

THE AU-UN PEACEMAKING MISSION IN DAFUR: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

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ABSTRACT

The recent attack on the Haskinita base of the African Union (AU) peacekeepers, South Dafur in Sudan, which killed nearly a dozen people and wounded many more, with several people also reported missing has again brought to focus, the challenges of peacekeeping, particularly in Africa, which has witnessed more conflicts in the post-Cold War era than any other continent in the world. Sudan, the largest country on the continent by area is home to blacks (about 50%), Arabs (about 39%), Beja (about 6%), foreigners (about 2%), and others (about 1%) has witnessed decades of conflict, since 1983 up to date. The current conflict however, is increasingly posing not only serious threat to international peace but also giving the international community an uphill task in terms of providing relief materials to displaced persons. The conflict is between the Arabs and the blacks (both predominantly Muslim) in the Dafur region and has recorded the worst humanitarian catastrophe since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, according to the United Nations. Some statistical sources have it that more than 200,000 people have been killed and about 2.2 million others forced to leave their homes since fighting erupted in 2003 in Darfur between the government of Sudan forces, allied Janjaweed militia and other armed rebel groups, mainly the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) among others. Since the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed in 2004, the mission has faced enormous challenges such as inadequate funding, lack of equipment, logistical shortcomings and unclear mandates among others, necessitating a joint mission between the AU and the United Nation (UN), expected to come into force in January 2008. This paper therefore examines these challenges and looks at the prospects for a successful AU-UN mission in Dafur.

Introduction

The conflict in the Western Dafur region of Sudan¹ represents one of the most critical test cases, not only to the African Union (AU) but also to the United Nations (UN) as a custodian of International peace and security as far as efforts towards ending crimes against humanity and humanitarian disaster is concerned. Of particular concern are the challenges it poses to these international bodies in terms of their peacemaking roles and efforts towards ending what has been described as the worst humanitarian catastrophe since the 1994 Rwandan genocide. When the Dafur conflict broke out in 2003 between the Arabs and the blacks (both predominantly Muslim), few people imagined that it was going to assume the dimension it has assumed today. The conflict started just at about the time when there was a breakthrough in the north-south peace process witnessing an escalating fighting in the western region of Darfur, where a complex web of conflicts involving rebel forces (the SLM/A and JEM among more than a dozen others). What appeared to be a mere struggle against perceived domination of non-Arabs by the Arab population in Darfur has now assumed an international dimension with its attendant consequences for international peace and security. Aside from the humanitarian dimensions of the conflict, its cross-border effects on neighbouring Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) is something to worry about. Over 200,000 thousand people have been reported dead and more than 2 million displaced as a result of the conflict, aside from other human rights abuses such as rape of women; abduction of women and children; theft of property such as cattle among others.² United States calls the situation in Dafur “genocide”³

The cross-border effects of the conflict have created enclaves for rebel groups along the neighbouring border towns from where they launch attacks against their home governments.⁴ In April 2004 the Sudanese government and the two rebel movements signed a humanitarian ceasefire agreement mediated by the Chadian government with support from the African Union. This led to the establishment of an AU peacekeeping mission, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was at first mandated to provide military observers to monitor and report on the ceasefire; an armed force to protect civilians and humanitarian aid workers; and an unarmed civilian police force and support teams were added later.⁵ The deployment of African Union peacekeepers in 2004 under the umbrella, African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor a fragile ceasefire between the factions was faced with so many challenges which necessitated the proposal for a UN-AU hybrid force, United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to substitute AMIS, expected to be deployed in January, 2008.

The questions which beg for answer are what constitute the mandate of the UN-AU hybrid force which is different from that of AMIS? What are the challenges that this new mission is potentially faced with and to what extent will it be able to overcome them? These questions will inevitably lead us to addressing several issues bordering on expanding the mandate of the mission; adequate funding of the mission; commitment on the part of both African countries and member nations of the United Nations towards troops contribution to the Mission; and intensifying humanitarian activities to bring relief to the millions of refugees and displaced persons by the conflict. For the purpose of clarity, this paper has been structured as follows: Shortly after the introductory part, we shall try to provide a background of the Dafur Conflict and the basis for the intervention

of both the African Union and the United Nations Organization. We shall then proceed to discuss briefly, the concept “peacemaking”, trying to outline its principles and focus on the changing nature of the international system with its implications on those peacemaking aspects like peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. It is important to take a look at some of the issues that have shaped the conflict in Darfur; issues such as economic and political marginalization, mobilization of ethnic militias, Islamization and Arabism, among others will be of interest to us. The international dimension of the conflict is also critical to its adequate understanding. Accordingly, we shall not only focus on the roles of the AU and the UN, but also examine the role of countries like the US, China and the immediate neighbours of Sudan, Chad, Libya, Eritrea, Egypt, and the Central African Republic, which have either been affected by the cross-border effects of the conflict or have intervened, in one way or the other in the conflict. We shall then focus on the peace process, examining the successes and failures of AMIS and lastly focusing on the challenges and prospects of AU-UN mission in the area. Finally, we shall make conclusion and then give recommendations.

Background of the Darfur Conflict

The Republic of Sudan, the largest country in Africa, lies on the western shore of the Red Sea. It is bordered by Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, Kenya, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo to the south, the Central African Republic, Chad and Libya to the west, and Egypt to the north.⁶ The population of around 28 million comprises a diverse range of ethnic groupings which speak over 400 languages. There are more than 30 ethnic groups in Darfur, but these can be divided broadly into two main categories: Arab and African. Arab and Arabic-speaking nomads inhabit the north and south of the region, whereas the centre is inhabited by African sedentary farmers, who are drawn, in the main, from the three principal African ethnic groups, the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaleit (often referred to collectively as black Africans).⁷ No part of the region can be said to be ethnically homogenous, and there has traditionally been a degree of movement and inter-marriage between these groups and social classes, resulting in a blurring of ethnic distinctions.⁸ Some of these ethnic groups are spread across neighbouring Chad, a phenomenon which is to have a lot of cross border implications for the two countries. Ethnic distinctions in Darfur are highly politicized and complex. The region is home to numerous groups who generally identify themselves as either “Arab” or “non-Arab,” and tensions between people belonging to these broad categories have existed for decades. In the 1960s Darfur was used as a base by largely “Arab” Chadian rebel groups fighting to overthrow their country’s government. In the 1970s Libyan leader Col. Mu`ammar al-Qadhafi, bent on “Arabizing” Chad and Sudan, created and supported militant “Arab” groups in Darfur whose aim was to overthrow the governments of both countries. Neither plan succeeded, but the population of Darfur continued to become polarized into opposing “Arab” and “non-Arab” groups. Open conflict erupted in Darfur in February 2003 when the well-armed SLM/A and the JEM took advantage of turmoil within the al-Bashir regime and launched attacks on government military bases. A series of rebel successes ensued during the first half of 2003, before government forces regrouped and responded with a counter-insurgency campaign. Government-backed Janjaweed militia

fighters carried out raids on communities suspected of aiding or sympathising with the rebels, and it is the humanitarian impact of these attacks which forms the core of the present crisis.⁹ It is certain that the current conflict in Dafur can not be understood in isolation from deep-rooted historical antecedents. To start with, post independence Sudanese governments did little to break away from the marginalization of Dafur as was perpetrated by colonial rule which largely neglected the area in terms of basic infrastructure.¹⁰ Again, the somewhat unstable political landscape of Sudan has also one way or the other promoted the factors that are responsible for the current conflict in Dafur. Since independence in 1956, Sudan has had a succession of alternating military and democratic regimes as shown in box below: Very little was however achieved in terms of addressing the marginalization of Dafur. And as we shall try to outline, the deep-rooted structural imbalances in the polity, economy, and social structure of the country since the pre-independence era up to the present time, particularly, with respect to Dafur, have created the basis for the current conflict.

Table 1 Military regimes and democratic governments in Sudan since Independence

Date	Government
1956 1 st January 1956	Sudan becomes an independent republic based on a democracy of sectarian parties.
1958, November	Coup d'etat resulting in the military regime of General Ibrahim Aboud.
1964, October	A transitional government led by Khattam al Khalifa (intended to prepare the country for democratic elections and devise a constitution).
1966, July	Coalition government of Sadiq al Mahdi, who won the parliamentary vote
1967, May	Mohamed Ahmed Maghoub replaced Sadiq al Mahdi
1968,	Elections returned Mohamed Ahmed Maghoub.
1969, May	Coup d'etat led by Colonel Jaafar Numayri
1983, May	Numayri re-elected with 99.6% of the vote!!
1985, April	Numayri overthrown by the Transitional Military Council lead by General Swar al-Dahab
1985, 14 th April	Sadiq al-Mahdi re-elected, winning 99 of the 301 seats. Revolutionary Council
1989, June 30 th	Military takeover by the Revolutionary Command Council led by Brigadier Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir. Ruled with the National Islamic Front led by Hasan el-Turabi.
1999	Split in the National Congress, and breakaway group formed by Turabi known as the National Popular Congress. ¹¹

Darfur province became latest chapter in Sudan's civil wars when Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels took arms against government February 2003. Rebels claimed years of political, economic and social marginalisation of the region. Rebels made up of predominantly African sedentary tribes, such as Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit. After string of military victories in spring 2003, government responded to rebellion by arming Arab "Janjaweed" militia to clear civilian population bases of African tribes thought to be supporting rebellion. Violence and broken ceasefires continued throughout 2004 and 2005 despite intermittent peace talks and presence of African Union protection force from August 2004. Divisions between and within the two rebel groups exacerbate conflict and hinder negotiations. Over 2 million civilians have since been displaced by the conflict and at least 200,000 killed. Humanitarian aid has been very difficult due to security situation.

Peacemaking: A conceptual survey

The term "peacemaking" is used in several different ways. According to the UN, peacemaking is "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations; Pacific Settlement of Disputes".¹² In this sense, peacemaking is the diplomatic effort intended to move a violent conflict into non-violent dialogue, where differences are settled through representative political institutions. The objective of peacemaking is thus to end the violence between the contending parties. Peacemaking can be done through negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. International law provides another channel through international courts.¹³ Peacemaking activities can be identified with the search for creative, and at the same time acceptable and sustainable, outcomes of the conflict.¹⁴ It is pertinent to state at this juncture that before any of such aforementioned peacemaking activities can take place, there must be a ceasefire between warring factions. Since its formation in 1945, the United Nations has carried out several peacemaking efforts in line with its Charter in several countries.¹⁵ United Nations peacemaking is an extension of the parties' own efforts to manage their conflict. When they cannot, the parties, the Security Council or the General Assembly may call upon the United Nations Secretary General to exercise his "Good Offices" to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. The Secretary General may also undertake independent peacemaking initiatives by offering his "Good Offices" to parties to resolve the conflict in a peaceful way. This inevitably leads us to focusing on peacekeeping as it traditionally perceived. Earlier efforts by the UN to restore peace in a conflict area and fast-track negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration were to begin with ensuring that warring factions, sign ceasefire accords and thereafter deploying peacekeeping forces to monitor such accords. Although there have been some unilateral interventions by some individual countries in other member countries of the UN in the name of "humanitarian intervention", apparently in contravention of the UN's principles of 'non-interference' and 'non use of force' without the UN taking decisive measures against such intervening states. Such interventions and the perceived inaction by the UN may not be divorced from the then Cold War politics and peculiarities of the international system then. Today however, the international system has changed. We have a world that has been

significantly transformed by globalization, with its attendant implications for among others, interstate diplomacy, human rights norms, international law, especially, the laws of war and laws on genocide.¹⁶ The current conflict in Dafur presents a critical challenge to not just African countries, but also the entire global community as its effects are not only threatening to the survival of the people of Dafur, but international peace and security.

The subject of peacemaking, especially when it is perceived as military intervention for protection of human beings, has been a controversial one. The traditional model of peacekeeping developed during the Cold War era as a means of resolving conflicts between States and involved the deployment of unarmed or lightly armed military personnel between belligerent parties. The rise in the number of intra-state conflicts, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, has resulted in a shift towards multidimensional peacekeeping operations that are often mandated to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement between parties to a civil war. This has, in turn, led to an expansion of the non-military component of peacekeeping operations whose success is increasingly dependent on the work of civilian experts in key areas such as the rule of law, human rights, gender, child protection, and elections.¹⁷

During the Cold War, countries could easily hide under the principle of “non-interference” as provided for by the UN Charter and on the other hand, big countries readily intervened in other countries, unilaterally for what they claimed “humanitarian reasons”, apparently in pursuit of their selfish interests. However, the changes brought about by the post-Cold War era have significantly created the basis for which issues such as genocide, war crimes, human rights abuse among others can not be simply waved aside by the international community.¹⁸ It is in line with this that the International Commission for State Sovereignty (ICSS) inaugurated by the United Nations in the year, 2000 initiated the concept of “responsibility to protect”.¹⁹ The African Union too, in its Consultative Act of 2000 which brought the AU in to existence in the year, 2001 also provides, in Article 4(h), “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of the grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.²⁰ It is against this background therefore, that the African Union established AMIS and deployed peacekeepers to Sudan in the year, 2004. The UN too, being the custodian of international peace and security has carried out series of diplomatic actions to try to resolve the conflict in Sudan, including the more recent passage of Resolution 1769, allowing for the establishment of a hybrid UN-AU Mission in Dafur (UNAMID).²¹ Whether or not this mission expected to be deployed by January 2008 will be successful or not depends on the efforts of all stakeholders to address the numerous challenges potentially or actually facing the mission.

Issues in the Dafur Conflict

The Dafur conflict raises a number of critical issues which include: political and economic marginalization of Darfur in the 20th century; Islamization and Arabism; the North South Civil War Peace Process; the mobilization of armed militias; and regional relations with Chad and Libya and implications for Darfur.

To begin with, the people of Dafur have cried of age long neglect, by the colonial government and even in the post independence era. Some statistics suggest that indeed the area has been neglected in terms of provision of social amenities, agriculture development, income distribution, political appointments, among others. A survey of some of such available statistics reveals for instance that for the 1169 agricultural Schemes implemented by the Sudanese Government as at 1955, none was sited in Dafur.²² Again, in 1939, maternity clinics in Sudan, there was only one in Juba and non in Dafur. Also, Dafur occupies the least position on the table showing income distribution as indicated on the table 2.

Although, the decades straddling independence saw a number of positive economic developments in Dafur,²³ this was soon to be reversed. By 1978, national economic crisis and management led to dramatic falls in exports, and widespread corruption. This affected the nascent economic growth in Dafur; cash crops suffered because of the problem of cost and supply of inputs and problems with local credit systems, which had a serious knock on agricultural labour.²⁴

Table 2 Disparities in Regional Income

Region	Income 1967/68	Income 1982/83
Khartoum	236	283
Middle (including the Blue Nile)	183	201
Eastern (including Port Sudan and Kassala)	180	195
Kordofan (including South Kordofan)	153	164
Northern Region	124	130
Darfur	98	102
Standard Deviation	44.5	57²⁵

The current insecurity in Dafur has to some extent has been blamed on the North/South conflict in a number of ways, including recruitment of militias from Dafur to fight in the south; use of similar tactics by Government of Sudan to deal with conflict in Dafur leading to increasing militarization of Dafur; drain on development resources and further marginalization of Dafur. There is indeed a long history of mobilizing tribes to support the various causes of the central riverain Arabs, dating back to the call of the Mahdi in the 19th century. But more recent mobilizing and arming of tribal militias dates back to the 1980's when President Numayri mobilised Muraheleen militias who were the armed Baggara Rizeigat from Southern Darfur and the Misseriya from Southern Kordofan to fight southern Sudanese rebels.²⁶ The more recent mobilization of armed forces to put

down the rebel insurgency in Darfur which started in 2003 was set in motion by a government appeal to all tribal leaders in Darfur to mobilize men to join the additional armed forces. These additional armed forces are widely known as the Janjaweed.²⁷

Again, the conflict in Darfur has been alleged to be tied to the attempt of the NIF government in Khartoum to advance the cause of the Arabs in Sudan over that of the black Africans. This view however, is being contested as there have been clashes even among Arab groups in Darfur recently.²⁸ The critical issue here is that whether one views the conflict as arising from attempt by the Arab-dominated government of Khartoum to marginalize the non-Arab groups or it is on that is divorced from the Arab factor, the areas affected have suffered long periods of neglect, what may be rightly described in the words of Johan Galtung as “structural violence”.

International Dimensions of the Conflict

The international dimensions of the Darfur conflict may be viewed from different angles including among others, its cross-border effects; the role of China; its international humanitarian implications; and the efforts of the international community towards intervention. To begin with, as earlier mentioned Sudan shares borders with nine countries altogether, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, Kenya, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo to the south, the Central African Republic, Chad and Libya to the west, and Egypt to the north. Of all these however, Chad, Eritrea, Libya and Egypt have been the most prominent as far either interference in the conflict in Darfur is, or as far the cross-border implications of the conflict is concerned.²⁹ The interplay between Darfur and eastern Chad can not just be seen as one of the spill over of the conflict in Darfur. It is certainly much more complex than that. It has been estimated that currently, over 200,000 Darfur refugees are in Chad, and Arab militias from Darfur have been attacking villages there. A Human Rights Watch report indicates that there is close coordination between Janjaweed militias and RDL rebels, and there are circumstantial and other evidences that not just the Janjaweed but the RDL receive material and other support from Sudanese government forces. RDL rebels have several bases in West Darfur around Geneina, where Janjaweed militias and RDL rebels are said to occupy nearly adjacent camps (and where the Sudanese government has a substantial military presence),³⁰ and in southern West Darfur. They have also reportedly been spotted in West Darfur in the company of government of Sudan army-sponsored Popular Defense Force militias. But the two countries’ politics have intertwined for decades. There are reports that suggest that President Deby supported Khartoum when the rebellion started in 2003 but the relationship quickly changed, with N’Djamena giving aid to the rebels, particularly the Zaghawa elements, and the NCP arming and supporting Chad insurgents. Analysts have concluded that the two countries are waging a proxy war in the border region and destabilizing the Central African Republic in the process.³¹

Again, the role of China in the Darfur conflict needs to be given adequate attention. To start with, China is the major investor in Sudan’s oil sector, implying that any happenings in Sudan must be of immense concern to China. Sudan on the other hand, has been

importing arms from China from proceeds of oil with which it has been prosecuting the conflict in the south and currently in Darfur. China has been an arms dealer to successive Sudanese governments. The Nimeiri government (1969-85) bought weapons from China. But these purchases rose in the 1990s due to Sudan's internal war and the promise of improved finances and enhanced international credit derived from its oil potential. Weapons deliveries from China to Sudan since 1995 have included ammunition, tanks, helicopters, and fighter aircraft. China also became a major supplier of antipersonnel and antitank mines after 1980, according to a Sudanese government official.³² The SPLA in 1997 overran government garrison towns in the south, and in one town alone, Yei, a Human Rights Watch researcher saw eight Chinese 122 mm towed howitzers, five Chinese-made T-59 tanks, and one Chinese 37 mm anti-aircraft gun abandoned by the government army.³³ Also, the role of China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council should be underscored. China has been accused of blocking resolutions and sanctions against the Khartoum government. In fact, many see the lingering intentional efforts towards addressing the conflict in Darfur as, to a large extent, a product of China's support to the Khartoum government.³⁴

The Darfur Peace Agreement and why it Failed to Bring Peace in Darfur

The first significant landmark towards bringing peace to Darfur was the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5, 2006, by the largest rebel group, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), led by Mini Menawi, and the Sudanese Government.³⁵ It is an agreement that attempts to address the long-standing marginalization of Darfur, and charts a path for lasting peace for the innocent victims of the crisis. The agreement requires that the Sudanese Government of National Unity complete verifiable disarmament and demobilization of Janjaweed militia by mid-October 2006 and places restrictions on the movements of the Popular Defense Forces and requires their downsizing. A detailed sequencing and phasing schedule ensures that the African Union certifies that Janjaweed and other armed militia have been disarmed before rebel forces assemble and prepare for their own disarmament and demobilization. The agreement stipulates that 4,000 former combatants be integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces, 1,000 be integrated into the police forces, and 3,000 be supported through education and training programs. The former combatants will be integrated in groups of 100-150 and will comprise 33 percent of each integrated battalion.

Democratic processes have been laid out for the people of Darfur to choose their leaders and determine their status as a region. Rebel signatories of the agreement were awarded the 4th highest position in the Sudanese Government of National Unity: Senior Assistant to the President and Chairperson of the newly established Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA). The TDRA will be responsible for implementation of the peace agreement in Darfur and the rebel movements will have effective control of that body. In July 2010, a popular referendum will be held to decide whether to establish Darfur as a unitary region with a single government. For the three-year period prior to elections, the agreement grants the rebel movements twelve seats in the National Assembly in Khartoum, 21 seats in each of the Darfur State legislatures, one State Governor and two

Deputy State Governors in Darfur, senior positions in State Ministries, and key posts in local governments. The accord commits the international community to holding a donors' conference to pledge additional funds for Darfur, and invites the TDRA Chairperson to present to that conference a summary of needs and priorities. The GNU is mandated to contribute \$300 million initially and then \$200 million/year for the next two years to rebuild the region. A Joint Assessment Mission - modelled on the one done for Southern reconstruction after the Comprehensive (North-South) Peace Agreement – will be established to determine the specific reconstruction and development needs of Darfur. Buffer zones are to be established around camps for internally displaced persons and humanitarian assistance corridors, and a commission has been created to work with the United Nations to help refugees and displaced persons return to their homes. The agreement provides that the Sudanese Government will provide \$30 million in compensation to victims of the conflict.

Although the DPA represents a landmark in efforts toward resolving the conflict in Darfur, it has not been able to achieve the desired objective due largely, to a number of challenges. The DPA has failed because it did not adequately deal with key issues, too few of the insurgents signed it, and there has been little buy-in from Darfur society, which was not sufficiently represented in the negotiations. A lasting solution to the conflict can only come through a revised political agreement but there is no consensus on the way forward. In November 2006, after months of inaction, the AU and UN announced joint efforts to renew political talks between the government and the rebel factions that did not sign the DPA but there has been little progress, while concurrent initiatives by Eritrea, Libya, Egypt and others have created confusion. Again, the Khartoum government has been accused of backtracking on the agreement.³⁶

The African Union and the Darfur Conflict: Successes and Failures

The AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) first discussed Darfur on 27 July 2004, when it requested its Chairperson to prepare a plan for making AMIS more effective. It emphasised the importance of disarming and neutralising the Janjaweed militias, protecting civilians, and facilitating humanitarian assistance, and raised the possibility of an AU peacekeeping mission.³⁷ Although PSC decisions are legally binding on AU members, the organisation soon realised that Khartoum's at least tacit cooperation was needed for successful deployment, thus limiting the scope of its activities to those acceptable to the government. As a result, the PSC retreated from its initial concept and on 20 October 2004 decided that the Mission's mandate should be: to monitor compliance with the 8 April 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and subsequent agreements; to assist in confidence-building; to protect civilians encountered who are under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within the limits of mission capability, it being understood that civilian protection is the government's responsibility; and to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and the eventual return of IDPs and refugees to their homes.³⁸

In April 2004, a UN Commission for Humanitarian Affairs report said the government was running 'reign of terror in Darfur'. In July 2004, the AU sent a monitoring force to the region; the next month, Algeria, Angola, Benin and other members of the UN Security Council backed a resolution calling on the Sudan government to disarm the Janjaweed and other militias attacking civilians. UN investigators concluded in January 2005 that the Sudan government had committed war crimes in Darfur and recommended that named members of the government should face trial at the international criminal court. Despite the criticisms, the NIF government continued its scorched-earth policy in Darfur into 2005. Due to lack of political will among bigger states on the UN Security Council, the atrocities in Darfur could not prompt international effort at the beginning. Against this backdrop, the AU organized peace talks between the main parties in Darfur and sent its own military observers and peacekeepers to monitor the putative ceasefire between the NIF and the main rebel groups, the SLA and the JEM. Little progress was made in the AU talks. The government concentrated on securing short-term tactical advantages, blocking external involvement and wider talks on Darfur's political status. It resisted initial demands for an AU peacekeeping force and was forced to accept it by the UN Security Council, it blocked calls for an AU investigation into war crimes in Darfur and was forced to accept a UN Security Council investigation. The intervention of the AU with initially, close diplomatic support of the UN is predicated on the objective of the regional body itself as enshrined in Article 3(f) and (h), which respectively state that: promote peace, security and stability on the continent and promote and protect human rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments. The principle of the intervention is enshrined in Article 4(h), which grants the Union the right "to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity".³⁹

AMIS has contributed to the reduction in combat through its limited presence and its reporting. It has had some success in reducing insecurity for civilians in the areas where it has deployed. Examples include: following months of violence in Kebkabiyah (North Darfur), AMIS established a permanent mission in late 2004, with the result that the Janjaweed no longer terrorise residents and IDPs inside the town, markets have reopened, and humanitarian NGOs operate in a more secure environment;⁴⁰ deployment to Labado (South Darfur) in January 2005 thwarted new attacks against that town and neighbouring Muhajaria and enabled some civilians to return home; positioning a Military Observer Group in Graidia (South Darfur) in February 2005 allowed the road to Baram to be opened and contributed to reducing violence between the Masalit and Habaniya tribes; in some locations, AMIS does liaise with traditional leaders to address citizen concerns, while striving to forge local reconciliation agreements to prevent cattle rustling from escalating into large-scale violence; AMIS has frequently ferried civilians who have been raped or attacked to hospitals or clinics, sometimes despite resistance from government forces seeking to conceal the targeting of civilians; and AMIS firewood patrols in several sectors protect women from assault and rape outside the camps.⁴¹

Although the Sudanese Government has insisted that any mission should be led the African Union and overwhelmingly staffed by African nations, the current African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has been incapable of providing a sufficient guarantee of civilian security in Darfur and is unlikely to ever be capable of doing so. A recent report by the International Peace Academy outlined several areas in which AMIS are failing, these are:

- Lack of clarity in the mission structure at field level and its inadequacy for the Purpose of integrated management of the mission;
- Lack of strategic management capacity;
- The absence of effective mechanism for operational level management;
- Lack of tools and know-how to handle the relations of the mission with a variety of external actors, including the Government of Sudan and international partners and agencies;
- Insufficient logistic support and ability to manage logistics;
- Insufficient capacity in the key area of communication and information systems, compound by unclear reporting lines from the field to the AU Commission;
- Problems in force generation and personnel management; and
- Total dependence on external partners to finance the mission and provide technical advice and support.⁴²

AMIS could not adequately protect civilians. Its ability to monitor the ceasefire, protect civilians and provide security for humanitarian operations in the area, the size of France or Texas requires a far larger force than AMIS had. Militias have attacked civilian targets, and the parties have attacked one another in AMIS's presence. AMIS's limitations are partially a consequence of AU inexperience in peacekeeping and the nascent stage of its PSC mechanisms, particularly in mission management and force generation. But beyond these institutional problems, the AU military operations in Darfur face constraints that would hamstring even the most experienced peacekeeping force: an inadequate mandate, insufficient forces and capabilities, and political failure to acknowledge that the Sudanese government has consistently failed to meet its responsibilities to neutralise the militias and protect its citizens. With a restrictive mandate and limited forces, AMIS tries to establish security primarily by deploying across parts of the eight regional sectors.⁴³ Again, Communication limitations severely curtail AMIS's ability to conduct operations. The mission lacks capability to transmit critical data such as operational orders or intelligence in a secure, high speed way. Communications are mostly passed from headquarters to units via voice transmission "in the open" or hard copy messages, which are liable to be intercepted by the Sudanese government.

AMIS does not have an intelligence apparatus or collection capacity and does not actively analyse or disseminate intelligence. It is, therefore, unable to give critical information to sector commanders that would permit them to take timely measures, even though intelligence gathering and monitoring of government, militia and rebel forces are two key responsibilities granted it under the Abuja Security Agreement of November 2004.⁴⁴

Troop mobility was hamstrung by inadequate ground transport and air assets. AMIS had no large troop transport vehicles. It also has very limited Mi-8 helicopters for most air operations, to effectively respond to any threats.

The UN-AU Peacemaking Mission: Challenges and Prospects

Following Khartoum's rejection of the deployment of a UN force in Darfur under UN Security Council Resolution 1706, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan unveiled his three-step plan for an AU-UN hybrid force for Darfur at a meeting in Addis Ababa on 16 November 2006. The plan was presented to the five permanent members of the UNSC (France, Russia, China, Britain and the USA), the AU, the Arab League and the Sudanese Government. Annan's plan, to which all parties agreed, envisaged a \$21 million support package to the AU, with the deployment of several hundred soldiers and police, and finally a 20,000-strong hybrid force, under UN command and control, to conduct peacekeeping duties in Darfur. The hybrid plan, which has been intermittently approved by Sudan, envisages three stages of implementation. The first two stages, the Light Support Package and the Heavy Support Package were seen as a means to help AMIS create an integrated command and control structure and to increase the effectiveness of its presence, overcoming many of the problems cited in the quoted peace academic report below. These first two stages of the package are a pre-requisite to the 26,000-strong hybrid force recently agreed under UN Security Council 1769.⁴⁵ While the first two stages of the hybrid operation have been delayed due to lack of infrastructure to support the force and a lack of security in Dafur, the final force is expected to be deployed by 31 December 2007.

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1769, the 26,000-strong United Nations-African Union Mission in Dafur (UNAMID) will be made up of 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liason officers, a civilian component including up to 3,772 international police and 19 special police units with up to 2,660 officers. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council has authorized UNAMID to take all necessary action to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as protect its own personnel, humanitarian workers and civilians "without prejudice to the Responsibility of the Government of Sudan".⁴⁶ The Resolution calls on UN member states to finalize their troop contributions to the new force within 30 days. Furthermore, UNAMID is expected to establish operational capabilities by October 2007 and to take command of the region from the 7,000-strong African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) by 31 December 2007, at the latest.

UNAMID's Mission

The resolution mandates that UNAMID's initial mission is to:

- Restore security to allow continued humanitarian assistance;
- Protect civilians;
- Monitor ceasefire agreements signed since 2004;
- Help implement the Darfur Peace Agreement;
- Ensure an inclusive political process and support AU-UN efforts to broaden and deepen commitment to the peace process; and
- Monitor and report on the presence of any illegal weapons in violation of the Darfur arms embargo. In addition, Resolution 1769 provides long-term missions for UNAMID, including:
 - Provide a secure environment for reconstruction, development, and return of Internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes;
 - Promote human rights and basic freedoms; promote the rule of law by Strengthening independent judiciary, prison system and development of legal framework; and
 - Monitor the security situation at borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.

In addition, UNAMID will have the authority to “take the necessary action” to:

- Support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and most importantly to protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Sudan, and
- Protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers.⁴⁷

Although this force is expected to come into effect in January 2008, it is important to attempt to identify the challenges facing it with a view to adding to the several suggestions on how to ensure a successful mission in Dafur, at least to restore hope to the millions displaced as a result of the conflict.

Challenges of the UN-AU Mission

While the latest UN Security Council resolution may pave the way for a more efficient peacekeeping force in Dafur, there are strong grounds for concern regarding the mandate and command control of the force, troop contributions, the timetable for deployment, funding and Sudan's resort to delaying tactics in particular. One of the challenges that AU-UN mission is going to face is the force's mandate. While the creation of chapter VII mandate is highly welcomed, the acknowledgement of Sudan's sovereignty within the same paragraph quite worrying, given the Sudanese Government's known attacks on its own civilian population. Again, in article 9 of the UN Resolution UNAMID is also

mandated to “monitor whether any arms or related materials are present in Dadur in violation of the Agreements and the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004). The initial demand that the force seize and dispose of illegal arms was abandoned.

Another challenge that UNAMID faces is one with respect to troop contribution. UN Security Council 1769 remains vague on troop contributions for the hybrid force and calls on the UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to agree to the final composition of the military component of UNAMID. Sudan has been resisting the deployment of non African troops into its territory, whereas only few African countries contributed troops to AMIS and from all indications, they are not prepared to make any further contributions.

Other challenges include: Darfur’s geographic isolation, harsh climate, limited food and water supplies, and poor infrastructure to support UNAMID’s mission. More than 30,000 troops, police, civilians and support personnel will need to be housed, fed, and transported in the Darfur region. UNAMID’s success is highly dependent on cooperation and compliance by the Sudanese government, which has fought its deployment at every step. Consequences must be developed, enacted, and enforced for Sudanese obstruction of UNAMID’s mission. UNAMID’s success depends on the Sudanese government and rebel forces moving towards a peace agreement and cease-fire. Some key rebel leaders have been unwilling to participate in the unified UN-AU peace process, to the detriment of the Darfuri people.

One of the most critical challenges UNAMID will be facing is the question of funding. The hybrid operation is expected to cost more than \$2 billion in the first year, yet no detailed long-term funding plan has been put in place.

Prospects of a UN-AU Mission in Dafur

Considering the numerous challenges facing UNAMID, its success is largely dependent on the ability all stakeholders to address them. Here, the onus rests on not only the Sudanese Government, AU and UN, but also on key Sudan’s neighbours like Chad, Eritrea, Libya and Egypt. The role of China, being Sudan’s main trading partner and being a permanent member of the UN SC is very crucial. To begin with, the success of UNAMID will only be possible if member nations of the UN ensure greater commitment in the area of troop contribution to be able to raise the set target of 26,000 personnel. Again, the cooperation of the Government of Sudan is the most determining factor. The Khartoum government should understand that the contemporary international system is not as it was, especially during the Cold War. The world can no longer stand aloof and watch the kind of human rights abuse going on in Dafur. It should equally understand that it is in the interest of Sudan that there should be urgent political settlement for the Dafur conflict, more so that the conflict has escalated to the level that no military option can lead to its resolution. Its cooperation therefore, is very important.

Recommendations and Concluding Remarks

On the basis of the foregoing challenges facing UNAMID, this paper sets out to make the following recommendations: first, the Sudanese Government should drop its hard stance that UNAMID forces should largely be drawn from AU-member countries. This is to allow for a rapid deployment of adequate personnel from other countries that are willing to contribute the troop built-up. The experience of AMIS has shown that troops purely from AU-member countries can not effectively tackle the security situation in Dafur. Secondly, the UNSC should expand the mandate of UNAMID to empower the force to seize illegal arms. Where any of the parties, whether the Sudanese Government or the rebels violate the terms of the ceasefire, the UNSC should enforce punitive measures, including sanctions, and arrests and prosecution before the ICC. The peace process should be all inclusive. All rebel groups that have not signed the DPA should be prevailed upon to sign a ceasefire agreement to pave way for a genuine political settlement in which a wider spectrum of the stakeholders will be involved. Also, humanitarian aid should be intensified to bring relief to the millions of Dafuris who have been displaced and are languishing in various camps in neighbouring Chad, and CAR.

The situation in Dafur indeed, is one that presents serious challenges to not on Sudan and its neighbours, but also the entire international community. Since Dafur rebels took up arms against the Sudanese Government in February 2003, opening another round of conflict in Sudan, which had experienced over two decades of civil war. The humanitarian catastrophe created by the current conflict in Dafur represents the worst of its kind since the Rwandan genocide of 1994, according to the UN and some rights groups. Efforts towards restoring peace in the area has been stalled intermittently, either due to lack of commitment by the Sudanese Government and rebel groups ; as a result of the counter productive roles played by some Sudan's neighbouring countries; and the lack of common position by the international community on the ways to tackle the conflict. The splinter of rebel groups in the area has further compounded the fragile situation, thereby worsening the security situation and making difficult for both peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers to operate.

The DPA which was signed by only two rebel groups and the Government of Sudan has largely not been a success due to the fact that several rebel groups refused to sign it and even the signatories themselves have not been faithful in its implementation. The deployment of AMIS which supervised the signing of the DPA has contributed just a little in improving the security situation in Dafur as it faced with numerous challenges, ranging from restricted mandate; inadequate troops to cover the vast areas of Dafur; insufficient logistic support and ability to manage logistics; and inadequate funding among others. These challenges have necessitated the establishment of UNAMID, based on UN SC Resolution 1769 to be deployed by January 2008. However, UNAMID itself already faces or potentially faces most of the challenges that made AMIS ineffective. It is the position of this paper that for a successful UNAMID, an all inclusive peace process must be put in place and all stakeholders must honour their obligation to ensure a lasting peace in the Dafur of Sudan.

APPENDIX A

MAP OF SUDAN, SHOWING THE VARIOUS STATES OF THE CITY



Source: Crisis Group Africa Report, "Dafur's New Security Reality", No 134 26 November 2007. P. 2

APPENDIX B

DARFUR NON-SIGNATORY MOVEMENTS

JEM (Justice and Equality Movement)	Leader: Khalil Ibrahim
SLA/AW (Sudan Liberation Army)	Leader: Abdel Wahid Nur
SLA/AS	Leader: Ahmed Abdelshaafie Breakaway faction from SLA/AW. SLA/AW commanders appointed Abdelshaafie as interim chairman to replace Abdel Wahid in July 2006.
SLA/G19 (SLA/Unity)	Leaders: Khamees Abdallah, Adam Bakhit, Jar el Neby Khamees had been the original leader of this group, but the group has since split into several factions. In Chad, Adam Bakhit continues to control a faction (in coordination with Khamees). Jar el Neby – with Suleiman Marajan and Osman Bushra – controls another faction in Darfur.
SLA/MM defectors	Groups that have defected from Minni Minawi, including those led by Salah “Bob” and Majzoub Hussein.
RDFP/PFA (Revolutionary Democratic Front Forces Popular Forces Army)	Leaders: Salah Mohamed Abdulrahman Musa (also known as “Abu Surrh”), Yassin Yousuf “Arab” rebel movement.
NMRD (National Movement for Reform and Development)	Leader: Gibril Abdelkarim Bari, Khalil Abdallah Originally broke away from JEM in March 2004.
SFDA (Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance)	Leaders: Ahmed Diraige, Sharif Harir Sharif Harir has reportedly left the SFDA to become a full member of the SLA.
NRF (National Redemption Front)	Leaders: Khalil Ibrahim, Sharif Harir, Ahmed Diraige, Khamees Abaker An alliance formed in Eritrea in June 2006. While initially effective as a military alliance, it has yet to find any political cohesion.
SLA/NSF (Non-signatory Faction)	Made up of SLA/AW, SLA/AS, and SLA/G19, created as a way to have representation in the Ceasefire Commission.

Source: Crisis Group Africa Report No 125, *Darfur: Revitalizing the Peace Process*, 30 April 2007. P. 30

APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDD-C	Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
HSP	Heavy support package
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally displaced person
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
LSP	Light support package
NCP	National Congress Party
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDF	Popular Defence Forces
RDL	<i>Rassemblement pour la democratie</i> (Chadian rebel group)
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SLA/MM	Sudan Liberation Army faction of Minni Minawi
SLA/AW	Sudan Liberation Army faction of Abdel Wahid
SPLA/M	Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement
TDRA	Transitional Darfur Regional Authority
UNAMID	United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

ENDNOTES

¹ Dafur, the largest region in Sudan, is said to be the size of France or Texas. It has three regions, namely, the Northern Region, Western Region and the Southern Region. See the regions of Dafur on the Map of Sudan in Appendix A.

² As at July 2007 the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) estimated that there are 2.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Darfur. There are also approximately 200,000 Darfurian refugees in Chad. UN OCHA, *Sudan Humanitarian Overview*, Issue 3, Vol. 5, July 31, 2007, <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LSGZ-768EVJ?OpenDocument>

³ See, for example, "Powell Accuses Sudan of Genocide in Darfur", *The Times* (London), 10 September 2004.

⁴ Cross-border rebel activities have been a recurrent feature between Sudan, Chad and Libya for several decades.

⁵ See *Human Rights Watch*, "Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change: The African Union Mission in Sudan", vol. 18 no.1(A), January 2006, <http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106/>.

⁶ See map of Sudan in Appendix A.

⁷ See Youngs, Tim, "Sudan: Conflict in Darfur", Research Paper, 2004 p.7 <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2004/rp04-051.pdf>.

⁸ See R S O'Fahey, 'A Complex ethnic Reality with a Long History', *International Herald Tribune*, 15 May 2004.

⁹ See Youngs, Tim, op. cit. P.10. Although the term "Janjaweed" is controversial, it is used to refer to men who were armed by the government and fought, or continue to fight, alongside the government or independently as informal fighters or as formal members of government paramilitary groups such as the Popular Defense Forces and Border Intelligence unit. The terms "militia" and "Janjaweed" are not used to describe members of the regular security services, including police, Sudanese Armed Forces (including Military Intelligence), or National Intelligence and Security Service, nor are these terms used to describe Sudanese rebels.

¹⁰ See Niblock, T. *Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics 1898-1985*, Albany, New York: State of University of New York Press, 1987.

¹¹ See Niblock, T. Ibid.

¹² Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace," (Online Document) New York: United Nations, 1992, available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>.

¹³ See "Peacemaking Overview" Conflict Management Toolkit, John Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Conflict Management Program. Available from <http://www.sais-jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/approaches/peacemaking/>.

¹⁴ See Galtung, Johan, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2003 P. 271

¹⁵ Peacekeeping has undergone so much transformation, from “traditional peacekeeping” or “first generation” peacekeeping to the “second generation” peacekeeping and the “third generation” peacekeeping”, also widely known as “peace support operations”. For more about peacekeeping and peace support operations see Kiani, Maria, “The Changing Dimensions of UN Peacekeeping”. Accessed from http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2004_files/no_1/article/8a.htm

¹⁶ See ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the International Commission on non Intervention and State Sovereignty, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa ON, Canada, December 2001,

¹⁷ See “The Challenges of Peacekeeping in the 21st Century”, 2004 Parliamentary Hearing at the United Nations, “From Disarmament to Lasting Peace: Defining the Parliamentary Role”, New York, October 2004 at <http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/unga04/peacekeeping.pdf>

¹⁸ Wheeler, Nicholas, J., *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* Oxford University Press, New York. Pages 1-53

¹⁹ Under the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine, states are not permitted to undertake unilateral action, such as armed humanitarian intervention, against another state in contravention of the UN Charter. The doctrine envisages the UN Security Council as being the only authority for allowing armed humanitarian intervention. See ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the International Commission on non Intervention and State Sovereignty, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, ON, Canada, December 2001,

²⁰ See the *Constitutive Act of the African Union* at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm

²¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1769 mandates the deployment of UNAMID by January 2008. For more information on Resolution 1769, full text of document at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8821.doc.htm>

²² Niblock T. op. cit.

²³ With the introduction of groundnuts farming (an important cash crop), expansion of commercial farming provided an agricultural labour market that was previously unavailable which provided a fall-back for small farmers. As South East Darfur was closest to the railway it became the most economically advanced, to the advantage of the Arabs. Economically the opportunities created by trade and development in Sudan have tended to favour South rather than North Darfur, which are evidenced in the way that Nyala has outstripped El Fasher. Morton J. *Conflict in Darfur. A different perspective*. Hemel Hempstead, UK: HTSPE, 2004. June 2004.

²⁴ See Ateem ESM. “Tribal Conflicts in Darfur: Causes and Solutions” Seminar on: the Political Problems of the Sudan 9 - 11 July 1999.: AKE-Bildungswerk Institute of Development Aid and Policy, Vlotho/NRW, Germany, 1999.

²⁵ See Mohammed AE. *Change in societies and its implications on tribal conflicts in Sudan* in Adam, Elzein, etal eds. *Tribal Conflicts In Sudan*, Institute of Afro Asian Studies, Khartoum, Sudan, Khartoum University Press, 1998.

²⁶ See *The Africa Report*, Quarterly No. 5 January 2007 P.160.

²⁷ Although the use of term “Janjaweed” is being controversial, it is more generally used to describe the armed militias mobilized by the government to address the counter-insurgency. Their methods and violations of human rights are infamous.

²⁸ The media often portrays the Darfur conflict as one between “Africans” and “Arabs”, with the Janjaweed and the “Arab Gathering” dominating most people’s ideas about the role of all Arab tribes. However, not all Arabs in Darfur support the Janjaweed or the NCP agenda behind it. The large *Baggara* tribes of South Darfur, in particular, have stayed very much on the periphery. Those such as the Habaniya, Maalia, southern Rezeigat, Beni Hussein and a good part of the Beni Halba did not take a substantial part in the earlier stages of the war. Some, such as the Taaisha, have not engaged in it as a tribe, although some leaders are key Janjaweed figures. See Crisis Group Report No 125, “Dafur: Revitalising the Peace Process”, 30 April 2007, p. 13; Crisis Group Africa Report No 134, “Dafur’s New Security Reality”, 26 November 2007, p. 3

²⁹ Read more about the international dimensions of the Dafur conflict in “Civil War and Genocide in Dafur: Chinese and Saharan Dimensions”. An address delivered by James Swan, US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, hosted at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, May 3, 2007 at <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/84401.htm> . Also, see Crisis Group Africa Report No 130 – 26 July 2007, P. 2.

³⁰ See *Human Rights Watch*, February 2006, “Cross-border Attacks on Civilians in Chad, Sudanese-based Janjaweed attacks into Chad”, <http://www.hrw.org>

³¹ See Crisis Group Africa Report N°111, *Chad: Back Towards War?*, 1 June 2006; Crisis Group Report, *To Save Darfur*, op. cit.

³² Human Rights Watch, China’s Involvement in Sudan: Arms and Oil”, Document accessed at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/26.htm>

³³ Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact, Arms Transfers to all Sides in the Civil War in Sudan,” Vol. 10, No. 4 (a) (New York: Human Rights Watch, August 1998), p. 20.

³⁴ McDoom, Opheera, “China’s Interest in Sudan Bring Diplomatic Cover”, Global Policy Forum, December 17, 2005. Accessed from <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/26.htm>

³⁵ Other rebel groups, SLA, led by Abdel Wahid and the JEM among others did not sign the agreement. See Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 39, *Dafur’s Fragile Peace Agreement* 20 June 2006. Also see details of the non-signatory rebel groups in Appendix B

³⁶ See Waging Peace Briefing “The UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Dafur: Will it Work?”, August 2007. Accessed from <http://www.globefordarfur.org/docs/WPWillItWork.pdf>

³⁷ AU PSC Communique, PSC/PR/Comm (XIII), 27 July 2004.

³⁸ PSC/PR/Comm, *ibid*. The full range of tasks are: monitor and verify the provision of security for returning IDPs and in the vicinity of existing IDP camps; monitor and verify cessation of all hostile acts by all parties; monitor and verify hostile militia activities against the population; monitor and verify efforts of the Sudanese government to disarm government-controlled militias; investigate and report on allegations of violations of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement; protect static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities; provide visible military presence by patrolling and establishing temporary outposts in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population; assist in the development of proactive confidence-building measures; establish and maintain contact with the Sudanese police; establish and maintain contact with

community leaders to receive complaints or seek advice on issues of concern; observe, monitor and report on local police; investigate and report all matters of police non-compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. See Crisis Group

³⁹ See Constitutive Act of the African Union, http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm

⁴⁰ However, civilians and IDPs continue to live in fear of Sudanese security and police forces in town and are unable to venture outside it due to persistent attacks and rapes by Janjaweed militias.

⁴¹ See Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 28, "The AU's Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps", 6 July 2005

⁴² See 'The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force', International Peace Academy, March 2007, http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/166/AU_IN_SUDAN-Eng2.pdf

⁴³ AMIS is headquartered in El Fasher, with an area of responsibility divided geographically into eight sectors. The sector headquarters are located at: (1) El Fasher; (2) Nyala; (3) Geneina; (4) Kebkabayah; (5) Tine; (6) Kutum; (7) Zalingei; and (8) El Da'ein. These locations were chosen based on proximity to IDP concentrations and airstrips. AMIS forces are distributed throughout these sectors commensurate with sector-specific threats. Each sector has between three and fourteen IDP camps, a headquarters (HQ) and two Military Observer (MILOB) group sites (MGS). One MGS in each sector is co-located at a shared facility with the headquarters. This makes for sixteen AMIS facilities throughout Darfur, in addition to the Force Headquarters at El Fasher and two additional sites at Marla and Labado. The facilities were constructed by Pacific Architects and Engineering (PAE) with U.S. government funding. Each provides shelter, potable water, sanitation, food, power generation, fuel, ammunition, and limited communications. The facilities within each sector are approximately 65 kilometres apart, which facilitates patrol overlap if necessary. See Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 28 op. cit. p.6

⁴⁴ "Protocol between the Government of Sudan, the SLM/A and the JEM on the enhancement of the security situation in Darfur in accordance with the N'Djamena agreement", 9 November 2004. The mid-May 2005 AU Ceasefire Commission troop verification mission was a positive step for determining the positions of all parties, but came six months after the ceasefire agreement was signed. See Crisis Group Africa Briefing No 28 *ibid.* p. 7

⁴⁵ See Waging Peace Briefing, "The UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur: Will it Work?", August 2007. Accessed from <http://www.globefordarfur.org/docs/WPWillItWork.pdf>

⁴⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2007/sc9089.doc.htm>

⁴⁷ See a copy of UN Security Council Resolution 1769 at
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/445/52/PDF/N0744552.pdf?OpenElement>

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