

HUMAN AND STATE SECURITY IN AFRICA - A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEW

African Human Security Initiative (AHSI)

"Money was not what should change Africa but the attitude and actions of its own leaders would".

Mozambican President Joachim Chissano, Durban, South Africa, July 2002

INTRODUCTION

During his speech to African Heads of State and Government in Lusaka in July 2001, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, made it clear that "Africa must reject the ways of the past, and commit itself to building a future of democratic governance subject to the rule of law. Such a future" he continued, "is only achievable on the condition that we end Africa's conflicts, without which no amount of aid or trade, assistance or advice, will make the difference." Earlier, in his report on Africa in 1998, Anan had stated the "for too long, conflict in Africa has been seen as inevitable or intractable, or both. It is neither. Conflict in Africa, as everywhere, is caused by human action, and can be ended by human action."

This paper sets out a conceptual framework for the review of selected commitments that African leaders have made at the level of the meetings of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. It does so within the spirit of the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). While 16 African countries have indicated that they intend to accede to the APRM, our review is limited to only eight of these countries, namely Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and South Africa. These countries have been selected on the basis of availability of data, knowledge of the countries concerned, regional representation and relative importance. Positive developments in these key countries will have important regional benefits, as well as impact in a significant manner upon the continent's broader development indicators. Collectively they account for 43% of the continent's population and 33% of its GDP.

Country	Population 2001	GDP 2001
Ghana	20,0 mil	\$5,3 bn
Nigeria	117,8 mil	\$41,4 bn
Senegal	9,6 mil	\$4,6 bn
Algeria	30,7 mil	\$54,7 bn
Ethiopia	67,3 mil	\$6,2 bn
Kenya	31,1 mil	\$11,4 bn
Uganda	24,2 mil	\$5,7 bn
South Africa	44,4 mil	\$113,3 bn
Total	345,1 million	\$195,9 bn

Total % of Africa	42,9%	33,2%
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Table 1: Population and GDP of the 8 AHSI selected countries¹

The debate on peer review has opened up considerable space for African civil society organizations to seek out and establish parallel processes to hold African governments and leaders accountable to their stated commitments and decisions.² With funding from the United Kingdom Department of International Development (DFID) the seven partners to the African Human Security Initiative (AHSI) intend to take up this challenge within the realm of selected human security indicators (www.africanreview.org).

This paper is intended to serve as theoretical background to the common project and does so by commenting first on our approach to human security – focusing on the key role of the state to provide security - and moving from there into a historical and developmental perspective on African state formation and characteristics. Final sections comment on the role of civil society and the NEPAD APRM process. Since the subsequent work by the project partners will focus their analysis on seven themes: democracy; human rights; civil society engagement; anti-corruption efforts; conflict resolution (including peacekeeping); control of small arms and light weapons (including landmines); and combating terrorism and organised crime, this paper weaves these themes into its explanatory narrative.

THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN SECURITY AND AFRICA

For the purposes of defining human security for this project we start off with a traditional approach. First we make a distinction between three levels of security, namely personal/individual, national and international³ security. Both individual and international security is dependent upon national security. Without the provision of effective national security, citizens cannot be personally secure. Without secure and stable countries and a body of practice or law whereby countries regulate their interaction, international security would remain elusive.

While national security is a prerequisite for human security, the reverse does not apply. Although human security can hardly exist without due provision of adequate national security, an outwardly aggressive and inwardly repressive regime can be a major source of human insecurity. Indeed, internal repression by governments is a greater cause of human suffering and abuse than any other.

For all states the national security problem therefore has two facets, internal and external. States can just as thoroughly be disrupted and destroyed by internal challenges (at the sub-state or from the national level) as they can be by external forces. The DR Congo is a good example of domestic rebellion (such as the repeated secession attempts by Katanga during the nineteen sixties), predatory governance (under Mobutu Seso Seko) and foreign invasion (by Uganda and Rwanda in 1998) – all three of which undermined national security.

Today many African states present the ‘shell’ of the territorial state: they focus on the provision of national security in the interests of their own preservation, provide personal security to a small elite, but little or no provision of human security for their citizenry. Such states are variously described as weak, quasi-states, intermediate states or, in extreme situations, as predatory in those instances where the regime literally feeds off the state carcass for its own survival, as was the case in Liberia under Charles Taylor. Recognition by the

international community provides the benefits (and obligations) associated with legal statehood,⁴ but does not provide a framework for human security.

Table 2: Partners and Clusters in the African Human Security Initiative

African Peace Forum (APFO);	control of small arms and light weapons (including landmines)
African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR)	conflict resolution (including peacekeeping)
Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA)	human rights
Institute for Security Studies (ISS)	combating terrorism and organised crime
Southern Africa Human Rights Trust (SAHRIT)	anti-corruption efforts
South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA)	democracy
The West African Network for Peace (WANEP)	civil society engagement

All security considerations revolve around the notions of predictability (ie have a futuristic time dimension) and control (ie have the potential for preventive or corrective action when threats emerge). Security is therefore time-bound and malleable. It implies protection against, or safety from, a future risk of severe deprivation, injury or death.

In organizational terms, national security is about those governmental institutions that ensure the physical protection and safety of their citizens. These are primarily the components of the criminal justice system (police, justice and correctional services/prisons), the military and the intelligence community. While the concept of national security largely refers to the security of the state against armed attack or insurrection, the ‘referent object’ of the broader concept of human security, which includes overlapping systems of security at individual, national and international levels, is the security of the individual in his or her personal surroundings and within the community - the ability thus of people and communities to pursue a safe livelihood on equal terms with others.⁵

While freedom from physical hurt, injury, abuse or the threat thereof constitutes the core of individual security, academic views of how far the communal concept of human security should (or could) be expanded from this core differ sharply. For some hunger, disease and environmental contamination represent grave security threats – even worse than physical violence. Thus conditions of abject poverty or powerlessness are viewed as not qualitatively different from vulnerability to physical violence during conflict. Others have argued that human security should include the notion of ‘structural violence’, referring to the structure of the relevant political-social system (such as apartheid) or the global trading system.⁶ While there are many different approaches, one thing is clear: the security of the individual is no longer defined exclusively within the realm of States and as a consequence of national security. As a result, individuals and communities are not only bystanders and collateral victims of conflicts, but core participants in protection strategies and post-conflict peace building, thus opening the door to the discussion on the role of civil society in the provision of human security in Africa in a separate section below.⁷ We do not therefore here follow the

approach advocated by Mahbub ul-Haq, Sadako Ogata and others to see human security as an alternative way in which to view traditional approaches to state security, but view the two in a complementary manner.⁸

If human development is freedom from want (a process widening the range of people's choices), human security can be understood as the ability to pursue those choices in a safe environment on an equal basis with others. Seen the other way around, human development contributes to human security by tackling the long-term structural causes of conflict and by strengthening the capability of societies to deal with conflict in a peaceful manner.⁹

AFRICA AND SECURITY TODAY

As Max Weber and others have repeatedly noted, the critical characteristic of a state is its monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in the territory it claims to control. This is not the situation in most of Africa where it is generally recognized that conflicts are of a regional and unregulated character (more so because state capacity to regulate (a) the amount of weapons in society is virtually non-existent and (b) the existence of a myriad of sub-state actors groups that increasingly are able to challenge and threaten the authority of the state). In the absence of administration and the application of any rule of law the nexus between the legitimate and illegitimate activities of business, government, criminals and conflict triggers are often difficult to distinguish from one another. These flow across national borders and involve numerous national and international actors. Insecurity and instability in Africa has become a single, complex and interrelated problem that is an intrinsic part of the debate about the nature and capability of the African state.¹⁰ While there are only a few collapsed or failed states in Africa, most African states are weak as governance has contracted rather than expanded in recent decades in parallel with the acute economic crises experienced by the continent.

Thus in Liberia some 250 000 people are believed to have died in war-related circumstances since 1989 - about 10% of the country's three million population. Liberia returned to war shortly after the carnage in neighbouring Sierra Leone was brought under control after free and fair elections in 2002 and at a time when Francophone West Africa saw its most prosperous country, Cote d'Ivoire, divided between a rebel held north and government controlled South after conflict broke out in September 2003. That widening regional conflict has threatened Guinea, Liberia, affected Mali, Niger and even Ghana.¹¹

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), an estimated 3 million people have died during the last three years of conflict. In neighbouring Rwanda 40 percent of the population have been killed or displaced since 1994. In Burundi, some 300 000 people have been killed over the past decade and fighting between the government and Hutu militias force about 100 000 to flee their homes each month. In Uganda the war with the Lord's Resistance Army that started in 1986 has displaced an estimated 1 million people since 1986. To the north the 20 years of civil war in Sudan have claimed the lives of two million people and caused the greatest displacement of people in Africa. Elsewhere in the Horn the war between Ethiopians and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000 cost around 100 000 lives. Neighbouring Somalia, with the limited exception of Somaliland and the region of Puntland, has had no government since the abortive UN mission ended in failure in 1993.

Underpinning Africa's security crisis is, of course, the continent's severe developmental failure. Undeniably the common denominator of civil war and conflict in Africa is poverty and much of that poverty the result of bad policy and poor governance. As economic and

social conditions have steadily worsened, so has insecurity and instability increased, affecting the general populace.¹² A dramatic reduction in agricultural output, upon which much of Africa is dependent, is but one factor that illustrates the failure of economics and politics in much of the continent. Manufacturing output has fallen and balance of payment difficulties followed shortly thereafter. Almost all sub-Saharan countries have been confronted with an endemic financial and debt crisis leading to external indebtedness and high debt-service ratios. Physical infrastructure has been crumbling and public services have broken down. Unemployment has escalated while skilled professionals emigrate to seek a better life abroad. Private capital has been disinvesting and substantial amounts of private wealth transferred overseas. The severity of the African crisis is reflected in the static levels of GDP per capita in Africa compared to that of other regions in the world.

Table 3: GDP Per Capita annual growth rate (1975-2001)¹³

Sierra Leone	-3,3%
Niger	-2,0%
Burkina Faso	1,3%
Mali	-0,4%
Burundi	-0,8%
Mozambique	1,8%
Ethiopia	0,1%
Central African Republic	-1,5%
DR Congo	-5,2%
Guinea-Bissau	0,3%
Chad	0,1%
Angola	-2,3%
Zambia	-2,2%
Malawi	0,2%
Côte d'Ivoire	-2,0%
Tanzania	0,3%
Benin	0,5%
Rwanda	-1,2%
Guinea	1,4%
Senegal	-0,1%
Djibouti	-4,6%
Nigeria	-0,7%
Gambia	-0,2%
Madagascar	-1,6%
Uganda	2,6%

Kenya	0,3%
Zimbabwe	0.2%
Cameroon	-0,6%

Africa's share of global trade in 1950 was 7% and in 2002 it was 2%. Africa's share of global capital in 1950 was 6% and in 2002 it was 1%. Left behind in international investment and globalization, Africa's share of global foreign direct investment in the 1980s was 30% and in 2002 it was 7%, in spite of its oil and gas output. One export that Africa can ill afford is people. According to the Geneva-based International Organisation for Migration, since 1990 Africa has been losing 20,000 doctors, university teachers and other professionals each year. The continent is producing expertise it badly needs, at considerable cost, without getting the benefits.

While African countries have generally failed to diversify and attract investors, their terms of trade have worsened. Average output per head was lower at the end of the 1990s than it was 30 years earlier when Africa was widely thought to be on the way to new prosperity.

Sub-Saharan Africa's disappointing performance is even worse when compared to other regions of the world over time. The Middle East and North Africa, and East Asia and the Pacific – both of which were poorer than Africa in the early 1960s, have long since surpassed continental indicators. South Asia, a region that was significantly poorer than Africa in the early 1960s has now almost caught up and will probably surpass Africa in the near future.

Recent years have seen a limited turn-around in previous trends, largely through improvements in macroeconomic policy. The picture in 2004 is therefore necessarily a mixed one. Recently Omar Kabbah, president of the African Development Bank, categorized Africa in three groups.¹⁴ About 20 countries were raising average income significantly and tackling poverty, a similar number growing more slowly and failing to reduce the number living below the Dollars 1 a day poverty line, and the remainder stagnating or falling back through bad government or war. Thus half of Africa's population now live on less than \$1 per day and the absolute number of Africans in this category has increased from 241 million in 1990 to 314 million in 1999 – reflecting the decline in the average African per capita income over this period. Yet the average rate of economic growth has accelerated since 1995 and some 16 African countries grew at more than 4% a year over the last decade. Amidst these harsh circumstances primary school enrolments have improved from a low of 56% in 1991 to 59% a decade later – admittedly far short of the far short of the millennium development goals set in 1990.

With the exception of northern Africa and South Africa, Mr Kabbaj said, Africa was the one region in the world most unlikely to meet the UN's development targets by the 2015 deadline. On current trends, according to the UN Development Programme, sub-Saharan Africa will take until 2147 to achieve the goal of halving the number living in extreme poverty, and until 2165 to reduce child mortality by two thirds.

Within this context the ownership reflected by many African governments, who are taking ownership of their development challenges through NEPAD. Broad statistics obscure more complex realities, for example, Gambia, with almost 60% of its citizens in absolute poverty, is among five countries in the world to reduce child mortality, while Senegal and Uganda have dramatically reduced HIV infection rates through education and prevention

programmes. While overall levels of international aid per head has almost halved in real terms in the last decade and stabilized at about 1990 levels, about \$7 billion per annum is flowing into Africa as foreign direct investment.¹⁵ Nigeria alone will stand to benefit from an estimated US\$110 bn and Angola from US\$40 bn oil income in the next 6 years.¹⁶ African countries that have taken advantage of the provisions of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa), notably Lesotho and Swaziland, have enjoyed an enormous increase in formal employment.¹⁷ Perhaps most significantly, tenuous democracy continues to hold in Nigeria (124 million people), a peace agreement is in place in the DRC (50 million people) while resource-rich Angola is preparing for elections and Sudan on the verge of an agreement that will end Africa's longest running war.

These changes in Africa's fortunes, admittedly tenuous and confronted by the impact of the HIV/Aids pandemic, underlie the fact that while poverty and insecurity in Africa remains informed by the colonial and Cold War legacy, political choices by African elites are the most important determinant factor that has determined the present state of the continent – reflected in the progress made in a country such as Uganda which today has only slightly more than a million people live with HIV, reflecting a decline in prevalence rates from 30% in the 1980s to around 6% today.¹⁸ As in the past, leadership is a key determinant in the future of Africa and the impact of such leadership is demonstrated not only in Uganda, but also in the extent to which African leaders have sought to end conflict – a quest exemplified by the dedication to peacemaking of South African president Thabo Mbeki in the Great Lakes Region, Comores, Liberia and elsewhere.

Based on the examples of mature democracies, we argue that at least five additions are required to complete the transition from a simple focus on national, personal and community security to human security within the African context. The first is the development of an administrative bureaucracy to manage the state along a rational-legal as opposed to a personal or patrimonial basis. The mere existence of such a bureaucracy is insufficient if the state is not in control of its entire territory, including the movement of people and goods, and provides public order. The second is the rise of an independent commercial class. This increases the resource base of the state and diffuses power, dividing the sources of patronage between politics and economics. The third is the transformation of subjects into citizens – traditionally through the process of nationalism as an ideology of the state. In Africa artificial colonial borders have given way to the subsequent awareness by Africans of a national identity in countries as vast as the DRC or as small and violent as Liberia. But national identity does not equate with citizenship and its implied reciprocal relationship of duties and rights between the individual and the state. That is a relationship that most African governments still have to earn. The fourth is the introduction of democracy that institutionalizes the transfer of sovereignty from ruler to people.¹⁹ Finally, we hold that the very weakness of African states demands a regional approach to security and development within which peace is pursued as a collaborative venture and economic growth based on the removal of national impediments to trade and the pursuit of improved individual livelihoods.

The provision of security and the organised pursuit of prosperity for its peoples remain a key consideration or justification of state-hood. It is our view that the absence of security and the failure of development in Africa are closely related to the nature of the African state. The reasons for this situation are to be found in an understanding of the key dynamics of African state formation – developments that have their origins rooted deeply in Africa's history.

STATE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

Relatively low population densities in Africa over previous centuries made it much more difficult to establish fixed territorial states than was the case in Europe and elsewhere in the past.²⁰ While great cities arose in Europe in recent centuries, African cities remained mere towns by comparison, as Africans relocated from one area to a next once soil became exhausted or illness intruded.

Different to Europe, the African state of the pre-colonial period was not a territorial state. Because of low population densities and the large amount of open land, wars of territorial conquest have seldom been a significant aspect of the continent's history. In pre-colonial Africa, the primary object of warfare was to capture (better not to equate women and cattle – might offend some people), cattle, slaves and treasure, not land, which was plentiful.²¹ While territorial conquest was a key factor in state formation in Europe and in other regions in modern history, war played a smaller role in state development in Africa (or Latin America). Thus, while at the end of the 18th century, the so-called 'absolute' states in Europe achieved a virtual monopoly on force, at the expense of their subject populations, the situation in Africa and elsewhere, was very different.

Of the 500 or so independent political units in the Europe in ca.1500, only 25 remained by 1900. In this process the modern European map took its shape as states were formed through war and territorial conquest - a process of steady extension of the provision of territorial security from one community to the next as the one king, bandit or warlord, succeeded in subjugating his neighbour. In this, and many other respects, European history, while serving as the dominant source of writing and reference, is quite dissimilar from that of much of the rest of the world, in particular that of Africa and much of Asia.

In this process security came to be identified with the security of the state from external or internal threat. Largely as a result of the important role that the military played in European state formation, much of the debate about security came to be dominated by military notions – with the armed forces seen as the last resort of power. Military institutions were of central importance in fashioning the nation-state that emerged in Western Europe and North America. In fact citizenship and compulsory national military service co-existed in a close relationship. Eventually the citizen army and its civilian reservists became instruments of nationalism and a device for political control over the military professionals.²²

In the 19th century then followed the democratisation of the European state, in part a response to pressure from subject populations for more rights, and in part as incentive offered by state leaders to increase the legitimacy of the states' demands for rising taxes. The 'state' developed as a separate institution from the broader citizenry that is today characterized as the evolution of the rational-legal state – in contrast to the personal exercise of power that continued to be the rule elsewhere. Events in North America had by then diverted from that in Europe with the establishment first of the Union and eventually the United States of America, built on the lessons of oppression and exploitation that its white people brought from Europe and on the sweat of the millions of black slaves that it bought from Africa.

In Africa, with its widely dispersed populations, concentrations of people in one area seldom intruded on the security consciousness elsewhere on the continent.²³ Boundaries between security communities were imprecise and fluid and it was unclear where one area of authority ended and another began. The result was that precolonial African states were exceptionally dynamic. Geoffrey Herbst therefore writes that “[p]olitical organizations were created, rose

and fell naturally in response to opportunities and challenges.”²⁴ Naturally low population density also reduced innovation and development pressure. Thus roads were few and far between, too costly to build and maintain over vast distances with low population density and low traffic volumes. Until modern medicine was able to overcome the limitations imposed by the environment on the procreation of humans on the continent, the political structure in Africa was an age-grade system that established gerontocracy as the dominant form of political organization.²⁵

In contrast to the history of Europe with its high population densities and tight territorial control, power tended to dissipate quite rapidly from the centre in Africa. Clear borders between tribes and kingdoms were seldom evident. The imposition of rigid colonial borders that were superimposed after the Berlin conference of the late 19th century thus represented impressive changes for the continent and its peoples. Although it would appear as if African state formation (in the territorial sense) had been accelerating during that century, the indigenous process of security consolidation that characterized European state formation was interrupted by the external and militarily superior intervention in Africa in the scramble for relative influence between European powers and control over resources.²⁶

Subsequent colonialism left an indelible footprint on Africa, despite the fact that the colonial interlude was relatively brief, the number of colonialists few, and the methods of control often indirect. In the process the continent was reordered along the political space concepts prevalent in Europe, derived from a foreign experience and not its own. Borders were drawn and determined by the political interests in Europe based on the occupation of what was, at least initially, only small slivers of African territory. Security was now guaranteed by a foreign, external force, differentiated by its superior organization and technological advancement – identified by the ascriptive skin colour of its soldiers and administrators. A thin white line stood between Africa and Europe, imposing the structures of the latter, however superficially, on the former.

Upon independence during the 1950s and 1960s, African governments thus inherited the trappings of statehood, including armed forces that had been orientated to serve a wider, imperial scheme such as protection of a sea-route or contribution to European forces in select frontiers. Quite literally, the armed forces of the newly independent African states had no clear role comparable to their European counterparts except to serve as presidential guard. No wonder that in time, they would aspire to political power. The police forces, previously essentially and practically there ‘to keep the natives in check’, soon served to keep any opposition to the government at bay. Perhaps more importantly, post-colonial administrations were taught and soon absorbed the thinking of their former colonial masters.

African states, artificial to start with, were subsequently held in place by the superpower rivalry of the Cold War, despite the obvious steady decay of state content that became particularly obvious during the late seventies. In this manner the external world served to buttress and maintain the developing states. Incumbent leaders such as Mobutu Seso Seko in the former Zaire or Agostinho Neto in Angola were supported by the United States or the Soviet Union because they aligned themselves to a particular side. In the process they were provided with the means to survive, irrespective of corruption, inefficiency, or the human rights record of their respective regimes. In this manner the Cold War served to undermine African governance and systems of accountability in a fundamental manner.

As an aside, this (and subsequent) broad generalizations should not obscure the varied relationships that developed between African countries, their former colonial masters, the two

superpowers and their allies and indeed with others. Thus France consolidated an exceptional relationship with the governing elites of francophone Africa - beyond those required by its Cold War interests, reflected in an average of one French military intervention in Africa per year from 1960 to 1994. This relationship underpinned France's claim to continue to be considered a world power in the post-colonial era, while African governing elites benefited from a reliable ally that provided economic, political, technical and, when required, military support in a situation where their hold on power was often fragile.²⁷

The end of the Cold War served to reduce Africa's strategic importance and the unquestioned resources that foreign sponsors were prepared to make available to support politically pliant leaders. In the process Africa's governing elite's lost much of their ability to extract capital and support from the East or the West. With the removal of this external scaffolding, the weakness of the African state was ultimately exposed to a world that was in the middle of a new revolution.²⁸ Globalization had the existing trading nations establish high barriers to protect them from fair competition at a time when the new found ability of capital, corporations and technology united the world into one market. The result, coming so soon after the damage that was caused by the twin oil shocks in the early eighties, was a very dramatic erosion of the state and even the creation of weak and so-called failed states over time. With little room to manoeuvre, African governments were forced to adopt a series of structural adjustment programs from the early 1980s. From then onward, the international financial institutions took effective control of a significant portion of the continent's economy, and imposed comprehensive programs of currency devaluation, privation, market pricing and macroeconomic stabilization. Power over much of Africa's troubled regimes had passed from the former colonial powers, first to the two opposing ideological superpowers, and now largely to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Although structural adjustment programmes registered some macro-economic improvements (such as the elimination of overvalued exchange rates), these did not overcome the region's troubled existence nor did they pave the way to sustained economic recovery. Improved governance and progress on democratization have also proven more difficult to effect than macroeconomic changes and all came at a tremendous social cost to Africa, often because domestic political elites resorted to more damaging practices to retain and protect their benefits.

In fact it soon became evident that the state and society were now often at odds with one another. For the first time, African leaders had to come to terms with their own security and development community – at least to the extent that donor conditionality and the dictates of the global economy would allow. And both would initially serve to further weaken the African state and its ability to govern at a time when Africa arguably needed more, not less government.

Beyond the dynamics of the Cold War, the dominant ideologies also had an impact upon the role that was expected of the state. At independence African leaders expected the state to play an extensive role in the political and economic life of their countries. Governments in independent Africa therefore assumed a leading and wide-ranging interventionist role. It was generally believed that the way to a better future lay through more and longer term state planning, with its implementation led by a large and ever-expanding public sector.²⁹ As a result, politicians and government officials made most important economic and other decisions, and economic allocations were strongly politicized. According to Anne Pitcher "... states were expected to be the mechanism that would hasten economic and social development; they would be responsible for making their countries modern. They would

bankroll large, technologically sophisticated industrial projects and mechanize agriculture.”³⁰ The result was massive growth of the state-owned enterprises that were established after independence. By the 1980s, at the time of the twin oil shocks and their devastating impact on Africa, the parastatal sector occupied a pivotal position in the economies of all sub-Saharan countries. Their associated poor performance and the extent of corruption set the scene for an extensive period of privatization and slimming down of government at the behest of the international financial institutions thereafter.³¹

In time analysts identified and commented upon the nature of (neo)patrimonialism in Africa as a subsequent impediment to stability and development. Amongst others, neopatrimonial systems evidence a high tolerance, and even legitimation, of market and patron-client networks. Since corruption is seen as an integral part of the political order, pervading most aspects of daily life and rewarding individuals according to a condoned social order, it is generally viewed as legitimate. Two examples of the instrumental function that corruption serves illustrate this point. On the one hand petty corruption ensures the survival of low ranking civil servants and their families and is therefore generally condoned. On the other paying below-subsistence civil service wages is a powerful means for a ruling group to retain the allegiance of its individual members – “... providing both an inescapable economic incentive (access to rents/bribes) and a disciplinary threat (dismissal for corruption).”³²

The extent of corruption, slow or negative growth and declining standards of well-being had scholars place the African state at the forefront of attempts to find out what went wrong – a process of investigation that soon pointed to the politicization of decision-making in Africa. No surprise that the subsequent prescriptions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were couched in terms that called for the minimalist state within which the appetite for Africa’s strongmen would be curbed by institutionally divorcing them from the means of accumulating wealth.

But the period of privatization of Africa’s bloated state-owned sector that followed the early 1980s had limited success since it threatened the existing patterns of patronage. Many divestiture decisions favoured cronies and supporters of the elite in power and thus helped to enhance the political position of those in control of the state.³³ Despite their impeccable credentials, Africa’s liberation leaders proved incapable of inculcating democratic practices when the choice of the electorate threatened their own hold on power.

Much has been written about corruption in Africa. Quantitative studies have indicated that corruption is positively correlated with political instability with the strongest correlation found at an aggregated regional level, with regions described as most corrupt also being the most affected by political violence and vice versa.³⁴ Phillippe le Billon postulates that “... corruption is an efficient organizational tool to create order from a situation of anarchy, ...”³⁵ thus contributing to political stability. Recent years have also seen an important shift away from earlier writing about corruption that was largely articulated along moralist and judgemental lines. Lately the focus is on the socio-political function that corruption serves. Subsequent research³⁶ into the relations between corruption, development and politics demonstrate that corruption is not systematically ‘naked self-interest’, and that it is endogenous to many political structures where it serves key hierarchical functions, thereby contributing to political order.³⁷

The preceding paragraphs support the view that modern African states were created by outsiders and held in place first by colonialism and then, during the bi-polar era, by Cold War rivalry before the external scaffolding was removed shortly after the collapse of the Berlin

Wall and Africa left to the machinations of the international financial institutions, the vagaries of globalization as well as the mismanagement of the continent's own leaders. Much changed in Africa as a result. From the mid-1980s onward African societies came under stress through rising external debt, structural adjustment programmes, the disengagement of cold war patrons, and the advance of democratization. These factors combined to challenge the prevailing political order. In many cases these changes disrupted the stability of the dominant neo-patrimonial systems across much of the continent, increasing competition and criminalization and drove the final nail into the unsustainable character of the post-colonial social system.³⁸

THE ROLE OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ELITES

Explanations about Africa's woes have tended to be presented in two analytically distinct ways: one emphasizing domestic factors, the other stressing external considerations. Although domestic and external factors are intimately linked, scholars have tended to view them as mutually exclusive alternatives.

Those favouring exogenous causes have attributed Africa's economic stagnation to the impact of various adverse features on the international political-economic environment such as the relative decline in world commodity prices.³⁹ These scholars seek to credit international actors and their associated ideology and policies with the primary responsibility for much of what happens in the continent. The blame for Africa's developmental and security crisis is thus largely placed on Africa's position in the world economy. Thus dependency theory argued that poor terms of trade for primary commodities and low levels of industrialization left African governments chronically short of funds to finance development projects. The current view is often that international financial flows and the rapidity of transport and communications further weaken the capacity of African states effectively to manage their economies. Thus the African state is generally viewed as soft, weak or underdeveloped while entirely dependent on international financial institutions for its limited role.

This explanation would have African leaders at the mercy of slavery, imperialism, colonialism, capitalism or socialism and recently globalization. By implication if globalization and the pressure to adopt neo-liberal policies such as privatization have made already weak governments irrelevant, it serves little purpose to hold African leaders accountable.

One important shortcoming of the external argument is that it does not enable us to understand why some African countries, confronted with the same difficult international economic environment, have fared better than others.⁴⁰ Furthermore, in recent history adverse developments in international trade only critically affected African countries in the 1980s when they were already in economic decline.

Eventually it would appear that domestic factors such as the choices and actions of local political elites compounded rather than moderated the external factors in Africa's economic decline. Thus, according to Roger Tangri: "African governments have done little to minimize or mitigate the deleterious impact of exogenous facts on their economies. Instead this external impact has been exacerbated by domestic factors. ... Domestic economic and political practices are central to any explanation of Africa's economic troubles."⁴¹

Nothing illustrates this alternative argument better than the history of oil income in Africa

where massive misappropriation and corruption has accompanied the discovery of oil in countries such as Nigeria and Angola. As the Financial Times recently wrote: ‘Nigeria, is a prime example of oil-fuelled failure. Since the 1960s it has earned perhaps \$300bn from oil but has little to show for it. It has acquired an unenviable legacy of military dictatorship, a towering foreign debt and an enduring reputation for corruption Most of its people have stayed poor, receiving little in public services or benefits other than access to subsidised fuel products. ... African oil producers provide no examples of good governance.’⁴² These examples have increased external conditionality and interference in the internal affairs of African countries. For example the World Bank only agreed to support the recent \$3,7 billion Chad oil venture with a guarantee that most of the government’s extra income – a 50% increase on its annual budget – would go into ‘real’ development projects and not the pockets of its governing elite.⁴³

Obviously international influences shape the context within which African governing elites make decisions about economic policy and political transition. For example, the change from a bipolar to a unipolar world impacts upon ideological orientation, policy choices and domestic priorities. This does not, however, mean that African elites are powerless, simply that their degree of influence of international factors varies over time in relation to external and domestic changes and that the strategies employed by elites to maintain their sources of patronage adapt according to the specific constraints that they face.⁴⁴

In retrospect Africa’s post-independence leaders, unlike East Asian state elites of the same period where independence had followed a different trajectory, appear to have been overly concerned with their own uniqueness as liberators. Having often fought for or otherwise brought their countries to independence from colonial rule, many have assumed a self-gratifying and imperial right to rule these newly independent countries – as if their contribution to liberation implied that the country owed them an immeasurable but massive debt. Thus, in time, political leaders appeared to be more concerned with staying in power and building an economic base for themselves than in economic and social development. In the process leaders virtually deified for their commitment to the struggle for independence and spent their latter years embroiled in an undignified fight for political power at the expense of their countries. This trend is epitomized by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, whose ruinous policies have caused his country’s GDP to shrink by roughly 40% during 1999 to 2003, inflation to rise by 526% by October 2003 and left two-thirds of the population in need of food aid in 2002/3.

Often African leaders appeared distracted by the benefits of office since “... power also brought with it many opportunities for attaining wealth in an African context of extreme scarcity and poverty as well as limited private accumulation.”⁴⁵ Since most other avenues to wealth were restricted, with the larger private enterprises being in non-African hands, political power and the benefits associated with state control became the focus of intense struggle. Thus “patronage politics has been integral to post-colonial efforts to maintain political control in poor, ethnically diverse peasant societies. Yet, although valuable in helping to consolidate ruling coalitions, the dynamics of patronage relations have proved economically highly damaging.”⁴⁶ As a result economic decisions were often placed at the service of political and personal ends.

Since patron-client ties have constituted the primary means of maintaining power in African countries in an authoritarian context, liberation leaders have rarely been held accountable for their actions. State elites have used public institutions to dispense an array of public benefits – jobs, credit, contracts, subsidies – to select clients and ethnic constituencies to build

political support and consolidate themselves in state power demonstrated by the corruption and nepotism that engulfed post-colonial Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta and were taken to new levels of sophistication by his anointed successor Daniel Arap Moi.

The AHSI partners hold that the contradictions inherent in the externally imposed state and the subsequent edifices that maintained these states after independence were compounded by the choices and options adopted by Africa's post-independence elites. The choices affected by these leaders and Africa's political elites play an important role in where the continent presently finds itself today.

In time most Africans, the majority of whom still reside in rural areas, sought to avoid the state, which in any case did not cater for nor recognize indigenous social systems. The result of this, compounded by state contraction, has been characterized as the growth of the informal nature of both politics and the economy in much of Africa. Those Africans, the vast majority, that do not benefit from the patrimonial state, necessarily resort to escapist strategies to survive in this harsh environment. This is a trend that is most evident in West and Central Africa, but part of the African reality from Cape to Cairo. In many African countries the size of the informal economy is several times that of the formal economy and the small formal economy now often serves as an adjunct to the much larger informal economy. It should thus come as no surprise to realise that the vast majority of Africans experienced the state, both colonial and post-colonial, as a foreign and predatory organisation that was there to exploit and to terrorise, not to serve and to protect. A smaller group, those that benefit from the state, see it as a resource to be milked, to be used to extract the maximum benefit. Few, if any, see the state serving the interests of the populace.

Liberation wars and Africa's role during the Cold War had already created a continent awash with arms, a situation compounded by the privatisation and outsourcing of arms providers during the latter years of that war to allow for support to proxy forces such as UNITA in Angola and the SPLA/M in Southern Sudan. As arms flooded into Africa thereafter, driven by the oversupply of these weapons following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and restructuring of NATO, a second trend became evident in the growth of quasi-militarization of the continent at local and regional level. In tandem with the steady erosion of state security agencies, communities could readily arm themselves with small and light weapons. Soon the continent came to be characterised by a balance of forces between the state and community. In the process, the military and police agencies lost the monopoly on organised violence as arms, particularly small arms, flooded into the continent. This had an impact at various levels. At the national level Yoweri Museveni set the new trend in January 1986 when he became the first leader to go back to the bush, form his own army, and seize power in Uganda. Previously military takeovers had originated in the national army and were essentially palace coups. Soon after, others with a taste for power and a grievance with which to mobilize followers found that there was an under-policed and incomplete controlled space in rural areas where forces could be assembled and mobilized.⁴⁷ Museveni would, in time, suffer the same consequences with an estimated 22 different rebel groups ranged against Uganda by 2003.⁴⁸

Since physical security is one of the most basic of human needs, alternative sources of collective security have experienced a boom in the absence of the provision of state security. The result is a rise in the use of private companies for those that can afford it in cities such as Luanda, Nairobi and Johannesburg, a resort to vigilantism as a crude alternative form of local justice in poor shantitowns such as in the sprawling suburbs of Lagos, and a return to traditional sources of security evident with the Mai Mai warriors in the Kivu provinces in the

Eastern DRC. In the process, a vicious spiral gains momentum. As alternative sources of security develop, they make that provided by the state ever more irrelevant and distant, further undermining the traditional role of the state in the provision of security.

Today, with Africa located on the periphery of the global international order, there is a real danger that a number of states will dissolve, with extreme destabilizing impacts on their neighbourhood. In the recent instances of Liberia and Sierra Leone, two such states, it was only international intervention that has staved off such a possibility. In parts of West, Central and the Horn of Africa, state boundaries today are held in place less by their local roots than by the conventions of international society about the sanctity of borders and the personal benefits that accrue to small groups of African leaders in keeping, what is in some places, a myth of sovereignty alive.⁴⁹ Despite the identification of Africans with colonial borders, it is largely the engagement by core countries of the global system, particularly the former colonial powers, that maintains the division of state power. In some instances only the promise of rapid and intrusive regional integration promises a reversal of the present trends towards dissolution and decay, particularly in West and Central Africa. These weak states face problems that can ultimately only be addressed at a regional level.⁵⁰ At the other extreme it seems more difficult for larger, more populous African countries (such as the DRC, Ethiopia and Nigeria) to institute good governance procedures than smaller ones⁵¹ and the continent faces what some have termed ‘diseconomies of scale’.

Taking a very broad brush to issues that deserve detailed analysis beyond the length limitations of this paper, this analysis has thus far argued that Africa’s security challenge and to some degree its developmental problems are primarily linked to the lack of state institutionalization. In the course of this explanation, a number of key human security concerns have already been flagged as deserved of further analysis, such as the proliferation of arms on the continent, and the pervasive impact of corruption and organized crime. With limited exceptions we have further argued that the choices made by African elites have compounded rather alleviated African security failure and therefore that any exercise that seeks to hold political leadership to account serves a useful purpose.

DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY

The provision of human security is not necessarily dependent upon the establishment of a democratic state. For example, India has been massively outperformed by autocratic China – a country that has averaged more than 8% growth in GDP per annum for more than two decades.⁵² Elsewhere the successful developmental states in East Asia (the newly industrialized countries) have been highly authoritarian for much of their recent history. During a period when these countries have all increased their prosperity and the security of their people, Africa has experienced the reverse.

The notion of national sovereignty has admittedly changed since the boom period of the newly industrialized countries during the nineteen sixties and seventies. Instead of being perceived as a means of isolating the state against external involvement or scrutiny, sovereignty is increasingly defined as a normative concept of responsibility. Thus, national sovereignty now requires a system of governance that is based on democratic popular citizen participation, constructive management of social diversities, respect for fundamental human rights and equitable distribution of national wealth and opportunities for development. According to Severine Rugumanmu: “For a state to claim sovereignty, it must establish legitimacy by meeting minimum standards of good governance or responsibility for the

security and general welfare of its citizens, and indeed, all those under its jurisdiction.”⁵³ Although the constitution of every African intergovernmental body dutifully reflects the desire for non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states, globalization and the steady advancement in international humanitarian law reduce the ability of countries to adopt political and economic trajectories that run counter to established minimum norms of governance and behaviour.

Africa is replete with examples of the provision of elite or regime security (represented by these elites as equivalent to state security) but an absence of human security. In the extreme case of a country such as Liberia under Charles Taylor, government is a direct source of insecurity, adopting policies that undermine the livelihood of the majority, using state instruments to the benefit of the presidential circle of patronage, deploying the armed forces in pursuit of commercial gain in neighbouring countries, and subverting the judicial process in the interests of the manipulation of contracts and tenders to partisan benefit. Leaders, acting in the name of national security, have often directly posed profound threats to human security, or, as is the case in a number of African countries, simply abdicate their responsibility and used state security resources to pursue personal or partisan objectives.

Since the start of colonialism, regimes in Africa were initially foreign, but always anti-developmental, often personalized and patrimonially orientated. Mahmood Mamdani has argued that colonial powers often divided the societies they ruled by supporting a small group of urbanized elite, who were educated, controlled by a written code of law and allowed some carefully constrained, independent political organisation⁵⁴. After independence, this elite took over power, shutting out the vast majority of the population, gathering virtually uncontrolled executive power, limited only by the capabilities of the coercive instruments at their disposal. Even today, many of the institutions and mechanisms of nominally democratic governance are too weak to control the executive power, partly because they are not well developed and partly because they are not independent of government influence. The situation in most sub-Saharan countries is one of a dominant executive and a weak legislature. Similarly legislative and judicial oversight of the conduct of government is limited. Thus political power remained personalized in the hands of a single ruler or a small oligarchy who exercise considerable unencumbered discretion over access to public resources as well as employing various coercive measures to maintain their hold on state power.⁵⁵

Since the late 1980s the international financial institutions have therefore contended that in Africa democratic systems are essential for improved economic performance since state economic decisions are driven pre-eminently by political and personal rather than economic and technical considerations. Operating within the rubric of ‘good governance’, the World Bank and others thus advocate greater openness and transparency in bureaucratic procedures, processes, appointments, contracts, procurements and investment decisions as well as seeking to strengthen accountability measures, including scrutiny by the legislature and prosecution by the courts.⁵⁶ While there are many features of structural adjustment programmes that have caused immense harm to Africa, this is a view we share. Ramesh Thakur therefore recently wrote:

“World history suggests that the market democracies have the best record of sustained prosperity. This is not surprising, as both democracy and capitalism put faith in the ability of citizens to decide what is best for them economically and politically. Governments can be fallible and markets are often imperfect; thus it's better to let the people decide and face the consequences of their choices. ... Both liberal democracies and market economies rely for their long-term success on similar attributes of good

governance: healthy competition, access to free and full information, secure property rights, the sanctity of contracts enforceable by an independent judiciary, a multiskilled and well-educated workforce and citizenry, an efficient and transparent legal system, prudential regulatory systems, merit-based recruitment and promotion, and executives who are accountable to shareholders for the mistakes they make as well as answerable to the courts for the legality of their actions. Markets require governance; good governance is not possible without democracy and civil society. Democracies also facilitate the achievement of the necessary social compromises between capital and labor, efficiency and equity, and growth and equality.”⁵⁷

This relationship between democracy and development presents Africa with immense challenges since democracy is difficult to establish amidst pervasive poverty and almost impossible to sustain in the absence of economic growth. Considerable social scientific work has underpinned the strong correlation between national wealth and democracy. Wealthy democracies do not die and, while wealthier countries are no more likely than poorer ones to effect a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, wealthier countries are far more likely to maintain democratic rule. Poor countries can, however, increase the prospects of democratic endurance if their economies grow steadily, and if they reduce inequalities. These linkages do not even consider the immense challenges from the most deadly of pandemics to confront Africa, namely that of HIV/Aids, based on the potential impact that the disease would have on the professional class and civil service upon which governance depends.⁵⁸

Despite these difficulties and challenges, we have no option but to conclude that democracy, development and security is closely linked in Africa. Africa’s lack of democracy simply increases African insecurity. This is, we have been glad to note, a view rhetorically (if not practically) shared by African Heads of State when they stated in 1990 that: “... democracy and development should go together and should be mutually reinforcing.”⁵⁹

Leaving HIV/Aids aside for the moment, the major security challenges in Africa in the 21st century are essentially thus both internal and regional, developmental and democratic within which the state occupies a key role.

The necessary democratic nature of the African developmental state and the argument for the key role of the state against the predatory characteristics often evident presents African civil society with a unique and important role.

THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The notion of civil society has a long pedigree in Western political philosophy, amongst others, in the writings of John Locke, Thomas Paine, Alexis de Tocqueville and Antonio Gramsci⁶⁰. It resurfaced as an important concept in democratic theory towards the end of the Cold War, when ordinary citizens embarked upon mass movements for change. Examples include the Solidarity movement in Poland, the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia, the United Democratic Front against apartheid in South Africa, protests in Tiananmen Square in China and the Greenbelt Movement in Kenya⁶¹.

In the Western definition of civil society, autonomous and active voluntary associations are regarded as both a counter-balance to state power, a training ground for democratic practises and as a necessary consequence of increasingly differentiated structures of governance that have increased the distance between citizens and the state. In these countries with their ever

more complex systems of social, political and economic interactions, governments can satisfy only a small and diminishing proportion of the needs of their citizens and the latter look more and more to civic associations to channel a growing range and variety of social interactions. These, in turn, need a framework of governance outside the jurisdiction of the state. In Africa it is rather the absence of governance that necessitates and fuels the growth of civil society. In both instances civil society refers, broadly speaking, to the social and political space where voluntary associations (as distinct from the automatic, binding and compulsory membership of statehood) attempts to shape norms and policies to regulate public life in social, political, economic and environmental dimensions. These are seen to include religious organisations, social clubs, social movements, free press and independent media, trade unions, professional associations and non-governmental organisations.

There has been an exponential growth in the number of civil society actors, and in the volume of transnational networks in which they are embedded. At the international level their increased impact is reflected in the role that civil society played in the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the adoption of the Ottawa Treaty on the prohibition on anti-personnel mines, the focus on the linkages between diamonds and conflict through the Kimberley Process, and to ease the debt of the highly indebted poor countries through Jubilee 2000, to name but a few. Undeniably, they play an important and growing role as an information channel, a font of legitimacy and a catalyst for accountability and transparency. The net result of expanding global citizen action has been to extend the theory and deepen the practice of grass-roots democracy within borders.⁶²

Clearly the multiplicity of these unofficial actors also presents new problems such as lack of coordination of efforts and of clear accountability. This is generally not a problem in established and mature democracies where governments accept that even the most open and transparent system should allow for voluntary and non-profit associations to pursue specific aims. In developing societies, including Africa, the situation is different, however. On the one hand membership organizations, such as trade unions and professional associations, are readily perceived as posing a potential political threat to incumbent elites – borne out by the political movements that had their origins within organized labour and eventually deposed Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and the close association between the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and the Movement for Democratic Change in neighbouring Zimbabwe. On the other, issue-based and advocacy organizations, necessarily funded by foreign governments, development agencies and philanthropic foundations, are readily questioned on issues of accountability and representivity. NGOs working for democracy, human rights and transparency are therefore often lambasted by governments on the basis of ‘who do they represent?’ or as organizations somehow acting at the behest of some foreign conspiracy for political or commercial gain. While Governments point to the reliance on foreign donor funding of NGOs to delegitimize them, the NGOs in turn point out that most African governments (and intergovernmental organizations such as SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD, the AU and NEPAD) are themselves heavily dependent on foreign aid and that their agenda’s are determined not in Kigali, Accra or Lilongwe, but in the boardrooms of the IMF and the World Bank.

It should come as no surprise to note that the relationship between African leaders and civil society, in particular, independent NGOs, has thus been characterised by mutual suspicion and, in some cases, outright hostility – except where CSOs are prepared to work as an extension of government, propagate its policies and sometimes serve as an alternative conduit to gain additional income for innovative leaders. In South Africa, a country that still provides

extensive space for civil society, the partnership and collaboration that characterized the post-apartheid era has, for example, since given way to an instrumentalist view of the relationship between CSOs and government. For the ruling party ‘civil society’ has achieved political power and there can be no legitimate role in questioning or criticizing state policy or practice.⁶³ The result is, with few exceptions, that NGOs scurry for political favour and to serve the interests of Pretoria.

Table 4: ODA as a proportion of GDP in selected African countries (2001)⁶⁴

Country	2001
Mozambique	25,9%
Sao Tome & Principe	80,8%
Guinea-Bissau	29,4%
Sierra Leone	44,5%
Ethiopia	17,3%
Malawi	23,0%
Eritrea	40,7%
Mauritania	26,0%
Ghana	12,3%
Kenya	4,0%
Algeria	0,3%
Nigeria	0,4%
Senegal	9,0%
South Africa	0,4%
Uganda	13,8%
Rwanda	17,1%

Nevertheless, rhetorical recognition of the need for popular participation in governance is growing at the level of the African Union and the impetus is on civil society organisations to use and expand the space created for their involvement. When the ‘third wave’ of democratisation hit African shores in the early nineteen nineties this was as much a home-grown movement as it was part of the global chain of events. As E. Gyimah-Boadi notes:

“External developments, such as the fall of communism and pressure from foreign donors were important for laying the groundwork for formal democracy. But it was often the resourcefulness, dedication, and tenacity of the continent’s nascent civil societies that initiated and sustained the process of democratic opening and political liberalisation. In late 1989, civil servants, teachers and traders in Benin were the first to bring an end to autocracy and economic mismanagement. In Zambia, the Congress of Trade Unions followed suit by successfully challenging the three-decade incumbency of Kenneth Kaunda. In Sierra Leone, the irrepressible resolve of the Women’s Forum thwarted the designs of the incumbent military regime to forestall that country’s return to democratic rule in 1996. And the damning pastoral letters of

such Christian leaders as Bishop Isidore de Souza of Benin, and Archbishop Fanoko Kpodzro of Togo proved highly successful in undermining the authority of the old regimes.”⁶⁵

Issues of development, security and defence now go beyond the state system. Globalization involves the sharing of power between state and non-state actors with the result that the state is no longer able to monopolize the concept and practice of security or indeed of governance. The information revolution has helped to end state-imposed isolation and allow for networks to grow beyond national borders. For example, it has been argued that the fax, photocopier, personal computer and desktop-publishing software was central to the pro-democracy movement’s campaign to discredit the Banda dictatorship in Malawi in 1992-93. The growing use of email and the internet in the past ten years have strengthened this phenomenon - best reflected in the extent to which information on the suppression of democracy and abuse of power by ZANU(PF) in Zimbabwe in recent years is still able to reach the outside world despite the assault on the independent media in that country.

Two arguments have thus far been made that provide for an important role by civil society in African security.⁶⁶ The first is that the majority of poor African countries suffer from a concentration of political, economic and social power in the executive branch of the state. In a situation where the state is both the dominant economic actor, largest source of employment, and where economic choices are highly politicized, civil society often provides the only check on the untrammelled power of the executive. This is, however, inevitably a confrontational relationship.

Secondly, we have earlier argued that the notion of human security has impacted upon traditional notions of national security. Today non-state actors benefit from closer involvement with the local community during internal conflicts and have greater potential for local conflict-resolution than other mechanisms. Organizations such as the ICRC, Oxfam and MSF act as relief agencies when governments are unable or unwilling to do so. NGOs such as the Inter-religious Councils in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Community of SanEgidio facilitate negotiations between warring parties. In many instances these entities function without the constraints (and without the legal and other power) of state institutions.

We have also hinted at a third argument for a role by civil society in developing countries. The capacity constraints experienced by both national governments and intergovernmental organizations have opened up a view that civil society organizations can complement official structures, adding capacity where those of mandated structures are lacking. Their presence in the field can be a vital link in providing early warning for dealing with humanitarian crises. Their specialized knowledge and contacts can be important components of the post-conflict peace building. They can mediate between the peace and security functions of intergovernmental organizations and the needs and wants of local civilian populations. They can exert a positive influence on the restoration of a climate of confidence for reconstruction. And they can bring additional expertise and comparative practices to bear in the process of policy development, monitoring and reportage.

Civil society is not a substitute for the state, nor can it claim to be thus, but is well positioned to play two crucial roles in relation to weak states in Africa. The first is to augment the capacity for development and security. The second is by holding the government and leaders accountable to the citizenry in Africa while simultaneously exerting pressure in Cabinet offices and the boardrooms of the rich countries to respond to the special needs of developing countries. It can do so in a confrontational or in a supportive manner.

We turn now to how these roles may be played out in the context of NEPAD.

NEPAD AND THE APRM

NEPAD is inherently a state-centric initiative, pitched at the level of African political leadership taking responsibility for the continent's development. As the opening text of the Abuja document states, NEPAD is "a pledge by African leaders" to place their countries on a path of sustainable growth and development⁶⁷. Article 47 is a clear expression of this leadership's point of view: "we believe that while African leaders derive their mandates from their people, it is their role to...lead the processes of implementation", while the "Appeal to African peoples" is that, "we are asking the African peoples to support the implementation of this initiative by setting up structures for organisation, mobilisation and action."⁶⁸ The analysis presented in this paper supports this view- but with the caveat that different sectors of civil society need to play the role of both implementer and watchdog.

Clearly, civil society organisations are not invited to sit down with African leaders and shape the agenda of NEPAD. This is not necessarily inappropriate, since the burden and responsibility for leadership lies first and foremost with the steadily increasing number of elected African leaders. But the poor service rendered to Africa by its post-independence leadership inspires little confidence that the leaders of the 21st century present a new cadre who will not, over time, come to believe in their own divine right and wisdom to the detriment of their people. Independent thinkers and interest groups will have to prise open space for a supporting and at times critical role for themselves in the common interest of African stability and development. The various components of civil society at all levels – from grassroots organisations to policy think tanks, from churches to the private sector – have vital contributions to make in the priority areas of NEPAD. These areas include:

- Strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- Promoting and protecting democracy and human rights;
- Extending education and healthcare;
- Promoting the role of women in social and economic development;
- Building state capacity to maintain law and order;
- Infrastructure and agricultural programmes.⁶⁹

At the same time, the formulation of NEPAD as a "pledge by African leaders" offers a position of critical distance to segments in civil society to play a role of monitoring NEPAD. Perhaps the most important admission of the NEPAD document is the statement that, "Post-colonial Africa inherited weak states and dysfunctional economies that were further aggravated by poor leadership, corruption and bad governance in many countries"⁷⁰. The promise to change this style of leadership is one that civil society should monitor with enthusiasm – but on its own terms. Senior advisor to the Electoral Institute of South Africa, Khabele Matlosa, spoke for many of the policy think tanks and independent agencies working in the areas of democracy and governance when he said: "There should be a shadow process by CSOs so that if they cannot participate in the formal process, they have their own process to keep it honest. As civil society, agencies must interrogate peer review, conduct research and share information with each other."⁷¹

Table 5: NEPAD APRM and AHSI countries

Countries that have joined the APRM	Countries selected by AHSI for review
Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. The first two countries to be reviewed will be Ghana and South Africa	Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda

The African Peer Review Mechanism is the most concrete and innovative development of NEPAD to date. Sixteen countries have already signed up to be reviewed, a panel of eminent persons have been appointed and the APRM secretariat is being established, albeit with donor as opposed to NEPAD member state funds. While civil society should participate in the consultations by the country review teams, they should have realistic expectations of what will come out of this government-to-government exercise in 'peer learning'.

The project by the African Human Security Initiative is a contribution to this process.

CONCLUSION

Despite the dramatic changes in the notion of exclusive sovereignty in recent years, the world system retains a natural tendency towards state formation, even in the 21st century. States provide the basis for the international system and, collectively, for the regulation of those relations and issues that fall outside or between the control of any single state. There is no clear alternative to geographical states as the basic building block and prerequisite for domestic safety and a stable international system and there is an emerging global consensus on the norms that apply to acceptable state behaviour.

The legacy of colonialism and the Cold War is an Africa divided along boundaries within which Africans today define themselves as Nigerian, Congolese, Zambian or Kenyan. For the most part the borders carved out by the colonial powers are here to stay. Some will eventually fade away in the efforts to create viable national units where they do not presently exist. This remains the case even in a country such as Somalia where the struggle to create a state from the remains of the previous one continues.

The state remains the most effective instrument for the redistribution of wealth in society and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Like the case in East Asia, state intervention can be beneficial to economic growth and its role in this respect may be critical, although the weakness of African governments mean that few can implement a strong state-led approach to development.

Above all, the state is the key provider of security. While there has been considerable outsourcing of some of the security functions of the state in different forms across the world, there are clear limits to the extent that a state can parcel out its most basic function to commercial companies. In an increasingly global and interconnected world, investment capital seeks the highest returns - and since predictability is a key consideration in such a calculus, security is a prerequisite for development that needs to attract more than risk capital.

In West and Central Africa⁷² there is discernable trend towards regional approaches to crises of governance. These approaches are most evident in measures to counter the proliferation of small arms, efforts to deal with the fragility of security sectors, combating cross-border movement of weapons, drugs and armed groups, ameliorating the mass movements of refugees, development, widespread poverty, and weak state institutions. These crosscutting challenges transcend national boundaries and require an integrated and holistic sub-regional approach to augment national solutions.

Today most Africa governments have jettisoned direct state management of factories and farms for greater reliance on the private sector and seek foreign investment as apposed to development assistance. African leaders, at least those that ascribe to NEPAD, have committed themselves publicly to liberal democracy rather than democratic centralism. Governments attempt to practice 'good governance', capacity building, and to foster partnerships with the private sector to pursue mutually beneficial goals.⁷³ The question to ask, is if these parrot to the requirements of international donors or if they reflect a genuine commitment to change?

We believe that the state and the actions of political elites are critical to the future of Africa. NEPAD has done much to change the context of African engagement on the continent, between Africa and its development partners and the debate about Africa. African ownership is demonstrated in the debates about development and security by Africans for Africa.

For perhaps the first time in a generation Africa presents a picture of hope, although it differs from region to region. Scant years ago much was made of the arc of conflict that stretched across Africa from Angola to neighbouring DR Congo, across Rwanda and Uganda to include Sudan and Somalia. The timely death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and subsequent end of the war in Angola and the ongoing peace process in the DRC has now seen the installation of an interim government in Kinshasa and there is hope that even the war in the Kivu's may be winding down. Elections in neighbouring Kenya swept away one of Africa's most corrupt leaders, Daniel Arap Moi, and elections have been held in Rwanda less than a decade after the 1994 genocide. The peace processes in Sudan present signs of hope while a comprehensive peace agreement appears to be within grasp in Burundi. In West Africa the removal from power of Charles Taylor and the commencement of reconstruction of Liberia inspires similar hope. Does this mean that Africa - wracked by years of international strife and civil war – will in time look forward to peace and that such stability will attract investment by Africans and the international community alike?

Indeed, the restoration of a degree of stability in large key countries such as Sudan, Angola and the DRC could reverse the regional disintegrative effects in their respective regions, as will the reversal of the corruption that was haemorrhaging Kenya in East Africa. West Africa and the steadily increased levels of inter-communal violence in Nigeria with its 124 million people present the most worrying future trend. Nigeria is slowly disintegrating and the implications for West Africa are alarming and, as yet, unrecognized.

Civil society, research NGOs in particular, has an important role to play in this regard – not as an adjunct to government or as principled hostile interlocutor – but as independent and responsible player. In the AHSI project the seven NGO partners listed earlier in this paper will seek to contribute by defining and measuring the extent to which African leaders in the eight selected countries adhere to their stated commitments to democracy, human rights, engagement with civil society, control of small arms, anti-corruption, commitment to counter organized crime and terrorism and conflict resolution. In doing so we hope to play a

constructive role in relation to NEPAD and the African Union in our common endeavour to improve Africa. Subsequent publications by the partners will therefore analyse and interrogate each of the sets of commitments in the eight NEPAD ARPM countries under review.

Of all the indicators of the gap between commitment and implementation in Africa none is more striking than the fact that almost half of the world's child soldiers (120 000 out of an estimated global total of 300 000) are in Africa, despite the entry into force, in 1999, of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the only regional treaty in the world that prohibits the use of child soldiers.⁷⁴

African leaders have committed themselves to common, global standards of democracy, human rights, constitutionalism and the rule of law. They have done so repeatedly and readily.⁷⁵ In this they have implicitly rejected the argument, advanced by some, that Africa is somehow 'different' – that our history justifies the argument of African exceptionalism. African history and its subsequent insecurity and lack of development is no excuse for poor governance. What is lacking are not paper commitments, but commensurate action and application.

¹ UNDP, Human Development Report 2003, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, Tables 5, 12, pp 250-253, 278-281. Africa's GDP is calculated as US\$589,6 bn and its total population as 803,6 million.

² J. Cilliers, Peace and Security through Good Governance - a guide to the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism, ISS Paper no 70, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, April 2003, p 14.

³ Lately human security concerns, based on the emerging body of international law that elevates human rights to a level where it impinges upon demands for absolute state sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of countries, have led to new expectations for action and standards of conduct in national and international affairs. This has resulted in the call for intervention by the international community (or a coalition acting on behalf of the international community) to protect people from predation, disease or hunger, exemplified by the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, December 2001. In this sense the normative foundations of human security can be found at the international and national level in the legal provision for the protection of human rights, humanitarian law and refugee law.

⁴ States that accord each other mutual recognition as legal equals lay the foundation for international law, diplomacy, regimes and organizations.

⁵ Some may argue that this is roughly similar to infusing the debate on security at all three levels with first generation human rights.

⁶ The notion of structural violence was popularized by Johan Galtung, Essays in peace research, vol I and III, Christian Ejlertsen, Copenhagen 1975 and 1978.

⁷ C. Bruderlein, People's security as a new measure of global stability, in IRRC, vol 83, no 842, June 2001, pp 358 & 360

⁸ See H ul-Haq, Human Rights, Security, and Governance, World's Apart: Human Security and Global Governance, IB Tauris, London, 1999, as presented on www.toda.org/publications/peace_policy/p_p_fw98/haq.html on 31st December 2002, and S Ogata, State Security – Human Security, The Fridtjof Nansen Memorial Lecture, Tokyo, 12 December 2001. While sensitive to those utilizing the 'new critical security paradigm' that argue that the reduction in absolute state sovereignty implies the primacy of human security over state or regime security, our approach is more traditional.

⁹ S Lodgaard, Human Security: concepts and operationalization, undated paper, Oslo, p 9.

¹⁰ In a paper for the World Bank, Kwesi Aning described such conflict complexes as “the particular ways in which a group of states conflict patterns link together sufficiently closely that supposedly domestic or internal conflicts cannot realistically be considered apart from one another. Conflict complexes emphasize the interconnectedness of the threats posed to states and hopefully the efforts at response’. See Conflict and Poverty Reduction in West Africa Prevention in a sub-regional framework, paper for World Bank/ECOWAS/UEMOA, November 2003, p 4.

¹¹ The Ivorian crisis started on 19 September 2002 when mutinous soldiers who failed to topple President Gbagbo, retreated to the north and west, seizing control of vast chunks of the territory. The mutineers formed the MPCCI rebel group and occupied several key towns including Bouake, Korhogo and Odienne in the north, Man in the west. The Economic Community of West African States subsequently deployed over 1,000 men peacekeepers while France, the former colonial power deployed 4,000 men on the ground.

¹² R Luckham, et al on poverty and conflict. FULL REFERENCE

¹³ UNDP, op cit, Table 12, pp 278-281

¹⁴ D White, More signs of peace but progress is slow, Financial Times, London, 21st January 2004.

¹⁵ J Wolfenson, Africa getting it right, Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 19 October 2003, and M Fleshman, Africa lagging on millennium goals, Business Day, Johannesburg, 29 December 2003.

¹⁶ S Morrison, CSIS, during a talk at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, on 14th October 2003. Africa’s FDI inflows declined to US\$11 bn in 2002 after a surge to US\$19 bn in 2001. As a result the continent’s share in global FDI inflows fell from 2,3% in 2001 to 1,7% in 2002. UN World Investment Report, 2003.

¹⁷ It is estimated that Agoa raised African exports to the US by 1 000% in the first two years, created 60 000 jobs and brought another US\$1bn worth of new investment. According to the US commerce department, Agoa imports to the US last year totalled US\$9bn, or half of total imports. G Mills & T Hughes, African Growth and Opportunity Act, Business Day, Johannesburg, 20th October 2003

¹⁸ P Busharizi, Uganda has learned to help itself in the war against Aids, Pretoria News, Pretoria, 29 December 2003.

¹⁹ B Buzan, Security, the State, the ‘New World Order,’ and Beyond, in R.D. Lipschutz (ed), On Security, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, pp 190-191

²⁰ Historically only a few places in Africa, including the Nile river, the Great Lakes region and the Ethiopian highlands, were fertile enough to support relatively high densities of people in previous centuries, reflected in the sophisticated and complex urban societies that developed in each. In contrast those that migrated out of Africa escaped the insects and organisms that had reinfected generation after generation of humans in Africa, particularly malaria, bilharzias and hookworms. See, for example, J Reader, Africa – A Biography of the Continent, Penguin Books, London, 1998, pp 178, 234-242. Also B Davidson, Africa in History – themes and outlines, revised and expanded edition, Phoenix Press, London, 2001, p 14.

²¹ J Herbst, States and Power in Africa – Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000, p 20

²² Particularly evident in the United States of America.

²³ According to Herbst “[t]he combination of large amounts of open land and rain-fed agriculture meant that, in precolonial Africa, control of territory was often not contested because it was often easier to escape from rulers than to fight them.” Herbst, op cit, p 39

²⁴ Ibid, p 44

²⁵ Gerontocracy consists of an age-group system that allocated a standard set of social and political duties to age groups. As individuals advance in years they change duties until those surviving have progressed through the entire set. Thus the system sustains no permanent or hereditary rulers or

office-holders. The highly conservative social customs and practices set by gerontocracy laid the foundations of what is known today as the patrimonial nature of African political practice. See Reader, *op cit*, pp 258-260. Apart from an attitude that discouraged innovation or change, the "... abiding strength of the gerontocratic system was that it functioned on a basis of compromise not coercion, and was disseminated by a process of consent, not conquest." *Ibid*, p 260

²⁶ Effective colonialism in Africa lasted a relatively brief period of some eighty years, as opposed to the various smaller coastal settlements that go back much longer. Colonialism, for all its impact took time to extend over the territories that had so readily been demarcated. It was thus often more an issue of colonialism of the (mostly coastal) capital city rather than that of the entire colony, with formal control in the hinterland coming much later. In fact the colonialists undermined state authority by largely (re)locating most inland capital cities to the coast so that they could be reachable by sea.

²⁷ T Chafer, *Franco-African relations: no longer so exceptional?*, in *African Affairs*, Royal African Society, Vol 101, No 402, January 2002, p 344. Thereafter, 1994 is generally seen as the start of the normalization of French-African relationships with the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc and the subsequent fall-out regarding French assistance to the Hutu-government of Juvénal Habyarimana.

²⁸ It is precisely those states that received large amounts of aid during the Cold War such as Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan and the former Zaire, that have declined the most.

²⁹ R Oliver as quoted by Tagri, *op cit*, p 3

³⁰ M A Pitcher, *Transforming Mozambique – the politics of privatization, 1975-2000*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p 17

³¹ Tagri, *op cit*, p 135

³² P Le Billon, *Buying Peace or Fuelling War: the role of corruption in armed conflicts*, in *Journal of International Development*, vol 15, PLACE, 2003, p 416.

³³ R Tangri, *The Politics of Patronage in Africa – parastals, privatization and private enterprise*, Africa World Press, James Currey, Oxford, 1999, p 14

³⁴ Le Billon, *op cit*, p 417.

³⁵ *Ibid*.

³⁶ Most notably by P Chabal, J-P Dalloz and P Le Billon.

³⁷ Different to what he terms 'nepotism and crisis corruption', the two types of unstable corruption of the four types of corruption that Johnston has identified, patronage and market corruption, serves a socially integrative function. He argues that market corruption, which involves relatively small amounts (routine stakes of exchanges) and many suppliers dispensing corrupt benefits, is socially integrative and very stable. Patronage, involving few suppliers but routine stakes concerning large networks, is integrative and stable. P Le Billon, *op cit*, p 414.

³⁸ Authors such as Mark Duffield argues that the criminalization of African economies can partly be interpreted as the use of and adaptation to globalization and market deregulation. See M Duffield, *globalization and war economies: promoting order or the return of history?*, *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, vol 23, no 2, PLACE, PUBLISHER pp 19-36.

³⁹ Tangri, *op cit*, p 2

⁴⁰ *Ibid*.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p 3. Thus virtually all West African countries had become dictatorships within a few years after gaining their independence, including Ghana, Togo and Niger. Literally only the Gambia did not. The same tendency to one-party rule and abuse of power was evident in Kenya, Tanzania, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia.

⁴² Editorial Comment, *See-through oil*, *Financial Times*, London, 8 October 2003.

⁴³ The facilities include a 1,000-kilometer pipeline designed to carry oil from Chad to the Atlantic coast of neighbouring Cameroon. Chad expects to receive US \$80 million annually in royalties while Cameroon expects US \$20 million annually from the operations of the pipeline over 25 years. The

pipeline, which will transfer 225,000 barrels of oil a day, is a joint venture between U.S. oil giants ExxonMobil (which holds 40 percent of the private equity) and Chevron (25 percent), and Malaysia's state oil company Petronas (35 percent). According to World Bank figures, the companies stand to gain some two-thirds of the estimated 13 billion dollars in revenues over 25 years.

⁴⁴ Pitcher, *op cit*, pp 12-14

⁴⁵ Tangri, *op cit*, p 9

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p 11

⁴⁷ In Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and former Zaire competing armies were able to seize power. In others such as Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia the result was mass destruction. The conflicts in Angola and Sudan predate the others. J Herbst & G Mills, *The Future of Africa: A New Order in Sight?*, Adephe Paper no 361, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2003, p 23

⁴⁸ According to the Amnesty Commission Report, December 2003, Kampala. The groups are: the Allied Democratic Forces, the Uganda National rescue Front II, the West Nile Bank Front, Action Restore Peace (ARP), Citizen Army for Multi Party Politics (CAMP), Force Obote Back (FOBA), Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) - which was replaced by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA); the National Union for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), National Federal Army (NFA), the Ninth October Movement (NOM), the People's Redemption Army (PRA), the Uganda Democratic Army/ Alliance (UDA/F), Uganda Federal Democratic Front (UFDf) and Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM). The 34-page report says that the majority of the estimated 40 000 rebels are based in southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and some are living in Kenya and Europe.

⁴⁹ See, for example D C Bach, *Revisiting a Paradigm*, in D.C. Bach (ed), *Regionalisation in Africa - Integration and Disintegration*, James Currey, Oxford, 1999, p 8

⁵⁰ Buzan, *op cit*, p 201

⁵¹ Thus the 13 African countries with populations below two million (but with only 1,7% of Africa's total population) grew by 21% between 1981 and 1999. In contrast, the per capita income rates of the DRC, Ethiopia and Nigeria collectively accounting for 37% of Africa's population, declined by 18%. Herbst & Mills, *op cit*, pp 17-18.

⁵² Thus Ramesh Thakur writes: "India's economic sluggishness for four decades was due to bad policies, not weaknesses inherent in democracy. Policies of economic autarky, import substitution and industrial licensing; fear of foreign investment; and rejection of market principles were conscious choices made by the ruling elite that had nothing to do with liberal democracy per se. Rather, the ideological suspicion of foreign firms was a product of history." He goes on to point out that India abandoned socialism 15 years later than China and that its integration into the world economy still lags that of China by about a decade. 'Democracy vs. GDP growth', in *The Japan Times*, Tokyo, Sunday, December 21, 2003.

⁵³ S Rugumamu, *State Sovereignty and Intervention in Africa: Nurturing new governance norms*, paper submitted to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Roundtable in Maputo, 10th March 2001, p 2.

⁵⁴ M Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Princeton University Press, 1996.

⁵⁵ Tangri, *op cit*, p 141

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p 139

⁵⁷ R Thakur, *op cit*.

⁵⁸ R Mattes, *Healthy Democracies? The potential impact of AIDS on democracy in Southern Africa*, Paper no 71, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, April 2003, pp 2-3. For the relationship between democracy and development see A Przeworski, M Alvarez, J Antonio Cheibub and F Limongi,

Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.

⁵⁹ Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU on the political and socio-economic situation in Africa and the fundamental changes taking place in the world, Addis Ababa, July 2002.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ T Bergdall, Civil Society Strengthening in Africa, MAP Consultations, DATE

⁶² Ibid. R Thakur, UN voice for 'civil society', The Japan Times, Tokyo, 28th December 2003.

⁶³ This relationship is partly informed by the fact that the ANC government has been most vocally criticized by civil society in three areas: policies on HIV/Aids, its arms purchases and the support that the government provides for President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe.

⁶⁴ UNDP, op cit, Table 16, pp 291-293

⁶⁵ E. Gyimah-Boadi, Civil Society in Africa: the good, the bad and the ugly, in the Civnet Journal, vol. 1, no. 1, May 1997.

⁶⁶ We adopt the basic distinction between the public sector, private sector and civil society in this section. Civil society therefore includes political parties, non-governmental organizations, religious movements, academic communities, the media, cultural communities, trade unions, etc.

⁶⁷ The New Partnership for Africa's Development, Abuja, Nigeria, October 2001.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid, article 49.

⁷⁰ Ibid. article 22.

⁷¹ Khabele Matlosa interviewed in ePolitics journal of the SAIIA, Johannesburg, October 2003.

⁷² See, for example, the Interim report of the multidisciplinary assessment mission to the Central African subregion (S/2003/1077), mandated by the UN Secretary General and submitted to the UNSC on 10th November 2003.

⁷³ Pitcher, op cit, p 3

⁷⁴ The charter forbids member states to recruit or use children (anyone under 18 years) in a participatory role in any acts of war or internal conflicts.

⁷⁵ See, for example, J Cilliers & K Sturman, Commitments by African heads of state to peace, democracy, human rights and associated issues, Paper 58, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, July 2002.