

**BEYOND THE ORTHODOXY OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN  
AFRICA: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY**

**BY**

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**BEING A PAPER PRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE ON  
PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA,  
BEYOND THE AU CHARTER – PEACE, SECURITY AND JUSTICE.  
AFRICAN HUMAN SECURITY INITIATIVE.  
HILTON HOTEL, ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA,  
20-23 FEBRUARY 2008.**

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**ABOUT THIS PAPER**

The emergence of the so called third sector of international politics, also referred to as global civil society and its impacts on international politics had led scholars and international relations commentators to question traditional state-centric approaches/models of the international system and call for a more comprehensive approach to analysing international political processes and outcomes. In any post-conflict environment, arms management is only an aspect of the peace process. The entire reconstruction process is more usefully conceptualised as a multi-faceted one, in which military, political, psychosocial, humanitarian as well as economic are seen as closely interwoven. The principal argument of this paper, at once implicit and explicit, is that the task of addressing the causes, effects, solutions, post-settlement impacts and general reconstruction in post-conflict African states, should involve global civil society, operating transnationally and guided by the spirit of pluralist inter-dependence and neo-liberal internationalism.

## **INTRODUCTION**

The end of the cold war witnessed a mixture of relative peace and instability in the continent of Africa. Many African countries held democratic elections, including South Africa and Namibia and Mozambique. Despite these liberal democratic positive developments, Africa still remain one of the center of attraction vis-à-vis widespread societal conflict and political instability. Political insecurity and violent conflict in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Somalia, Congo DR, Rwanda, Burundi were persistent feature of the development scene in Africa. As internal strife with deep historical roots continue to surface in many African countries, the institutional and human capacity to manage these pervasive conflicts need commensurate development to cope with reconstruction efforts (Rugumamu and Gbla 2003:5).

In the ideal situation, every post conflict reconstruction effort seeks to respond to the urgent needs of societies emerging from armed conflicts and works to improve the efforts of key actors in rehabilitation and reconstruction operations by identifying and filling gaps within the current capacities of stakeholders. Therefore, while effective reconstruction strategies apparently inform planning, in practice, planning also helps refine strategies by framing and assessing alternative approaches, identifying different actor interests; and trade offs, and highlighting policy disconnects for decision makers.<sup>1</sup>

As a matter of fact, in any post-conflict environment, arms management is only an aspect of the peace process. The entire reconstruction process is more usefully conceptualised as a multi-faceted one, in which military, political, psychosocial, humanitarian as well as economic are seen as closely interwoven (Adekanye 1997). Civil wars and ethno-political conflict that ravage African countries have serious implications for development and sustainable growth and if post-conflict reconstructions are not effectively implemented and all stakeholders adequately reintegrated into the state, there is the potential danger of a return to war.

The central argument of this paper, at once implicit and explicit, is that the task of addressing the causes, effects, solutions, post-settlement impact, and general reconstruction in post-conflict African states, should involve global civil society, operating transnationally. The imperative of incorporating and institutionalizing transnational social moments in the entire post-conflict reconstruction and peace building process, derives from the fact that in today global reality, the importance and possibility for societies across the globe to share strategies, in order to combat the problems of the twenty first century, is becoming increasingly evident.

For the avoidance of analytical ambiguity, the paper is divided into five main sections. The section that follows this introductory one, attempts a conceptual and theoretical exploration of the emerging concept and field of global civil society and post conflict reconstruction respectively. Section three examines the African Union (AU)'s policy frameworks for post-conflict reconstruction while section four addresses the central objectives of the paper by presenting an agenda for the institutionalization of global civil society in Africa's post-conflict reconstruction policy framework. The last section summarises and concludes the paper.

### **THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS**

To fully understand the dynamics of the concept of Global Civil Society, it is necessary to explore further the larger context of political globalisation and its relationship to societal activism. As argued by Pluralist interdependence theorists, political problems are embedded in the larger social-and particularly economic-setting in which they take place. In contradistinction to the realists outlook (that focus on the activities of states), the proponents of the pluralist-interdependence theory posit that in the modern global system, all policy actors are intertwined and affect each other. This is because, states are not the only actors in the international system, though they (states) set the rules of economic, communications, technology and other games that occur simultaneously, they (states) do not set the international agenda, nor can they make decisions as if removed from the interests, values and

aspirations of millions of business firms, banks, shipping companies, political parties, citizen's groups, and the like. It is these non-state actors that initially raise items to international agenda (Holsti 1995:8-10).

Non-state actors, the pluralist-interdependence theorist argue, create all sorts of transnational coalitions that circumvent the policies of any individual state. They act as international pressure groups, they publicise problems and they propose solutions and way forward to the various world problems. In the perspective of the pluralist-interdependence theorists, issues that are internationally recognized as "key" (transition, re-integration on of Ex-combatants, illegal, surplus Arms, etc) in post-conflict situations,<sup>2</sup> could not be left in the hands of states alone, because in any enduring post conflict reconstructive efforts, the power of publicity and scientific, technical, economic knowledge largely replace the power of guns and armies.<sup>3</sup> Even in major international forum such as the UN, they (proponents of this theory) reiterate that:

Non-governmental groups have access to delegates, provide all sorts of information, and lobby for their preferred solutions to a variety of international problems, ranging from the saving of threatened animal species to the treatment of refugees in individual countries (Holsti 1995:9).

Consequently, in the spirit of humanitarianism and liberal internationalism, external organizations have assumed responsibility for building peace in war-torn societies with the aim of preventing recidism into violent conflicts (Pugh 2000:1). This is why there is now the recognition of the legitimacy of transnational civil groups in the international system, in compatibility with the neo-liberal agenda to bring about enduring peace in war torn countries and in the post-conflict reconstructive efforts. The main point of emphasis here is that the roles being played by transnational social movement in post-conflict reconstruction all over the world, (accelerating the transition to civil rules, increasing refugee returns, law and

order, contributing to the development of institutions new electoral law, media reform, social welfare and human rights), are generally informed by the position of neo-liberalism that international peace and security in the world can only be achieved through the complementary efforts and understanding of states and non-state actors in international politics.

Although, interventionary actors appear to be caught in a dilemma between support for state sovereignty and support for civil society, and the ideology of neo-liberal economic modernization, with which lead organizations such as the world Bank and IMF have been imbued, often has the effect of undermining the mechanisms necessary for state building and dirigisme that could make authorities in war-torn societies take greater responsibility for the welfare and right of their people;<sup>4</sup> the fact remains that in the peace process, international financial institutions and their main donors have often expected non-governmental organisations, private, voluntary sector and United Nations agencies to take on a safety-netting, role for such societies (Pugh 2000:5). Essential services are often subcontracted to the private or NGO sectors, in line with the neo-liberal agenda, that humanitarian organisations are impelled to attempt to provide a safety net beyond the phase of emergency, relief, where government structures, revenue and public expenditure allocations have foundered (Stewart, et al 1974).

Therefore, for long lasting peace and effective capacity building in post-conflict countries in Africa, this paper argues that the collaborative and complementary efforts of states, relevant international bodies and vibrant global civil society groups are sine quo non.

Furthermore, global civil society has emerged as part of a political process of globalisation. As argued by Reimann (2002), the emergence of global civil society is a build up on the social movement theory, the sociological institutional argument and works done by strong state theorist interested in civil society at the National level. In providing explanations for the rise of new citizen advocacy groups and

social movement organisations, political scientists from the strong state perspective and social movement theorists have focused on the incentives provided by political opportunity structures in shaping various form of political participation. When extended to the international level, the concept of political opportunity structure offers a useful theoretical framework for understanding how changing international political structures and contexts have directly shaped the growth of international Non-governmental organisations and other civil society groups operating transnationally.

Social movement theorists interested in transnational social movements have argued convincingly that the emergence and expansion of inter-governmental organisations (IGO's) in the post war period (like the emergence of the nation-state in previous centuries) has provided new incentives for societal actors to organize on a global scale and to turn to new international targets as location of action.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, this political liberalisation, which involved a significant opening at the international level, of several dimensions of political opportunities, has been of particular relevance to organisers of global civil society.

But more importantly, the relevant of global civil society in post-conflict reconstruction is part of a system of collective world security where states and people can live in peace with each other, ideologies aside, and observed each other's borders and maintain collective security interests (Sedghi 1992 cited in farazmand 1999).

### **WHAT IS GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY?**

Chandler (2004) explains that with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold war in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a whole new era of ethical foreign policy and humanitarian intervention has come to preoccupy statesmen in Europe and America; this new politicization has had strong impact on the discipline of international relation. In contemporary international relations, it appears that the old theories of relations between states, states pursuing self-interest, governed by the

principles of national sovereignty – are hopelessly outdated; there are new realities in international relations, such that the literature on conflict resolution, state building, international civil society, theories of the construction of national identities and normative interpretations of the international sphere, now abound.

Jeau and Andrew (1992), argue that theories of civil society based on domestic politics envision frequently and dense exchange among individuals, groups, and organizations in the public sphere, separate from state-dominated action. A well-developed civil society has the potentials to influence national government in two basic ways: it enhances political responsiveness by aggregating and expressing the wishes of the public through a wealth of non governmental forms of association, and it safeguards public/people's freedom by limiting the government's ability to impose arbitrary rule by force.<sup>6</sup> In the same vein, the increase in the numbers of non-governmental organizations with shared transnational goal could be equated with the emergence of global civil society. But the explosion in the number of actors is even a minimal condition for the rise of global civil society; deeper changes should be evident in the quality of non-governmental access and proximity to global forms of governance.

Evidence of the globalism of civil society is empirical in the quality of social interaction in current global politics when we examine the substantive content of non-governmental organization participation and interactions (particularly at the UN conferences) with the clear indication that common understandings are now developing both among non- governmental organizations themselves and between non-governmental organizations and states. Global civil society therefore connotes:

a vast, interconnected, multilayered, social space that comprises many hundreds of self-directing, or non-governmental institutions and ways of life. Through its cross border networks, global civil society is constituted of chains of interactions linking the local, regional and planetary orders. This new social world is constituted of networks,

coalitions, partnerships and social movements (Anheier & Themudo 2002:24).

Other scholars or social movement theorists conceptualize global civil society as made up of some combination of networks of legal protection, voluntary associations, and forums of independent public expression (Clark, et al 1998). These conceptualisations, notwithstanding, there is still a divergence of opinions scholarly on this emerging trend of global civil society. Some even argue that it is too soon to declare that a global civil society has definitively emerged because of what they see as uneven geographical spread and achievement of global civil society as compared with the expectations generated from the theorisation of the concept (Chandhoke, 2002; Keane, cited in Anheiver and Themudo, 2002).

However, from the foregoing, what is so fundamental to the concept of a global civil society and very relevant to the present study is that the emergence of transnational social and political communities constituted through trans-border migration is increasingly being conceptualized as the basis for new forms of citizenship identity to the extent that members maintain identification and solidarities with one another across state territorial divides. These identification and solidarities arise out of networks, activities and ideologies that span the home and the host society (sassen 2003).

Therefore, recent researches in international non-governmental organizations, transnationalism, social movements, global citizenship and global governance indicate and declare that there is now a global civil society operating transnationally and cross-borderly all over the globe. (Anheiver and Themudo, 2002; Taylor, 2004; Chandler, 2004). As reported by Taylor (2004), in the first yearbook of global civil society, the geography of its subject is given prominence... one of the most striking findings of the yearbook is that global civil society is heavily concentrated in north – Western Europe. The authors of the first yearbook of global civil society has illustrated their findings with a table that identifies the

top countries that are the ‘focal points’ of globalization, international rule of law and global civil society. But by using an interlocking network model and data on 74, global non-governmental organizations with offices across 178 cities, Ngo connectivity values for cities show that there is a ‘global south’, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, geographical bias, Nairobi is the most connected world city with respect to non-governmental organizations activities. Thus, Taylor (2004) concludes that:

Global civil society does not replicate the geography of economic globalisation; it is creating its own new geography. This is a revision of received wisdom on the geography of global civil society, based upon a new methodology that focuses upon the networks of NGOs activities across cities.

It is imperative to profer a reminder here, that global civil society is actually more than the activities of just NGOs, but as Chandhoke (2002:38) puts it ‘NGOs play a larger than – life sole in global civil society’.

Consequently, non-governmental organisations remain, in the words of Taylor (2004) ‘the obvious foundation for describing the geography of global civil society’. In the argument of Sassen (2002), strategic cross border geography that by-passes national states, is part of the infrastructure of global civil society and this is because cities provide a ‘thick enabling environment through which transnational and sub-national activities can be brought together’.<sup>7</sup> She subsequently concludes thus:

The density of political and civic cultures in large cities localizes global civil society in people’s lives. We can think of these as multiple localizations of civil society that are global in that they are part of global circuits and trans-boundary networks.

In her assessment of the anticipatory potential of global civil society, Kaldor (2003) accepts the criticisms of Chandhoke (2002) and others that many NGOs have

become too close to both governments and corporations thus compromising their radical potential. She understands this growing dissatisfaction and refers to NGOs as “tamed” successors to earlier, more radical, social movements. However, she (Kaldor) does not thereby conclude that global civil society is irrelevant to creating a more humane globalisation. Thus, she observed that ‘Global Civil Society is a process through which social contracts can be negotiated and agreements made at local, national and global scales’.

In the interlocking network model of conceptualising global civil society used by Taylor (2004), as illustrated in Table 1, the results indicate that cities house NGOs, with very large office networks; these are the places to be for global NGOs. For their global strategies, most NGOs consider Nairobi, Bangkok, New Delhi and Manila to be as important as Brussels, London and Washington.

**Table 1: Top 25 NGO cities by network connectives**

City	NGO network connectivity		Global network connectivity	
	Level	Rank	Rank	Difference
Nairobi	3729	1	99	98
Brussels	3408	2	15	13
Bangkok	3378	3	28	25
London	3211	4	1	-3
New Delhi	3209	5	52	47
Manila	3198	6	46	40
Washington	3181	7	37	30
Harare	2999	8	132	124
Geneva	2796	9	67	58
Moscow	2779	10	34	24
New York	2758	11	2	-9
Mexico City	2626	12	18	6
Jakarta	2624	13	22	9
Tokyo	2616	14	5	-9
Accra	2599	15	150	135
Cairo	2569	16	59	43
Dhaka	2562	17	152	135
Rome	2560	18	53	35
Dakar	2433	19	207	187
Santiago	2408	20	57	37
Abidijan	2326	21	131	110
Buenos Aires	2320	22	23	1
Dar es Salam	2282	23	196	173
Copenhagen	2256	24	44	20
Beijing	2251	25	36	11

*Source: Globalization, 1( 2).*

The key point in this empirical results is that the global south is not 'represented' in any sense through NGOs but their global activities are providing a legitimising platform for dissident and diverse voices from regions where economic and political power is lacking. Thus, bringing about a renewed hope for developing an emancipatory global agenda, and inform the basis for situating global civil society within the context of post – conflict reconstruction in the continent of Africa.

### **THE FIELD OF POST–CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION**

Post – conflict reconstruction, as an aspect of development study, typically involves the repair and reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructure in a country that has recently experienced widespread violence, or where the preoccupation of the state is armed warfare, or where a significant part of the population is engaged in armed struggle with the state.<sup>8</sup> In a post-conflict situation, the state institutions are usually so weakened that they exhibit little capacity to carry out their traditional functions; hence, post – conflict reconstruction also entails a number of external interventions aimed at rebuilding the weakened institutions. Those critical interventions include revering the economy, restructuring the framework for democratic governance, rebuilding and maintaining key social infrastructure, and planning for financial normalization. Post conflict intervention tend to have explicit objectives such as supporting the transition from war to peace, resumption of economic and social development, reconciliation and reconstruction, human and institutional capacity building, and establishing special investment funds to maintain social cohesion during the period of economic adjustment and poverty reduction and decentralization (Rugumamu & Gbla 2003:10). From the foregoing, it is obvious that post- conflict reconstructive operations require intensive monitoring to ensure their continued relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. Because it is an undeniable fact that the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction –security, social and economic well – being, justice and

reconciliation, and governance and participation – are all inextricably linked, and a positive outcome in each area depends on successful integration and interaction across them (Scott 2003).

The implication for stability and sustainable development of emergent post-conflict societies have attracted the rising interest of scholars and policy-makers in the reduction of defence outlays to supportable levels, demobilization, reintegration, and rehabilitation of ex-combatants, as well as demilitarization, democratization, economic reconstruction and structural adjustment (Adekanye 1997). Subsequently, Adekanye (2001) identifies certain issues that are internationally recognised as ‘key issues’ in post-conflict environment because there are empirical interconnections which should not be ignored between ‘conflict’ and ‘the post-conflict stage’, between ‘violence’ and ‘politics’, between ‘war’ and ‘peace’. So, the key issues that are germane to the peace process are:

- The contradiction of three Transitions in one
- Reintegration of Ex-combatants
- Problems of illegal surplus Arms
- Power-sharing versus political inclusion
- Making committed Electoral Players out of former Guerilla Leaders
- Reconciliation versus Justice
- Market-Driven Liberalisation versus post-conflict peace building
- Countering the phenomenon of ‘Return Wars’

In an attempt to redress what he called the ‘structural appropriation of Reconstruction over Transformation in peace-building’, Evans-Kent (2004), distinguished between Reconstructive peace-building and Transformative peace-building. While the one is a creation of the United Nations (UN) and peace operations, the other (which is the less widely used form) addresses the causes of conflict and the community-level needs of post-conflict societies. Each of these

needs to operate in conjunction with the other and peace cannot be attained without addressing both the reconstruction of a community and the transformation of the conflict.

Reconstructive peace-building is a short term structural rebuilding. The physical and political reconstruction of this form of peace-building begins with the United Nations, which has endeavoured to produce a model that achieves these outcomes. Reconstructive peace-building concerns the more tangible aspects of peace building such as addressing infrastructure needs, the development of healthcare systems and political institutions.<sup>9</sup> On the reconstructive side are activities such as: relief, humanitarian assistance, disarmament; demobilisation; political restructuring; elections; mine clearance; and health.

Transformative peace-building on the other hand is a long term reconciliation. It is a broad term for approaches that focus less on physical reconstruction than on the broader social relationships that exist within conflict-prone societies. It is an attempt to alter conflict such that lasting forms of peace may be built. This form of peace-building usually encompasses those aspects that work towards the long term transformation of the conflict environment. They can include: inter-ethnic contact, contact between professions, stereo-type elimination, work collectives, school projects, conflict resolution training, justice, police and military training, cross-cultural television and radio efforts and acknowledgement. Hence, Lederach (1995:120) observes that: conflict is a socially constructed cultural event and people are active participants, it is therefore difficult for political level resolutions alone to transform conflict.

## **AFRICAN UNION'S POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: A SYNOPTIC OVERVIEW**

The African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy framework, under the auspices of the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a policy framework that aims at addressing the fates of conflict ridden African states in their post-conflict reconstruction bids.<sup>10</sup> The framework set out an African agenda for post-conflict reconstruction which aims to, among other things, address the nexus between the peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building. The framework intends to encourage an overall state of mutual consistency among the policies and programmes of the African Union/NEPAD, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Member States, civil society and the financial and private sector in Africa, on one hand, and the various international institutions, agencies, governments, NGOs and private contractors that constitute the external actors in the post-conflict reconstruction system, on the other. This policy framework provides a common platform for the diverse range of actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction systems to conceptualise, organise and prioritise policy responses. It is aimed at facilitating coherence in the assessment, planning, coordination and monitoring of post-conflict reconstruction systems by providing a common frame of reference and conceptual based for the broad range of multidisciplinary, multifunctional and multidimensional actors that collectively populate these systems.

The framework was actually borne out of the need to bring all the current strategic planning and funding processes together into one coherent overall country level strategic framework so that the political, security, humanitarian and development aspects of the overall post-conflict reconstruction system are synchronized and coordinated. Such an overall strategic framework needs to be linked to a monitoring and evaluation system so that the various dimensions, sectors

and programmes that make up the system can adjust their plans according to the feedback received from others on progress made or setbacks experiences elsewhere in the system. An overall country level strategic framework will assist in coordinating the various constituent elements of the post-conflict reconstruction system around a common country strategy.

According to the policy framework, each country's transition from conflict to peace should be informed by its own particular circumstances. Each specific post-conflict reconstruction system emerges in response to that conflict system's specific set of circumstances and it will thus be unique in its composition, prioritisation, timing and sequencing. At the same time, there are recurrent phases, dimensions and processes that are common to most, if not all, post-conflict reconstruction systems. This policy framework is an attempt to identify those common phases, dimensions and processes prevalent in the African experience.

The African Union's mechanism agrees that there are three phases of the post-conflict reconstruction process: The Emergency phase, the Transition phase and the Development phase. But recognize that these phases are sometimes not having clear boundaries, not absolute and not time bound. The emergency phase is the period that follows immediately after the end of hostilities and has a dual focus, namely the establishment of a safe and secure environment and an emergency response to the immediate consequences of the conflict through humanitarian relief programmes. The emergency phase is characterized by the influx of external actors usually in the form of a military intervention to ensure basic security, and by humanitarian actors responding to the humanitarian consequences of the conflict.

The transition phase derives its name from the transition from an appointed interim government, followed by, in the shortest reasonable period, some form of election or legitimate traditional process to select or elect a transitional government, constituent assembly or some other body responsible for writing a new constitution or otherwise laying the foundation for a future political dispensation. The

transitional stage typically ends with an election, run according to the provisions of the new constitution, after which a fully sovereign and legitimately elected government is in power.

The development phase is aimed at supporting the newly elected government and the civil society with a broad range of programmes aimed at fostering reconciliation, boosting socio-economic reconstruction and supporting ongoing development programmes in the post-conflict environment.

**Table 2: Phases of Post-Conflict Reconstruction**

<b>PHASES</b>	<b>MAIN FOCUSES</b>
<b>EMERGENCY PHASE</b>	Response to the immediate consequences of conflict through humanitarian relief programmes.
<b>TRANSITION PHASE</b>	Selection or election of transitional government and laying the foundation for a future political dispensation.
<b>DEVELOPMENT PHASE</b>	Fostering reconstruction, boosting socio-economic recovery and development.

*Source: African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, NEPAD Secretariat, 2005.*

The policy framework also agrees that, though the specific configuration of the post-conflict reconstruction system is unique, five broad framework of dimensions are identifiable as seemingly common to most post-conflict systems. These are: (1) security; (2) political transition governance and participation; (3) socio-economic development; (4) human rights, justice and reconciliation; and (5) coordination, management and resource mobilization dimensions.

The different dimensions of the post-conflict reconstruction system have relationships with the three basic phases as explicitly presented in Table 3. However, as earlier adumbrated, the degree to which the various conditions within each phase of the post-conflict reconstruction system are met, is a major determinant of the movement or transition from one phase to the next. This has therefore, created a situation in which the phases sometimes overlap; and some programmes undertaken in, say, the emergency phase continue into the transition phase.

**Table 3: Relationships among Post-Conflict Reconstruction Phases and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Dimensions**

	<b>EMERGENCY PHASE</b>	<b>TRANSITION PHASE</b>	<b>DEVELOPMENT PHASE</b>
<b>SECURITY</b>	Establish a safe and secure environment.	Develop legitimate and stable security institutions.	Consolidate local capacity.
<b>POLITICAL TRANSITION, GOVERNANCE, &amp; PARTICIPATION</b>	Determine the governance structures, foundations for participation, and processes for political transition.	Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes.	Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes.
<b>SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT</b>	Provide for emergency humanitarian needs.	Establish foundations, structures, and processes for development.	Institutionalise long-term developmental programme.
<b>HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION</b>	Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances.	Build the legal system and processes for reconciliation and monitoring human rights.	Established and functional legal system based on accepted international norms.
<b>COORDINATION AND MANAGEMENT</b>	Develop consultative and coordination mechanism for internal and external actors.	Develop technical bodies to facilitate programme development.	Develop internal sustainable processes and capacity for coordination.

*Source: African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, NEPAD Secretariat, 2005.*

In terms of time frame, the emergency phase may range from Ninety (90) days to twelve calendar months (a year). During this period, internal actors are usually preoccupied with survival strategies in the new socio-political environment. External actors play visible roles here but should (according to the policy direction) involve or consult with internal actors. The Transition phase may range from one year to three years and during this period, there should be a growing partnership between internal and external actors. External actors should hand over more responsibility to the internal actors and engage in programmes aimed at capacity building for local actors. The Development phase of post-conflict reconstruction usually range from Four (4) to Ten (10) years with a tendency to extend far beyond decades after the conflict. While internal actors, at this stage, develop the capacity to take full responsibility for post-conflict sustainable development, external actors should only provide technical assistance and support.

**Table 4: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Phases and External Actors Involvement**

<b>Phases</b>	<b>Time Frame</b>	<b>External Actors</b>
Emergency	90 days – 1 year	Play prominent role in consultation with local actors.
Transition	1 year – 3 years	Growing partnership with local actors.
Development	4 years – 10 years	Provide technical assistance and support to local actors.

*Source: Culled from African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, 2005 and Re-arranged by the Writer.*

A detailed perusal of the AU/NEPAD framework for post-conflict reconstruction in Africa, shows that the framework as at now, despite recognizing the importance of external actors – international institutions, agencies, governments, NGOs and private contractors – unequivocally frown at externally driven post-conflict reconstruction process. The thinking is that such a process lack sufficient local ownership and participations are therefore unsustainable. The ultimate role of external actors is a systematic capacity development of the local/internal actors. Moreover, the AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit plays crucial role in facilitating the implementation of the policy framework. It is the duty of the unit to undertake advocacy; develop post-conflict reconstruction programmes assist stakeholders in the process of formulating, planning and evaluating policy; promote research an issues of common interests, and develop a monitoring and evaluation process.

#### **TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: INSTITUTIONALISING THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY**

Post-conflict reconstruction programmes and processes in Africa are still traditional, state-centre and authority dominated. This probably explains why the peace processes and African post-conflict reconstruction has been generally problematic and there is the apparent danger of a return to war in almost all cases of African post-conflict environment.

Post-conflict reconstruction mechanisms in Africa has been quite different in trajectory and achievement and this is evident, particularly in the Great Lakes Region Cases – Congo D.R., Burundi and Rwanda and in other conflict ridden African States. However, there is a common desire which is that a conflict affected country must confront the challenges of a trade-off between immediate emergency needs, (the emergency phase), short-term measures necessary for rehabilitation, reconstruction of destroyed social and physical infrastructure, (the transition phase) and the medium to long term needs for socio-economic recovery and sustainable development (the development phase) (Barungi & Mbugua 2005:31).

Meaning that, for effective post-conflict reconstruction, all stakeholders must be taken into due consideration, more wounds should not be inflicted in the name of reconciliation and reconstruction. The post-conflict reconstruction programme should not follow the path as dictated by the winning or most influential or powerful parties to the conflict. For instance, in the Rwandan case the post-conflict reconstruction model put more emphasis on justice and punishment, mitigated by the nature of the genocide, and one of the parties to the conflict have overbearing influence on the peace process and general reconstruction because it won the war against the regime that instigated the genocide (Barungi & Mbugua 2005:31).

In the case of Cong DR, all parties to the conflict have continued to make effective reconciliation on and reconstruction problematic as the violation of the rules of the game became the order of the day. The Lusaka accords of 1999 would have been one of the most innovative in African peace process but incessant violations of the agreement by all parties made the implementation of the accords inconsequential. The point of emphasis here is that African post-conflict reconstruction efforts have not be able to achieve the desired goals, hence, the African capacity building foundation, African Human Security initiative, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in Africa and other organisation and groups concerned about African post-conflict reconstruction, have continued to conduct research in this area. The African Union itself has continued to search for an enduring post-conflict reconstruction and development policy framework for the continent.

Consequently and questioning the traditional, state – centric models of post-conflict reconstruction programmes and efforts in Africa, this paper calls for a more comprehensive and liberal model of African post conflict reconstruction. Under the auspices of the African Union, Global Civil Society should be legally, institutionally and authoritatively incorporated into the post-conflict reconstruction mechanism in Africa. This represent a major paradigm shift in African post-conflict reconstruction and has the potentials of creating a psychosocial attitude in the consciousness of the

parties to conflicts, especially non-state parties, that the peace process and general reconstruction are based on justice and fair play.

The proposed framework of African post-conflict reconstruction would have notable elements of Global Civil Society playing major roles in the three phases of post-conflict reconstruction and within the five main dimensional frameworks of the post-conflict reconstruction system. From the stage of emergency needs to the stage of infrastructure and socio-economic development, representatives of Global Civil Society would be strategically positioned and empowered to visibly initiate, monitor, evaluate and endure a balanced participatory process of post-conflict reconstruction. For instance, the incorporation of Global Civil Society in the post-conflict reconstruction in achieving the goals within each dimensional elements in the Transition phase may reveal the following picture as presented in Table 5.

**Table 5: A Hypothetical Model of Global Civil Society Role in the Transition Phase of Post-Conflict Reconstruction**

PCR dimensions	TRANSITION PHASE	GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENTS
Security	Develop legitimate and stable security institutions.	Active members of security sector reform institutions
Political transition, governance, & participation	Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes.	Legitimate members of transition committee and high rank officers of the new electoral body.
Socio-economic development	Establish foundations, structures, and processes for development.	Monitor and participate prominently in the reconstruction of physical infrastructure and provision of social services such as education, health, employment, trade and investment etc.
Human rights, justice and reconciliation	Build the legal system and processes for reconciliation and monitoring human rights.	Organise National Dialogue, be members of the judicial system, truth and reconciliation commissions and monitor general human rights provisions adherence.
Coordination and management	Develop technical bodies to facilitate programme development.	Actively synchronise all stake holders activities and roles to ensure compliance with common goals.

*Source: Culled from African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, 2005 with addendum by the Writer.*

Furthermore, the model recognises and identifies some neutral, regional or global organisations and social movements as representing the spirit of Global Civil Society and meticulously and officially make them part and parcel of the entire post-conflict reconstruction process in Africa. The thinking is that if the entire peace process and post-conflict reconstruction has predominant presence of recognized

representatives of Global Civil Society, say, the secretary, vice president, vice chairman, coordinator, program officer or any highly experienced representatives of transnational organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Amnesty International, African Capacity Building Foundation, African Human Security Initiative (AHSI), United Network of Young Peace-builders (UNOY Peace-builders) and other neutral organizations and social movements operating transnationally in the spirit of humanitarianism and neo-liberal internationalism, parties to conflicts are more likely to be assured and convinced that a genuine, authentic and lopsidedless post-conflict reconstruction is on course. This is expected to motivate them to become more committed to sustainable peaceful co-existence in the post-conflict environment.

The conviction for this comprehensive and all inclusive model of African post-conflict reconstruction framework, with Global Civil Society playing decisive role in the entire process, stem from the historical antecedent and contemporary evidence of Global Civil Society in world's affairs, particularly in the social and economic activities of the United Nations. Article 71 of the UN Charter allows United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to 'make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence',<sup>11</sup> and by the late 1960s a three-tiered status system was set up which categorized NGOs by their degree of relevance to ECOSOC activities. This brought about formal international recognition and official status for NGO participation in UN international conferences since the ECOSOC has been the main organizer for many of these events.

Consequently, from the late 1960s through the 1990s and till date, the forms in which transnational civil society groups developed to participate in United Nations thematic conferences reveal significant advances in both the quantity and quality of their participation. In 1992, 1400 NGOs registered with the Rio conference, and 18,000 transnational civil groups attended the parallel NGO forum (Morphet 1996). For the 1993 Human Rights Conference in Vienna, a UN source

lists 248 NGOs in consultative status and 593 as participants (UN 1993). But civil society reports estimated that 1,400 to 1,500 NGOs attended the conference (Amnesty International 1993).

At the 1975 Mexico City Conference for International Women's Year 6,000 people attended the NGO forum, and 114 NGOs gained access to the official conference; at the 1985 closing conference of the United Nations Decade on Women in Nairobi, 13,500 people registered for and many more attended the NGO forum, and 163 NGOs were accredited to the official meetings. Ten years later over 300,000 people attended the Beijing NGO forum, doubling previous attendance records. But equally impressive, 3,000 accredited NGOs gained access to the Fourth World Conference on Women (UN 1996). In the Vienna conference process, many of the larger and older human rights NGOs defended the principles of universality, interdependence, and indivisibility from possible retrograde movement while pushing concrete proposals for better implementation of human rights measures.

In a division of labour at the Vienna Conference of 1993 on human rights, the large international non-governmental organizations individually advocated particular proposals. For example, Amnesty International revived the idea of a high commissioner for human rights who could oversee an integrated United Nations response to human rights violations; the international commission of Jurists advocated the creation of an international tribunal on human rights. Human rights NGOs also coordinated working groups to discuss lobbying strategies during the official conference in Vienna; Amnesty International 'mounted a constant guard outside the drafting meetings'; closely following progress on issues of concern (Cook 1996). When NGOs were excluded from drafting meetings, NGO representatives serving on official delegations also began to report regularly to caucuses of their lobbying colleagues, gaining their input and involvement in turn (Felice 1996).

Evidence of the quality of social interaction in current global politics could be examined by the substantive content of Non-governmental organizations participation in the United Nations World Conferences, which shows clearly that common understandings are developing both among Global Civil Society groups themselves and between Non-governmental organizations and states. Transnational civil groups, through their participation in the United Nations Conferences have been able to change the agenda and understandings of governments at those conferences (Clark, et al 1998:2).

## **CONCLUSION**

The increased visibility of non-state actors now known as Global Civil Society at the international level and global political process, invites continuing evaluation of the extent and significant of the role they now play in world affairs. Global Civil Society has demonstrated considerable influence during the UN ‘mega conferences’: the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, or Earth Summit) held in Rio de Janeiro; the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna; and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing, and these intense interactions between and among states and non-state actors during the conference processes provide a microcosm of global state – society relations.

The problematic of post-conflict reconstruction in Africa makes it apparent that the issue cannot longer be left in the hands of state leaders and other state centric and authority determined and dominated mechanisms. This is because in any post-conflict environment, arms management is only an aspect of the peace process. The entire reconstruction process is more usefully conceptualised as a multi-faceted one, in which military, political, psychosocial, humanitarian as well as economic are closely interwoven (Adekanye 1997). This complexity in the nature of post-conflict reconstruction and the desire to adequately reintegrate all stakeholders into the society, have make the presence of Global Civil Society in all phases and activities of reconstruction indispensable.

The central position of this paper is that as Global Civil Society has continued to form major alternatives in United Nations and World Conferences, they should not only also form alternatives in the entire African post-conflict reconstruction in war-torn countries, but should be officially and legally incorporated firmly into the policy framework for African post-conflict reconstruction. Institutionalising the role of Global Civil Society in the reconstruction process will raise the morale and psychosocial spirit and consciousness of parties and participants (internal and external). As posited by Korten, et al (2002:4), Global Civil Society has emerged as an expression of the love of life, freedom, community, and democracy that resides deep in the soul of every human being; and while concentration and centralisation of power and wealth are essential organizing principles of elite globalisation, the essential organising principles of global civil society has been the equitable distribution and decentralization of power and wealth.

## ENDNOTES:

1. This was the highlight of the Report of an operation based study by African Capacity Building Foundation in 2003 by Prof. S. Rugumamu and Dr. O. Gbla, which synthesized Post-Conflict Reconstruction Experiences in Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. The study revealed the rationale behind the adoption of different reconstruction plans and approaches to deal with more or less similar post-conflict situations.
2. For the full discussion on the key issues in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, see J.B. Adekanye's 2001 Keynote presentation, *From Violence to Politics: Key Issues Internationally*. Delivered at the Fifth International Ethnic Studies Network (ESN) Conference, hosted by INCORE, University of Ulster, Magee Campus, Derry/London Derry, Northern Ireland, June 27 – 30.
3. On the concept of interdependence in international politics, see full analysis in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. 1989. *Power and Interdependence*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Boston: Little Brown.
4. Among the critiques, see Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli 1994; Joe Hanlon 1996; Wayne Mafziger 1996; Peter Uvin 1998, all cited in Michael Pugh (2000) available online at: <http://www.jba.ac/articles/a034.htm>.
5. See Passy 1999; Smith 2000; Tarrow 2001, for full explanations of Transnational Social Movement Theorists on Global Civil Society, all cited in K. Reiman 2002. *International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs*. U.S.A.: Harvard University.
6. Further analysis on this point could be found in Keck, M.E. and Sikkink, K. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, New York: Cornell University Press.
7. Sassen 1994 has argued that cities constitute strategic places in the development of a new world geography but in 2002 she transfer this argument from the global services market to global civil society. For more information see Sassen, S. (2002) *Global Cities and Diasporic Networks: Micro-sites in Global Civil Society*. In Glasius, M. et al (eds). *Global Civil Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Indicators of post-conflict recovery are macro-economic stability, recovery of the private sector confidence and effectiveness of institutional arrangement. See World Bank 1997. *A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, Washington, DC.

9. This form of peace-building was articulated by the then Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros Ghali in his 1992 Report, *An Agenda for Peace*.
10. The overview here is based on the perusal of the policy framework on *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction* 2005. NEPAD Secretariat, Governance, Peace and Security Programme, June.
11. United Nations Charter, in Article 71 provides for formal recognition of non-governmental organizations in ECOSOC Activities.

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