exclusion of local actors. An externally-driven process that does not give adequate consideration to local actors and processes is harmful to the country’s long-term progress. The international community does not seem to be aware of this potentially destructive situation.

The discussion also examined the role of transnational business firms, such as mining companies and private security companies, which receive government support and can contribute to the escalation of conflict in the country. It is important to note that there are some that actually benefit from conflict.

Other challenges include the special court which, although it is one of the country’s primary reconciliation mechanisms, has largely failed in its mandate although it has consumed significant financial resources. Most of the main actors in the conflict are already dead and many of the people who are responsible for the conflict and devastation in Sierra Leone have not yet been brought to justice.

PLENARY SESSION 3

Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

Role Of Women And Youth

Chair: ISS Christopher Ayangafac

There is consensus that while women are rarely, if ever, the primary instigators of armed conflict, both in Africa and other parts of the world, they are almost always among its main victims. Societal breakdown and the failure of law and order leaves women in vulnerable situations in which they face abuses such as abduction, systematic rape, sexual enslavement and gender-based violence.

ENGENDERING CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE-MAKING IN AFRICA: PUTTING WOMEN AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS FIRST

Bernard Mugisha

Mugisha explored the meaning of gender and its evolution in the African context. African society, he stated, is patriarchal, with power, resources, decision-making and control traditionally dominated by men. Women's roles have also been generally dictated by men.

Issues of gender, stated Mugisha, were largely ignored in early African charters. The OAU, established in 1963, was primarily concerned with the preservation of African independence, combating colonialism, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign African states and gave little attention to gender equality and the protection of women.

More recently, however, the AU has taken important steps towards the promotion of women's participation in political and social issues. In its 2000/01 Constitutive Act, the AU highlights gender balance and equality as one of its principles. The AU has taken measures to promote equitable gender representation in its bodies, and currently at least 50 per cent of the membership of the Commission of the AU are women. A number of individual African governments have also made efforts to increase women's representation in political positions.

Although much progress has been made in efforts to address gender inequalities in the AU through various declarations and protocols, the AU Charter continues to be silent or weak on several fronts when it comes to achieving gender equity and equality. For example:

- The Charter only provides for the protection of women's rights in a single article that focuses on the protection of children and the family

- The Charter does not discuss the involvement of women in conflict transformation
- Apart from a general provision on equality and prohibition of unfair discrimination, the Charter does not provide for the involvement of women in decision-making or representation, and
- The Charter does not have provisions in other areas that are crucial to women in situations of conflict, such as violence against women, rape, and war crimes.

Mugisha further argued that the Protocol of Women of the African Union's Peace and Security Council should explicitly state that women must be involved in all structures and processes of peacemaking and conflict resolution in Africa. Mugisha concluded his presentation by suggesting a multi-pronged strategy that calls for proactive action to eliminate and redress all obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making and societal management. He reiterated the need to promote women's role in peacemaking and the wider protection of human rights and stated that women must be given consideration in peace-building activities.

Discussion

The discussion focused on the need for women to play a crucial role in the prevention of conflicts and in peacebuilding efforts in Africa. Since women also bear the brunt of the consequences of conflict, it is important that they are included in conflict resolution processes. In order to protect the wellbeing of women and tap into their potential to prevent conflict and contribute to the building of sustainable peace, both international and domestic conventions and protocols must give women due consideration.

In its 2000/01 Constitutive Act, the African Union incorporated the issue of women's rights. While this is a significant and encouraging development, it is important to ensure that all international and domestic protocols and conventions incorporate the rights of women. Dual efforts are needed to challenge cultural norms that relegate women to a lower status than men in their societies and communities. While the participation of women in positions of political leadership has been increasing, more needs to be done to promote the rights of women in Africa and to encourage their participation in political and peacebuilding processes.

THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND PEACEBUILDING

Damilola Amilola Taiye Agbajobi

Agbajobi examined the role of women in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. She started her presentation by noting that violence against women and children in conflict and transition countries has emerged as a major obstacle in building peace. Sexual assault and exploitation of women are frequently employed as tools of war, and victimisation leads to isolation, alienation, prolonged emotional trauma, and unwanted pregnancies that can result in abandoned children. It is imperative that conflict management and peacebuilding programs take into consideration the unique experiences of women and men during conflict. Although conflict may, in some cases, improve gender relations as a result of shift in gender roles, by and large its impact on women is devastatingly negative.

Women should be at the forefront of decision-making and peacebuilding efforts to ensure that perpetrators are held responsible for actions committed against women and children. She cited UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security as the most important commitment made by the global community to date with regard to women's participation in the maintenance of peace and security. Women peace activists worldwide, she noted, are using resolution 1325 as a tool for raising awareness about women's experiences in conflict and for holding local authorities and governments accountable. She provided several examples of how resolution 1325 is being implemented around the world, including:

- In 2003, a resolution drafted along the lines of 1325 was introduced in the US Congress
- In Israel, Knesset members have introduced a bill based on 1325 as a means for raising awareness about the issue of women's participation in peace and security issues
- In Sri Lanka, women peace activists run workshops on 'taking 1325 to the village', and
- In Fiji in 2003, the local Women, Peace and Security Committee demanded that the National Defense Review Process acknowledge the role of women in peace and security issues and successfully advocated for the inclusion of the Minister for Gender Affairs on the National Security Council.

Agbajobi went on to discuss obstacles to women's increased participation, including cultural standards that negate the value of their contributions and voices; restrictions on women's mobility; and the traditional exclusion of women from public arenas. Even when women want to participate, she stated, they may not have the required education or training, and conflict may have disrupted their education. At present, the groups and organisations involved in trying to influence formal processes tend to be male-dominated. Women's organisations often lack resources, limiting their ability to effectively participate in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding processes. In order to strengthen women's capacity to contribute to such processes, there is a

need to increase women's access to employment opportunities and productive assets such as land, capital, health services, training and education.

In order to enhance women's roles in conflict resolution, Agbajobi offered the following recommendations:

Governments must:

- Implement, in full, UN Security Council Resolution 1325
- Include women in peace negotiations at all levels of society, and especially in decision making processes
- Ensure that women play a key role in the design and implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and peace building activities
- Support and strengthen women's organisations in their peacebuilding efforts by providing adequate and sustained financial and technical support for them
- Strengthen the protection and representation of refugees and displaced women by paying special attention to their health, rehabilitation and training needs, and
- End impunity and ensure redress of crimes committed against women in war and violent conflict.

NGOs must:

- Integrate a gender perspective into all of their projects
- Build partnerships and collaborate with other NGOs
- Support trauma counselling during and after the conflict, which could help to recognise the different ways in which men and women deal with trauma
- Provide safe spaces for non-war action and create and promote non-war economic activity, and
- Increase women's participation in political, social, and economic processes through training, awareness raising, campaigns and quota implementation.

The United Nations must:

- Act as an example to other nations by fully integrating a gender perspective into the terms of reference of the Security Council Resolution and engage women fully in its own peacebuilding efforts
- Call upon member states to establish measures to address non-compliance
- Call for the inclusion of peacebuilding elements in the consolidation of peace agreements and in the mandates of peace building and post conflict reconstruction
- Urge peacebuilders to focus on gender-based violence and women's human rights
- Encourage states to provide gender sensitive training to the peacebuilders before they arrive in zones of conflict, and
- Encourage peace education at all levels of the educational system and
- Call for the establishment of reporting systems for sexual abuses, including a monitoring and enforcing mechanism.

Agbajobi concluded by calling for the involvement of women in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Women, she stated, can mobilise for peace and have already played key roles as activists and peacemakers in conflict situations while, at the same time, holding together their families and communities. There is a need for governments and the UN to have a consistent and high level of commitment to gender equality and equal representation of women in peacebuilding activities.

Discussion

The discussion centred on the status and role of women in society. Some noted that the existing attitude toward women in Africa remains discouraging and many families remain undemocratic institutions that do not accord women their rightful status. Although women can be good mediators and can reduce violence in Africa, they do not take adequate part in conflict resolution initiatives and are not generally included in peacebuilding activities, taking on 'observer' status instead. Strategies must be adopted to make society more gender sensitive and involve women in the design, planning and implementation of the post-conflict reconstruction process and peacebuilding. There must be greater political commitment among African governments to improve the protection of women's rights and involve them in peacebuilding activities.

OUR BODIES, THEIR BATTLEFRONT: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN CONFLICT ZONES: NOT A CASE OF IMPUNITY

Cecelia Mzvondiwa

Mzvondiwa brought to light the suffering and abuse women confront in conflict zones and the silence and shame that many women live with after facing rape. She argued that the differential treatment of rape underscores the fact that the problem is not just the absence of adequate legal prohibitions but also the international community's willingness to tolerate the subordination of women.

She went on to discuss the shortcomings in the Geneva Convention's treatment of rape and sexual violence against women. These include:

- Sexual violence is not expressly designated as a 'grave breach'. This is a reflection of the international community's historical failure to appreciate the seriousness of sexual violence during armed conflict. The law has so far trivialised rape as a crime of war
- Rape and other forms of sexual violence are characterized as attacks against the honour of women or, at most, as an outrage upon personal dignity. Such reference implies that the so called 'honour' or dignity is something lent to women by men and that a raped woman is thereby dishonoured. This poses an obstacle to classifying rape as a crime that violates the bodily integrity of the woman as an individual with human rights.

Mzvondiwa called upon African governments and the international community to take action against rape in war. Building political will, she stated, is essential to ensure the sustainable, efficient implementation of national plans to fight sexual violence against women. Political engagement must extend far beyond the executive branch; the justice and enforcement sectors must also be involved. She concluded her presentation with the following recommendations:

- Implement and follow-through on international laws that protect women
- Embrace the protocols of the African Charter
- Understand that Africa cannot realise the Millennium Development Goals unless women's rights are respected
- Declare sexual violence in conflict a war crime
- Give the International Criminal Court a clear mandate to prosecute rape as a war crime
- Offer adequate and professional gender training for all departments of the War Crimes Tribunals and the ICC
- Ensure UN peacekeepers lead by example in upholding women's rights and security at all times, and
- Revise the Geneva conventions to condemn the rape of women as a breach in human rights rather than a violation of personal honour.

Discussion

The discussion centred on how rape is used as a weapon of war in all conflict areas. In order to prevent women from rape and other violent acts, protection mechanisms must be implemented and enforced on the ground, particularly because women often lack the necessary abilities to protect their rights on their own. There is a need to strengthen political will to enforce the legal framework to protect women in conflict zones. Though many African countries have ratified protocols to protect women from various acts of violence, there is a huge gap between such protocols and their implementation. There is also a need to strengthen punitive action against perpetrators of violence against women. Efforts to punish those involved in such acts of violence are almost non-existent in most African countries.

GUARDIANS OF THE NATION OR UNRULY DISCIPLES? A CRITIQUE OF YOUTH AND GOVERNANCE IN POST-COLONIAL ZIMBABWE'S CONTESTED POLITICAL SPACES

Terence Mashingaidze

The primary objective of Mashingaidze's presentation was to examine the role of the youth in political governance in Africa and, in particular, in Zimbabwe. Youth violence is often precipitated by African leaders whose parties turn to violence in order to withstand political competition and to 'neutralize' other contenders for state power. In such situations, the youth population can be manipulated by parties to work for their ends. However, Mashingaidze stated, it is also important to note that there are

many examples of youth who make deliberate efforts to align themselves with resource-rich and influential adult politicians for their own benefit. For example, most of the young men and women who participated in the government's controversial National Youth Service training program in Zimbabwe between 2001 and 2005 were poverty stricken, and lived in rural areas or ghettos.

Using Zimbabwe as a case study, Mashingaidze explored the roles and terms of youth participation in post-colonial politics in the country. He found that politicians have, at times, viewed the youth as a threat to their power and have historically made them instruments to work for and perpetuate their systems in different forms. Citing the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front and its Youth Brigades as an example, he described how the youth were exploited by the party and its leaders. The Youth Brigades were a kind of party militia that was operated with financial and strategic backing from the Ministry of Youth, Co-operatives and Employment Creation, whose offices at one point were based at the ruling party headquarters in the capital.

Mashingaidze went on to say that when the government lost the 2000 Draft Constitution Referendum, which was its first electoral defeat since 1980, it quickly revived the National Youth Service (NYS) of the 1980s. It also introduced National Strategic Studies (NSS) in the country's tertiary institutions. These programmes aimed to simultaneously promote the centrality of the ruling party in the nation's history as well as its indispensability in the future.

YOUTH EXCLUSION, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT

Assouan Gbesso

In contrast to Mashingaidze, Gbesso examined youth exclusion and its relationship to youth violence. He described how frustrated young people can resort to violent actions when they are marginalized, excluded and when their basic needs are not met. Contemporary literature on youth and conflict in Africa, Gbesso stated, shows that youth unemployment and disaffection appear to play an important role in inciting youth participation in conflict. When basic public services are inadequate or non-existent and when young people lack access to education, there is increased risk of the youth becoming involved in violence or joining gangs or rebel groups.

Gbesso provided several examples of countries in which youth have had active involvement in conflict. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, young people joined the *Jeunes Patriotes* (Young Patriots) movement because they were given money by political leaders or were promised jobs and other positions in the future.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, young people joined armed groups to have control over diamond trafficking and other precious resources.

While young people in Africa are often at the forefront of conflict and can be a threat to social stability and cohesion, Gbesso stated, they also constitute a pool of energy and opportunity to eradicate a number of problems that affect the continent. There is a need to more fully involve young people in preventing conflict and building a sustainable peace, and promoting their active participation in decision-making and the development of their communities.

Gbesso went on to argue that proper development initiatives can prevent young people from taking part in violent conflicts and from resorting to violence when they feel marginalized. Such development initiatives, he asserted, should be participatory and encourage youth to refrain from participation in violent movements and instead utilise non-violent responses to conflict. In order for such initiatives to be successful, however, Gbesso proposed that we must combat traditional notions that deny young people the right or ability to take part in community decision-making. We must also combat the 'social exclusion' of youth, which he described as a 'social paradigm' that identifies certain individuals or groups as excluded because of their poverty or their underprivileged social position.

Gbesso concluded by stating that in order to prevent conflicts and promote sustainable peace and development in Africa, governments, NGOs, and other institutions cannot ignore the youth. Youth must be properly involved and empowered to take part in the development of the continent.

Discussion

The discussion focused on youth involvement in the political process. In Africa, politicians have too frequently used youth for their own selfish purposes and hidden agendas, which can be destabilising to political systems and harmful to positive youth development. Young people have not received adequate credit or attention for their ability to serve as important actors in building peace, preventing conflicts, and promoting development. In order to improve the status of youth in the political, economic and social development of a nation, their participation has to be strengthened.

Governments have the responsibility to improve the economic and social life of youth by encouraging their participation, combating youth marginalisation and deprivation, creating and ensuring employment opportunities for youth, and promoting development strategies and policies that protect the rights and interests of the youth. Since one of the key root causes of conflict is poverty, countries should strive to eradicate poverty through the direct involvement of the youth. Governments must also emphasise and promote education, which is the cornerstone of a strong and productive nation.

PARALLEL SESSION 4

Conflict Management, Mediation, and Peace Support Operations

PARALLEL SESSION A: THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS IN PEACE AGREEMENTS AND MEDIATION PROCESSES; HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Chair: Yvonne Chibiya, SAHRIT

Mediation and Peacebuilding through Regional Arms Control and Disarmament Diplomacy: A Diplomatic Continuum in the Somali Peace Process *Philip Njuguna Mwanika*

In his presentation, Mwanika focused on the role of diplomacy, human rights and justice as a mode of mediation in protracted conflicts. He explored the concept of peacebuilding and the utilisation of regional arms control legal regimes and disarmament diplomacy, using Somalia as a specific case study.

Somalia, he stated, has defied peacekeeping, conflict management norms, and challenged the Westphalian concept of the state and its legitimacy. The country has been host to violent internal conflicts, a failed UN peace enforcement operation and, most recently, an invasion by Ethiopia. In recent developments, Somalia has witnessed the violation of laws of arms control by virtually all actors involved in the Somali conflict.

The presence, proliferation and lack of transparent control of small arms and light weapons continues to be a major challenge in Somalia despite the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the UN Security Council arms embargo that has been in place since 1992. Attempts by external actors to respond to Somalia's internal challenges have tended to be militaristic in nature and have had only a marginal positive impact on the Somali conflict.

Mwanika elaborated on the observation that while governments in the region are obliged to execute the various arms control and disarmament provisions of Nairobi Protocol, state actors have yet to actively pursue such measures in Somalia. The Nairobi Protocol makes provision for the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) to play an active diplomatic role in promoting arms control and disarmament in the region. However, to date, RECSA has maintained a relatively low profile in this regard because of its lack of resources and capacity. The Nairobi Protocol could be employed as a diplomatic umbrella by groups such as IGAD and the International Somali

Contact Group to bolster legitimate mediation and reconciliation processes in Somalia.

Mwanika concluded by stating that for sustainable peace to be achieved in Somalia it is imperative that conflict management and peacebuilding approaches be pursued vigorously by all relevant parties. This should be combined with efforts (especially by RECSA) to encourage the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol by states that are signatories to this agreement.

Discussion

The discussion touched on the intractability of the Somali conflict. The primary suggestion resulting from the discussion was the need to link disarmament and conflict management across the region to effectively implement the Nairobi Protocol. While there have been 14 attempts to make peace, they have not involved all actors and some actors, such as the Hawiya clan, have been marginalised in the process. Even though warlords participated in the peace process for more than two years, the process failed. To move forward, there is a need for disarmament and diplomacy incorporating the social, political, and resource concerns of the country's varying factions.

Another issue raised during the discussion was that of weapons trafficking because Somalia's long coastline has resulted in a huge influx of weapons both in Somali markets and in the markets of its neighbours. There is a need to develop monitoring capabilities along this coastline.

There was consensus among conference participants that resolutions, protocols and proclamations alone will not help to stop conflicts if there is no political will or a genuine desire for peace.

The Darfur Conflict and Humanitarian Crises in the Region: Can Sovereignty of States Stand as Justification for Non-Intervention?

Sharkdam Wapmuk

Wapmuk examined protracted conflict in Darfur and raised a question: should sovereignty continue to provide a justification for non-intervention. According to Wapmuk, factors contributing to the conflict in Darfur include:

- Decades of economic and political marginalisation by the power elites in Khartoum towards Darfurians

- Tension over increasingly scarce farmland and water resources
- Unfair distribution of political power and the lack of any sharing of oil revenue between northern and southern Sudan, and
- Long-standing socio-economic neglect and discrimination toward Darfur by successive Sudanese governments.

The dispute over land and power has resulted in the proliferation of armed groups and the surge of violence, displacing Darfurians. Sharkdam blamed the state for recruiting militias known as the 'Janjaweed' to suppress the uprisings in Darfur. Combined with the rising insurgency by various rebel groups, Sharkdam noted that the militias fuelled a protracted civil conflict that has displaced more than two million people and killed at least 200,000.

Sharkdam stated that the government of Sudan has been reluctant to allow the international community to intervene in the conflict, arguing that it is protecting its sovereignty. However, Sharkdam argued, sovereignty does not imply that states are free from obligations to their citizens and responsibility to members of the international community. Humanitarian intervention and forcible military assistance can and should be implemented without agreement from the state in the case of grave and large-scale violations of human rights. In such circumstances, there is due justification to breach state sovereignty. It is important to remember, however, that for an intervention to be 'humanitarian', the desire to address violations of human rights must be the driving force to act.

He went on to criticise the AU and the UN for failing to respond in a timely matter to the crisis. While the situation has continued to deteriorate, the AU and UN have maintained their recognition and respect of Sudan as a sovereign state, seeking its consent to deploy a hybrid force of about 20,000 peacekeepers. The AU, he argued, must clarify its position on interference and intervention in Article 4(h) and 4(g) of the AU Constitutive Act in order to pave the way for meaningful peace operations. While Article 2 of the Charter of the UN posits the UN's respect for the sovereignty of member states, Article 24 gives the Security Council responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. According to Sharkdam, it will not be sufficient for the UN to enforce action on Sudan under Chapter VII of its Charter because of the evolving, complex nature of the conflict in Darfur.

In conclusion, Sharkdam reiterated that the defence of state sovereignty does not mean unlimited power. Sovereignty is subject to international recognition; without such recognition a nation is not sovereign. Sovereignty in the Westphalian tradition does not allow states to intervene in one another's domestic affairs, even in cases when the state abuses citizens' rights. This notion, argued Sharkdam, is hypocritical because it has been abused by states. In the case of Darfur, the government cannot continue to plead sovereignty while the lives of millions of Darfurians are being lost or dehumanized. Similarly, the AU and UN should mount more diplomatic pressure on the state to implement agreements such as the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and joint communiqués signed with the UN. Given the emergence of more armed groups, the peace talks will require broad participation, including that of women.

Discussion

The discussion centred on the motives among states for intervening in particular conflict situations. Since states tend to intervene primarily in situations in which they have explicit political interest, this could hamper unified intervention efforts.

The AU-UN Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur: Challenges and Prospects

Samuel Obadiah

Obadiah examined the AU-UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur and asserted that the conflict in the western region of Darfur represents one of the most critical tests for Africa and the international community as a whole. Instability in Sudan, he argued, has assumed international dimensions and resulted in a large-scale humanitarian crisis that has claimed over 200,000 lives, displaced over 2 million people, and posed security threats to neighbouring countries.

Serious conflict erupted in Darfur in February 2003 when the well-armed Sudan Liberation Movement, the Sudanese Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement took advantage of turmoil within the al-Bashir regime and launched attacks on government military bases in Fashir, Darfur's main city. The conflict also has deep historical roots that must be examined, including the marginalisation of Darfurians, the gradual emergence of militia groups in the area, and the spread of small arms and light weapons. Additional contributing factors include issues related to drought and famine, the government's policy of 'Arabisation', the effect of north-south conflict, and the isolation of the Darfuran people, particularly women and children, from political and economic participation.

In response to the February 2003 attacks, the Sudanese government launched a counterinsurgency campaign of 'ethnic cleansing' against the Fur, Zaghawa and Massalit ethnic groups. To reinforce its attack, the government mobilized the Janjaweed, supporting, arming and training them. The conflict in Darfur has international dimensions that are manifested through cross-border rebel activities in neighbouring countries. In Chad and the Central African Republic, the influx of displaced people from Darfur and the related refugee crisis has implications for the international community. China's support for the Sudanese government and involvement in neighbouring countries like Chad, Eritrea, Egypt, Libya, as well as the intervention of international organisations such as the AU and the UN in Sudan, have further internationalised the conflict.

In 2006, a peace agreement was signed that provided for the following:

- The disarming and demobilisation of the Janjaweed militia by the Sudanese government of national unity
- The integration of former combatants into the Sudanese armed forces
- Upholding of the right of the people of Darfur to elect their leaders and determine their regional status, and
- The establishment of protective buffer zones around camps for the internally displaced.

However, the AU-UN Peacemaking Mission in Darfur faced problems, and the deployment of the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was not entirely smooth. According to Obadiah, the challenges the mission has faced include:

- The likelihood of command and control confusion
- An inability to bring the rebel movements to comply with the ceasefire agreement and sign the peace accord
- The lack of an adequate warning system for imminent attacks
- The lack of comprehensive and timely intelligence
- Difficulty in distinguishing between combatants and allies, and
- Uncooperative officials within the Sudanese government.

With regard to the intervention by the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), said Obadiah, it faced many challenges, and its inadequacies necessitated the establishment of an AU-UN hybrid force to bridge the gaps.

Obadiah concluded by stating that one of the main challenges for lasting peace and stability in the region is deemed to be the failure to bring together the rebels to sign the proposed peace agreement. Obadiah criticized all the actors, including the government, for consistently violating the ceasefire accord. He called upon the international community to build consensus on the way forward in the Darfur peace process, to unite the rebel groups and urged them to sign an all-encompassing peace agreement, to increase troop and funding contribution to UNAMID, and, most importantly, to secure the cooperation of the Sudanese government.

The Role of Human Rights in Peacebuilding in Post Conflict Societies

Lawrence Juma

In his presentation, Juma focused on the role of human rights in building peace in post-conflict societies. In discussing human rights issues in post-conflict situations, he emphasized the importance of conceptualising the spectrum of human rights issues that might emerge from new institutions, new dynamics, and new understandings of differences. Among human rights issues to take into consideration are gender equality, female circumcision, polygamy, homosexual rights, religion, and language.

In addition to conceptualising differences in our understanding of human rights, the issue of differences in hierarchy ought to be considered as well. He posed the following question:

- Should certain human rights be more important than others? For example, is freedom of speech more important than food or school or medicine in a country where the poverty index is high?

He went on to suggest that the issue of hierarchy is problematic, not only with regard to human rights but also with regard to laws, constitutions, and customary issues.

For any given country, there are three stages in which human rights issues should be discussed:

- Before the conflict
- During conflict escalation, and
- After the conflict.

In the post-conflict stage, there are three sub-phases:

- The pre-negotiation agreement
- The substantive framework agreement, and
- The agreement implementation.

In discussing human rights, he reiterated, issues of human dignity should not be taken for granted. The principle of human dignity is the basis for freedom, justice and peace.

Juma concluded his presentation by posing the following critical questions:

- In post -conflict situations, should peace agreements give amnesty to all who violated human rights?
- Which types of human rights institutions should be built in such situations?

PARALLEL SESSION B: CROSS-CUTTING THEMES: PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION REGIMES IN AFRICA: PRINCIPLES, THEORIES, DOCTRINES AND EMERGING DYNAMICS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, PEACE RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN AFRICA

Chair: Christopher Ayangafac, ISS

The Evolving Role of the Military in the Peace and Security Architecture of West Africa

James Gadin

Gadin examined the role of the military in the peace and security architecture in West Africa. This region is arguably one of the poorest regions in the world and is plagued by endemic poverty, high rates of HIV/Aids infection, entrenched corruption, lack of accountability, and poor governance. In the recent past, West Africa has been characterized by insecurity, violent conflicts, warlordism, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, cross-border crimes and banditry, collapse of social and economic infrastructure and, in some cases, near state collapse or failure.

ECOWAS was established in 1975. In its original conception, ECOWAS was founded as a regional economic integration body and not as a security institution. It was increasingly recognised, however, that peace and security are interdependent prerequisites for economic growth and regional integration in member states. Subsequently, in 1978, ECOWAS adopted a Protocol of Non-Aggression, and in 1981 it adopted a Protocol for Mutual Assistance in Defence. Both protocols were designed, primarily, to address external threats and aggression.

After war broke out in Liberia in 1991, it was recognized that ECOWAS's existing protocols were insufficient to address the

security problems in Liberia. This prompted member states to review these protocols and led to the adoption of a sub-regional approach to conflict management, as well as an institutionalised security mechanism.

In 1999, the Authority of Heads of State and Government, which is the highest organ of ECOWAS, signed the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. This Protocol came into being amidst problems in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The mechanism may be applied under a number of situations, which include the following:

- Aggression against a member state or the threat of aggression
- Conflict between several member states
- Internal conflict that threatens to result in humanitarian disaster, or poses a threat to peace and security in the sub-region
- Serious violation of human rights and the rule of law, and/or
- Overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government.

The institutions charged with the responsibility of implementing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution Peacekeeping and Security include:

1. The Authority of Heads of State and Government
2. The Mediation and Security Council
3. The Defence and Security Commission
4. The Council of Elders
5. The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
6. The ECOWAS Commission – Observation and Monitoring Centre, Experts, Civil Society

These institutions are staffed by military officers from ECOWAS member states.

In December 2001, in Dakar, Senegal, the ECOWAS Heads of State signed an addendum to the Peace and Security Mechanism, titled the ‘Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance’. The mechanism and the supplementary protocol constitute a comprehensive framework for addressing threats to peace and human security on a far-reaching basis by addressing the core elements of conflict.

Within the security-sector reforms and transformation, there is an ongoing re-professionalisation of armed forces and para-military services across the sub-region. Training and participation in peacekeeping has helped expose the military personnel in the sub-region to international human rights standards, norms and the respect for rule of law.

Ideally, stated Gadin, this process envisions the total disengagement of the military from political control of the state, and the submission of the armed forces in the sub-region to democratic control. The reforms are meant to better position the armed forces to safeguard both the internal and external territorial integrity of states they serve. Since the move toward greater professionalism and their return to the barracks, the military is now better able to guarantee democratic stability by protecting and defending legitimate, democratic institutions.

He also noted that at the sub-regional level, there has been a drastic reduction in the number of armed conflicts, to such an extent that, currently, there are no ECOWAS forces deployed in any member state for the purposes of peacekeeping. However, there remains a need for democracy education as part of the ECOWAS Peace Support Operation multifunctional operations training.

In order to keep the sub-region on the right path towards sustainable peace for regional economic development, Gadin concluded, a number of issues have to be addressed. These include:

- Initiation and control of the ECOWAS Standby Force missions, including clear articulation under the coordination and political control of the ECOWAS Commission.
- The issue of HIV/Aids and its implications for conflict management efforts in the region.

Greed and Grievance: Interrogating the Resource Conflicts Question and Adding Peace Studies to the Curriculum in Africa *Hassan Saliu*

Saliu examined the issue of resource conflicts and the idea of bringing in peace studies as a mechanism for building long-term peace in Africa. He argued that greed and grievance are major sources of conflict in Africa. Within the last three decades, the continent has been marred by more than 20 major violent conflicts, the majority of which have been characterized by intra-state wars fuelled by racial and ethnic animosities, greed for power and resources, as well as religious intolerance. Currently, there are about 10 armed conflicts in Africa, with a particular concentration in the Horn of Africa. These conflicts are mostly intra-state, with the exception being the inter-state conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Recent studies attribute the causes and origins of most armed conflicts in Africa to economic factors and the contestation of natural resources. The possession of natural resources within a particular country often triggers conflict, especially in a state where the structures and institutions of the government are weak. Most countries in Africa that have rich endowments of natural resources such as oil and diamonds have been engaged in armed conflicts (e.g., DRC, Nigeria, Angola, the Sudan, Sierra Leone and Liberia). Though natural resource endowment is a contributing cause to armed conflict in Africa, it should not be seen as the only factor responsible. Other contributing factors include:

- **Issues of politics and the weak and/or soft institutional structures.** The existence of such weak structures creates opportunities for elites to unfairly allocate and distribute natural resources or profits. Such practices have been said to be major causes of grievances that have led to violent outburst as marginalized groups seek to obtain recognition and a share of state resources. The cases of Nigeria and Sudan conform to this scenario. In Nigeria, the Niger Delta crisis is built on weak governance structures, inequality, injustices in the distribution of resources, and marginalisation of minority ethnic groups.

- **Resource-related grievances.** Grievances arising from economic issues, often exacerbated by poverty or inequality, have also tended to influence civil wars. Current thinking on the causes of present-day conflicts sees violence as a response to grievances such as systematic discrimination, human rights violations, inequalities in wealth and political power, and scarcity of resources. Civil wars, according to scholars on armed conflicts and peace in Africa, also stem from the behaviour of those with control over resources and the grievances of marginalised communities or groups who seek justice.

This holds true in Nigeria's Niger Delta, as can be substantiated by the activities of the rebels and their desire for power and war-wealth. In Sierra Leone and Angola, the goal and target of rebels was the control of the lucrative diamond trade. In Sierra Leone, for example, Foday Sankoh, the rebel leader of the Revolutionary United Front was offered the vice president position but declined, as did Jonas Savimbi of Angola. The reason for such behaviour can be attributed to the fact that Sankoh was already earning large profits from his diamond trade activities.

Saliu emphasized the urgent need for 'peace education' as a strategy for conflict management and to advance the cause of human security. Education is a process of imparting and acquiring knowledge through teaching and learning. Peace studies need to be complemented as a conscious attempt to institutionalise peace education in the primary and post-primary educational levels, thereby targeting youth in their formative stages of value development. This is particularly important because youths are often victims as well as players and/or actors in armed conflicts (e.g., child soldiering and child trafficking).

Discussion

The discussion centred on the engagement and role of the military and the rationale for engaging the military in public affairs such as elections. Concerns were raised about the intervention or involvement of the military at a time when importance should be placed on strengthening the capacity of civilians. Another concern was whether peace education is possible in poor communities. There was consensus that greed is not the only factor and cause of conflict. There is little doubt, however, that it is among the major causes, particularly in the context of many of Africa's conflicts.

Interrogating the Shifting Theoretical Paradigms of Conflicts in Africa: The Ethnic Resource Remittance Theory of Conflicts

Bonnie Ayodele

Ayodele focused on the ethnic and resource-related theories of conflict in Africa. He emphasized the interrelated and interwoven nature of ethnic conflicts and resource conflicts. He argued that economic factors and conflict over control of resources have been at the core of most conflicts that have assumed ethnic dimensions. There has been, he stated, a paradigm shift in identifying the causes of conflicts, moving from ethnicity to resources. In Nigeria, for example, resources remain the major cause of conflict.

Ayodele pointed out that there is contestation between ethnic politics and resource sharing. In the event of unfair distribution of resources in an ethnically or heterogeneous state, there is a high possibility of friction and instability, leading to conflict. In Africa, only two violent conflicts, those occurring in Burundi and Rwanda, can be characterized as having ethnic origins. The continent's other conflicts have been, for the most part, resource-based in origin and character.

In addition, stated Ayodele, it is worth noting that many of Africa's conflicts have external factors that contribute to their initiation and escalation. External actors who are interested in Africa's resources have been a major contributing factor. For example, Angola's war, which lasted almost 30 years, was propelled by external interests that arose during the Cold war.

In conclusion, Ayodele offered the following recommendations:

- Redirect the process of resource extraction, allocation and distribution in Africa. Manage ethnic and resource-based conflict through the democratisation of resource remittances and political and economic reforms and reconstruction
- Develop policy priorities that will ensure effective, accountable, and inclusive governance of institutions and institutionalise democracy at the national and local levels through free, fair, participatory, and inclusive elections
- Strengthen the legitimacy of the state by setting up proper checks and balances in the political system. Respect constitutionalism, the ability of the Parliament and the judiciary to check on the executive, devolution of powers, and the ability of regional authorities to counterbalance central power. Ensure the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary
- Ensure for equality of ethnic and religious representativeness in the government. Also ensure equality of access to political activity, participative decision-making, and fair recruitment in the administration and other public institutions
- Respect the rule of law as an ideology of development. Furthermore, ensure equality of all citizens before the law; ensure effective possibility to undertake legal action against state decisions; and enforce legal decisions
- Establish effective reconciliation mechanisms
- Increase the presence and effectiveness of mechanisms arbitrating between conflicting parties (wise men, elders, ombudsmen) and strengthen regional forums for conflict prevention/resolution and
- Adapt the idea of institutionalizing peace education and address educational disparities between social groups, urban-rural populations, and genders.

Education a la Paix apres La Guerre: Construire une Paix Durable dans les Societes Post-conflict (Peace Education after War: Building Sustainable Peace in Post-conflict Societes)

Assouan Gbesso

Gbesso focused on the importance of peace education in building peace in post-conflict societies. He began his presentation by discussing the MDGs and noted that the attainment of the

MDGs by most African countries remains a challenge. With incessant conflicts and their impact on African countries, he noted, development and building sustainable societies remains a tall order. In spite of the fact that a few countries have made significant progress toward achieving the MDGs, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa will find it difficult to achieve any measurable number of the MDGs by the target year of 2015. For instance, although one of the most important goals in the MDG program is universal primary education for all children, millions of African children have not been given the opportunity to acquire at least some basic education.

Achieving the MDGs in their entirety, stated Gbesso, will require African countries to forge partnerships with donor countries that will seek to ensure that MDG programs are well funded and that allocated funds are utilized in a transparent and accountable manner.

At the same time, he cautioned that donor funding might be insufficient to achieve the MDGs. For instance, one of the major obstacles to the achievement of the MDGs is the amount of resources that African countries put into debt servicing. It is therefore imperative that complementary measures, such as the cancellation of debt for highly indebted countries, are undertaken so that countries will have the opportunity to divert resources toward MDG programs.

Gbesso went on to discuss the status of peace education in Africa and noted that, currently, the educational systems in most African countries do not systematically integrate peace and development in their curricula and teaching programs. Even when peace is integrated through special programmes, not all citizens benefit from them. There is a need to introduce reforms in the curricula and education programmes to make them more suitable for new teaching methods and guide them towards peace, non-violence and development. It is possible, he stated, to promote

peace education in a systematic way, such as through the use of the media.

Education and peace education, argued Gbesso, will enhance the capacity of African citizens to address the many problems facing their countries as well as facing the continent. Institutionalising peace education at all levels of the educational system in the continent will ensure that issues of justice, structural inequities and developmental priorities are taken into consideration. Gbesso emphasised that he is not advocating for a 'one size fits all' curriculum but rather for the design of a generic peace education curriculum that can, in turn, be adapted by individual countries to fit their specific contexts. Such an approach, he argues, will ensure that future generations develop positive attitudes towards peace and development on the continent.

Gbesso concluded by emphasizing the importance of involving all stakeholders in the promotion of educational reforms. Such reforms, he stated, should promote accountability, good governance and an active citizenry in national development.

Discussion

During the discussion, the question was raised as to whether education can lead to peace, given that the people involved in conflict in some countries (e.g., military officers) are relatively well educated. If education is a panacea for conflicts, the question was posed, why do we still witness conflicts? At the same, it was pointed out that we should not lose sight of the fact that about 80 per cent of the people involved in conflict in the Niger Delta are illiterate.

The discussion also raised the issue of the possibility of implementing peace education in the non-formal sector. It was felt that such programmes are, in fact, possible and should take into account language and means of transmission such as the media and radio.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

The discussions among the participants touched on the following questions:

- How do we go beyond the AU Charter, beyond elections, beyond constitutionalism, and beyond resource conflicts?
- Do all Africans long for peace? How do we build a culture of peace?
- Do we have the capacity to deal with electoral violence? What will be the parameters for intervening in electoral conflicts?
- Are we ready for a paradigm shift from non-interference to non-indifference? What about sovereignty?
- How can we embrace peace and security as a condition for achievement of MDGs? Is Goal No. 8 (Development assistance and trade) the core for achieving the MDGs?
- How wide is the scramble for Africa's resources? Do we have strategies to curb the scramble for Africa's resources? How do we democratise to benefit from Africa's resources? How do we bridge the gap of limited involvement of women in resource management and the wider societal issues?
- Is the Gacaca court process the way forward in post-conflict situations in the pursuit of transitional justice?
- Do we have the logistical approaches to deal with youth grievances and the potential of youth to be involved in conflict management?
- How do we address the critical concerns of Africa? Is it just via conference, papers, workshops, etc?

There was general consensus that Africa has a deep longing for peace and this has been amply demonstrated by the establishment of the African Union, the NEPAD framework and the APRM. However, this framework has not translated to the eradication of conflict and has not automatically ushered in sustainable development. These institutions and structures have to be strengthened and made to work.

African countries continue to face multiple and complex challenges relating to peace and security, sustainable development, democratisation and respect for human rights. We must continue to critically examine how Africa will deal with the new threats on the horizon and move forward to build a culture of peace. We must also examine whether Africa has the capacity and the resources to deal with the scourge and impact of conflicts and wars as well as to finance conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives. Though most of these challenges have

been addressed in the AU Charter and other such instruments, such as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and The African Charter on Democracy and Elections and Governance, wars and conflicts continue to undermine peace and security. HIV/Aids is one example of a new threat to peace and security, with at least 70 per cent of those infected residing in Africa. Its impact on households, communities, and whole sectors of the economy, as well as to the achievement of the MDGs, is just beginning to be comprehended. It is also clear that violent conflicts affect the continent's progress towards the achievement of MDGs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations emerging from this conference include:

- There must be efforts to ensure political inclusion, participation and the designing of electoral systems that are suitable for the political and social dynamics of the different countries
- While elections have become major sources of conflict on the continent, there is no mechanism within the AU or any of the regional groups to deal urgently with post election violence. There is a need to establish mechanisms within the AU framework to address the legitimate concerns of the aggrieved parties
- States need to institutionalise electoral dispute settlement systems using best practices from other African countries
- The MDGs must embrace conflict resolution and peacebuilding as a holistic approach to the achievement of sustainable development in Africa, and
- The continent must create a minimum standard for the management of natural resources.

CLOSING REMARKS

Yvonne Chibiya of SAHRIT, on behalf of the AHSI secretariat and AHSI partners, thanked the participants for their valuable contributions. She stressed the need to engage and continue to work towards reform around the issues of peace and security and crime and criminal justice in Africa. She also emphasized that finding ways to support the AU and give 'teeth' to its on-going efforts remains critical.

Appendices

APPENDIX 1

Conference Program

CONFERENCE ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: BEYOND THE AU CHARTER, PEACE, SECURITY AND JUSTICE

Hilton Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
20-23 February 2008

Day One: Wednesday, 20 February

Arrivals and checking in	
18:00–19:30	Opening Session: Welcome and Introduction <i>Peter Edopu-Director ISS /Nairobi Office</i> <i>Jakkie Cilliers, AHSI partner- ISS, Executive Director, ISS</i> <i>Ambassador Ochieng Adala- APFO (AHSI Partner Representative)</i>
19:30	Cocktail at the Hilton Hotel

Day Two: Thursday February 21

7:00–8:00	Breakfast and Registration	
8:15–8:30	Keynote speech <i>Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo Chaired by APFO</i>	
8:30–8:45	Introduction of AHSI Partners' work- 15 minutes	
8:45–11:30	Session 1 Plenary Session Causes of Conflict in Africa Natural Resources and Conflicts in Africa Violent Conflict: A Key Obstacle for Achieving Millennium Development Goals-Where is the Evidence?	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Violent Conflicts: A Key Obstacle for Achieving Millennium Development Goals-Where is the Evidence? <i>Dereje Wordofa</i> ■ In Pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Conflict-Affected Countries in Africa: An Uphill Challenge And Policy Lessons <i>Kojo Asiedu</i> 	
	10:00–10:15	Coffee Break
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The Challenges of Post Conflict Stabilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Local Peace Imperatives and Geo-political Equations <i>Shayka Anastase</i> ■ The Correlation Between Resource Wars- War on Terror and Insecurity in Africa <i>Dr. J.J. Asongu</i> 	
12:30–13:30	Lunch break	
13:30 – 15:45	Session 2 Parallel Session A Peace Building in Africa: Transitional Justice in Post Conflict Situations; Social Constructions and Peace building in Times of War <i>Chaired by ISS</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The Natural Resource Conflict Nexus: Bringing Back Politics <i>Chrysantus Ayangafac</i> ■ Circumscribing Conflicts in the Resources Endowed Niger Delta Communities of Nigeria <i>Akeem Ayofe Akinwale, Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan, Nigeria</i> 	
	Parallel Session B Governance and Conflict Management; Conflict Resolution/The Role of Aid Agencies/NGOs-Civil Society <i>Chaired by WANEP</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Towards a better conflict management framework: the role of national, regional and continental organisations <i>Adérito Machava, MA Department of History Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo- Mozambique</i> ■ Beyond the Orthodoxy of Post Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: The Institutionalisation of Global Civil Society <i>Oladiran Afolabi</i> 	
	15:15–15:30	Coffee Break

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Electoral Systems and Electoral Violence in the SADC Region <i>Bertha Chiroro (EISA)</i> ■ When Combatants Become Judges: The Role of Ex-Combatants in Gacaca Courts and its affect on the Reintegration and Reconciliation Processes in Rwanda <i>Richard Bowd</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ War Termination, Inclusive Identity, and Post-Conflict Elections in Côte d'Ivoire <i>Lucien TOULOU, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa</i> ■ Armed conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa: Internal or Internationalized Responsibilities? Sierra Leone as a case study <i>Oscar Mateos</i>
Day 3 Thursday 22 February		
8:45–12:30	<p>Session 3 Plenary Session Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: The Role of Women in Post-conflict Resolution and Peace Building; Preventing Conflict and Building Peace Through 'Democratic Security' <i>Chaired by ISS</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Summary Presentations from Day 2's Parallel sessions ■ Engendering Conflicting Prevention and Peace Making in Africa: Putting Women and Women's Rights First <i>Bernard Mugisha</i> ■ The Role of Women in Post Conflict Resolution and Peace Building <i>Damilola Amilola Taiye Agbajobi, Redeemer's University, Ogun State</i> ■ Our bodies their battlefield: Sexual violence against women in Conflict Zones, Not a Case for Impunity! <i>Cecilia Ntombizodwa Mzvondiwa</i> 	
	10:00–10:15	Coffee Break
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Guardians of the Nation or Unruly Disciples? A Critique of Youth and Governance in Post-Colonial Zimbabwe's Contested Political Spaces <i>Terence Mashingaidze</i> ■ Youth Exclusion, Conflict and Development in Africa <i>Assouan Gbesso</i> 	
12:30–13:30	Lunch break	
13:30–15:45	Session 4	
	<p>Parallel Session A The Influence of International Laws in Peace Agreements and Mediation Processes; Human Rights and Conflict Management <i>Chaired by SAHRIT</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Mediation and Peace-building through Regional Arms Control and Disarmament Diplomacy; A Diplomatic Continuum in the Somali Peace Process <i>Phillip Njuguna, AMP, ISS</i> ■ The Darfur Conflict and Humanitarian Crisis in the Region: Can Sovereignty of States Stand as a Justification For Non Intervention? <i>Wapmuk, Sharkdam Research Fellow, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs</i> ■ The AU-UN Peacemaking Mission in Darfur: Challenges and Prospects <i>Samuel Obadiah</i> 	<p>Parallel Session B Peace Support Operation Regimes in Africa: Principles, Theories, Doctrines and Emerging Dynamics of Peace Keeping Operations, Peace Research and Education in Africa <i>Chaired by ISS</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The Evolving Role of the Military in the Peace and Security Architecture of West Africa <i>James Gadin Elsa</i> ■ Greed and Grievances: Interrogating the Resource Conflicts Question and Curriculumizing Peace Studies in Africa <i>Hassan A. Saliu, PhD</i> ■ Interrogating the Shifting Theoretical Paradigms of Conflicts in Africa : The Ethnic and Resource Remittance Theory of Conflicts <i>Bonnie Ayodele, Department of Political Science, University of Ado Ekiti</i> ■ <i>L'Éducation à la Paix après la Guerre: Construire une Paix Durable dans les Sociétés Post-Conflict</i> (Peace Education after War: Building Sustainable Peace in Post-conflict Societies) <i>Assouan Gbesso, MA in Peace Education, UN University for Peace</i>
	15:15–16:00	Coffee Break
16:00-17:30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Summary Presentations from Parallel sessions ■ Summary of proceedings ■ Closing speech <i>SAHRIT Yvonne Chibiya</i> 	

APPENDIX 2

List of participants

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