

# **African Human Security Initiative (AHSI)**

## **CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT**

**Submitted by:  
WEST AFRICA NETWORK FOR PEACEBUILDING (WANEP)**

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

ADM	Africa Muslim Party
ADM	African Democratic Movement
AEC	African Economic Community
AHSI	African Human Security Initiative
AMCP	African Moderates Congress Party
ANC	African National Congress
APLP	All People's Liberation Party
<b>APN</b>	
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ARPS	Aborigines Rights Protection Society
ARPBs	Association of Recognized Professional Bodies
ASDR	African Strategic Dialogue Research
AU	African Union
BNPP	Better Nigerian Progressive Party
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CBC	Conference of Bishops
CBC	Catholic Bishops Conference
CBG	Community Based Groups
CDD	Center for Democratic Development
CCG	Christian Council of Ghana
<b>CCN</b>	
CEDAW Women	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CPN	Community Party of Nigeria
CPP	Convention People's Party
CRs	Communaute Rurales (Rural Communities)
CSSDCA	Conference on Stability, Security, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DA	Democratic Alternative
DFID	Department For International Development
DPASA	Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
<b>FLN</b>	National Liberation Front
FNWS	Federation of Nigerian Women's Societies
FP	Federal Party
GBA	Ghana Bar Association
GBC	Ghana Broadcasting Corporation
GONGOS	Government-sponsored Non-Governmental Organizations
GP	Green Party
GPRS	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
HCE	Haut Conseil d'Etat
HCS	High Council of State
HSC	Haut Councell de Securite
HURILAW	Human Rights Law Service
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
<b>IDR</b>	
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JP	Justice Party
KANU	Kenyan African National Union
KISS	Keep It Straight and Simple Party
LDPN	Liberal Democratic Party of Nigeria
LUSAP	Luso-South Africa Party
MDJ	Movement for Democracy and Justice
MF	Minority Front
MMN	Masses Movement of Nigeria

MP	People's Mandate Party
MPs	Members of Parliament
NAC	National Alliance for Change
NAC	National Action Council
NCP	National Conscience Party
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
<b>NICEF</b>	
NLC	Nigerian Labour Congress
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NRP	National Reformation Party
NNPP	New Nigerian People's Party
ND	New Democrats
NAP	Nigeria Advance Party
NDA	National Development Agency
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NPC	Nigeria People's Conscience
<b>NOTU</b>	
NPP	New Patriotic Party
<b>NUDIPU</b>	
NUGS	National Union of Ghana Students
NUPENG	National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers
NUSAS	National Union of South African Students
OAU/AU	Organization of African Unity (now the African Union – AU)
PAN	Progressive Action of Nigeria
PAP	Pan African Parliament
PENGASSAN	Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria
PMA	Plan for Modernization of Agriculture
PNDC	Peoples' National Defence Council
PRP	People's Redemption Party
PSD	Party for Social Democracy
PSP	People's Salvation Party
QUANGOS	Quasi Non-Governmental Organizations
SANGOCO	South African National NGO Coalition
SOCCER	Sports Organization for Collective Contributions and Equal Rights
TUC	Trades Union Congress
UDF	Union Democratic Front
UDN	Ugandan Debt Network
UGTA	Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens
UNDP	United Nations' Development Programme
UNEA	National Union of Algerian Students (Union Nationale des Étudiants Algériens)
UNJA	National Union of Algerian Youth (Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algérienne)
UNFA	National Union of Algerian Women (Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes)
UPE	Universal Primary Education
UTAG	University Teachers Association of Ghana
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WIN	Women In Nigeria
WRPP	Women's Rights Peace Party
WLP	Worker's List Party
XPP	Ximoko Progressive Party

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## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

### **Background**

The African Human Security Initiative (AHSI), a core network of seven African Non-Governmental Organizations<sup>1</sup>, with support from the Department for International Development (DFID) of the British Government, embarked upon a research project aimed at benchmarking the performance of key African governments in respect of human security issues measured against the commitments taken at the level of OAU/AU heads of states meetings and summits. The project focused on 8 countries, namely Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda. These countries are among the African states that are most active in promoting the goals of the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and have acceded to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The selection of the countries is on the basis of their commitment to NEPAD and geographical spread across East, North, South, and West Africa. While there are several dimensions to human security in Africa, the Network selected seven clusters of factors that it deems salient and to which governments of the above countries committed themselves through protocols, conventions, declarations, etc. of the African Union (previously the OAU). The core factors are: Human Rights, Democracy and Governance, Civil Society Engagement, Small Arms and Light Weapons, Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, Anti-Corruption, and Terrorism and Organized Crime.

Since the establishment of the OAU and now AU African governments have consistently pledged to be the guarantor of the individual, communal, and national security of their people. The majority of the pledges have however remained papers to be shelved. The seeming distance of ordinary people from the state and the lack of organized civil society groups who would hold these governments to account have aided the lack of commitment of governments to deliver on their promises. It would seem that the new breed of African leaders led by South Africa, Nigeria, and Senegal are committed to break the jinx of undelivered promises. Through the NEPAD initiative governments have availed themselves to a peer review mechanism (the African Peer Review Mechanism) whereby African governments would account to their peer on issues of good governance, peace and security, development, healthcare, education, women empowerment, and promoting the rule of law. As cited in the concept paper of this study, Khabele Matlosa, Senior Advisor to the Electoral Institute of South Africa invited civil society organizations to organize shadow processes to interrogate peer review, conduct research and share information with each other so that governments are aware that their people are watching their performances on what they promised and how their lives have been affected by their actions.

AHSI is responding to this invitation by assessing the numerous commitments already made by these governments to promote human security. The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), a member of the AHSI, was selected by the Network to focus on the Civil Society Cluster. WANEP is a network of over 300 civil society organizations (particularly NGOs) active in conflict prevention, Peacebuilding, human rights and good governance in 17 West and Central African countries. The Civil Society Study hypothesizes that by *enhancing cooperation between states and civil society groups and organizations and encouraging the latter's participation in governance, development, and monitoring of state's performance on human security Africa will benefit from rapid economic and social development within vibrant democracies.*

### *Research Goal*

The study seeks to benchmark the performance of 8 African governments against commitments made at the level of OAU/AU to strengthen and cooperate with civil society groups and organizations for the promotion of peace and human security.

### *Objectives*

The study is expected to:

- (i) Identify and track the extent of implementation of commitments made by 8 African governments through the OAU/AU to forge cooperative relations with their civil society groups and organizations;
- (ii) Evaluate strategies and programs instituted by governments to promote civil society and state cooperation;
- (iii) Map and assess the efficacy of laws promulgated for civil society empowerment, promotion, and protection by governments;
- (iv) Propose a mechanism for monitoring the instruments and processes pertaining to state engagement with civil society groups;
- (v) Evaluate the level of civil society participation in the implementation of programs and laws to promote the other clusters—human rights, small arms and light weapons, Organized Crime and Terrorism, Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, Anti-Corruption, and Democracy).

This comprehensive report highlights findings of the study conducted by WANEP over the period of four months beginning September 2003. The report highlights the conceptual discourse on civil society and its role in the promotion of human security in Africa, reviews the historical perspectives of civil society particularly in the 8 countries, measures and makes conclusions on the performance of individual states with respect to the core benchmarks agreed upon by the Network.

### *Key Benchmarks*

In consultation with other members of the African Human Security Initiative WANEP selected three core benchmarks measured against commitments to peoples of the respective African states by their governments through protocols, conventions and declarations signed and ratified by the governments. The scope of the research is limited to commitments made through the OAU/AU. It does not include commitments made through sub regional, United Nations, and other international bodies. However, WANEP and AHSI are aware of the inter-linkages and complementary nature of most multilateral commitments. The core benchmarks selected are the following:

1. *Popular Participation in Public Affairs*: Is the government fostering and facilitating active and genuine participation of every citizen of the country in the decision-making processes and the conduct of public affairs?
2. *Political Pluralism*: Is the government promoting political pluralism—by allowing for the existence of several political parties, worker' unions, student unions, women's movements, etc? Are there efforts made to ensure gender balance in the political process?

3. *Partnership in Development, democracy, governance, peace and security.* Are there active partnerships between the government and all segments of civil society?

A set of measurable indicators and means of measuring and verifying them were developed. (Please Annex 1: Matrix of Measuring the Commitments).

### ***Methodology***

The team of researchers comprised six persons. Three persons were responsible for data collection and field research within WANEP. The team was supervised by the Program Manager for Capacity Building in WANEP. Her task also included contacting resource persons in the various countries; and maintaining regular contact with the field research team members. The research team of WANEP designed the process in phases. Each phase was given a time frame with clear indicators to measure progress in the phase. Regular weekly meetings were held with the team to assess progress and clarify misunderstandings:

*Phase 1* Primary tasks in this phase included constituting the core team, reviewing and clarifying the terms of reference for the study, and reviewing all protocols, declaration, conventions, etc. related to the three core benchmarks selected for the study. Core questions answered in the phase on the benchmarks were: Which of the numerous resolutions of OAU/AU contain explicit commitments to the benchmarks? What particular performance indicators did the heads of states set out for themselves? Which of the resolutions require ratifications and which have taken effect since declaration? What sources to consult for data on the commitment? An outcome of phase one was the development of an assessment tool (See Annex 1) and the selection of the following primary documents wherein the heads of states committed themselves to the promotion of and cooperation with civil society organizations and groups in Africa:

- AEC Treaty 1991
- AU Constitutive Act, 2000
- CSSDCA Solemn Declaration, 2000
- Protocol on Pan-African Parliament (2001)
- African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Arusha Declaration (1990)

*Phase 2:* Desk Research and data collection. During this phase the team conducted extensive research through the internet, libraries of relevant government ministries and CSOs. The research provided large documents containing important information as it relates to the governments' performances vis-à-vis the commitments. The team of researchers reviewed and extracted information from the materials. The results were studied and processed by the three senior researchers. The collated materials were developed into the very rough draft for discussion with the full team.

*Phase 3:* At the end of phase two the researchers identified the gaps after the desk research and formulated various structured questionnaires for qualitative interviews in the selected countries. Questionnaire for each country was based on the particular gap identified after the desk research. The field research was conducted by resource persons identified in the countries using focus group meetings, individual interviews, and special civil society meetings, conferences, and consultations.

*Phase 4:* Design of the final draft. The three senior researchers collected and collated all field research materials and revised the rough draft into the first comprehensive working draft. The draft was reviewed by the visiting partner from the ISS. After this review the visiting partner recommended areas needing improvement which the research team expanded on.

### ***Structure of the Report***

The Report is divided into chapters. Chapter one provides an overview of the study; Chapter two looks at the theoretical concepts and historical perspectives of civil society in Africa. It focuses on the historical perspectives of the development of civil society in the 8 target countries. The chapter also looks at the relationship between civil society engagement and the promotion of human security. Chapter three looks at civil society and political pluralism which chapter four discusses popular participation. Chapter five looks at civil society and government partnerships in the target countries. Chapter six contains conclusion and recommendations.

## CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPT AND EVOLUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

### *Understanding the Concept*

Civil society can be difficult to understand, in view of many conflicting definitions. The OAU-civil society conference construed it as “the whole of the material relations of individuals within a given stage of development of the productive forces.” Michael Bratton defines civil society as a sphere of social interaction between the household and the state which is manifest in norms of community cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of public communication.<sup>2</sup> Another useful definition of civil society is that of the World Bank. It uses the term civil society to refer to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil society organizations therefore refer to a wide array of organizations: community groups or community based organizations (CBOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, students unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith based organizations, professional associations, and foundations.

As far as political governance is concerned civil society has largely been used in referring to confrontational relations with the state. The underlying assumption is that only those organizations and movements that confront and challenge state power constitute civil society. (John Kean, 1988; Naomi Chazan, 1988, 1994; Bayart, 1986). This definition of civil society has major limitations, if not totally flawed. As aptly observed by Kasfir (1998:4), “Defining civil society as confrontational creates problems... one question is whether civil society disappears when its actors engaged in non-confrontational activities.” By extension, citizens groups, religious bodies and other organizations whose activities may not be inherently confrontational do not qualify as part of civil society in view of the confrontation concept.

Patrick Chabal in his book “Africa works-Disorder as political instrument” suggests that civil society does not exist unless there is an explicit interaction between the state and civil society. He posits that referring to a civil society outside the state in sub-Saharan Africa is difficult. He argues that a notion of civil society can only apply if there is a meaningful institutional separation between a well organized civil society and a relatively autonomous bureaucratic state. Chabal’s most important argument is that African societies are essentially plural, fragmented, and above all, organized along vertical lines. The assumption of a civil society in Africa is, therefore, eminently misleading and derives more from wishful thinking or ideological bias than from a careful analysis of present conditions. He dismisses the idea of a political cleavage between “state” and civil “society” and calls for increased support and attention to the actual behavior and performance of the main political actor—[the state].<sup>3</sup>

That civil society is essentially confrontational and is only existent if it directly interacts with the state is contested by this study. Chabal’s argument seems to limit the state to governments and their administrative bodies. It gives no recognition to the concept of public space and the use of that space by a collective of people to promote the common good. Post-independence states in Africa met these collectives of people and their roles in promoting peace, security, and social and economic development of their communities. Self-help and other associational initiatives are historically rooted in Africa and these have played significant roles with or without direct interaction with governments. Even in post-independence Africa the gross absence of governance and the relevance of the state in African society has left a huge gap which has been filled by civil society.

The engagement of state by civil society may either be cordial or antagonistic. As Lewis suggest, “While civil society intrinsically resists state encroachment, the various interests within civil society also seek to influence the state in the exercise of public policy and the allocation of valued resources. This engagement may be either cordial or antagonistic, but it does reflect a common recognition of state sovereignty...” (Lewis: 1992:36). Chantal Mouffe goes on to argue further that civil society organizations are not democratic merely because they are politically independent of the state. Instead they are democratic to the extent that they pursue the goals of liberty and equality. Civil society can be a critical vehicle for democratization as long as it can serve as a “counter-balance to state power, a training ground for democratic practices and as a necessary consequence of increasingly differentiated structures of governance that have increased the distance between citizens and the state.”<sup>4</sup>

Within the framework of state-civil society relations as analyzed above, civil society as ‘an arena where manifold social movements... and civil organizations from all classes... attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests’ (Cited in Bratton, 1989:417) is fairly adequate. It must be pointed out that civil society is not a substitute to the state. Its primary roles are to complement the state in development and promotion of human security as well as to serve as a watchdog to keep the state in check.

Bratton distinguished the institutions of civil society as:

- *The norms of civic community.* He outlines that the most important values for the construction of civil society are trust, reciprocity, tolerance, and inclusion. He asserts that Trust is a prerequisite for individuals to associate voluntarily; reciprocity is a resource for reducing the transaction costs of collective action; political tolerance enables the emergence of diverse and plural forms of association. These values are promoted by citizens who actively seek to participate in public affairs.
- *The Structures of associational life:* Bratton states that for civil life to become institutionalized, it must be expressed in organizational form. He identifies the most common organizational structure in civil society as the voluntary association, a grouping of citizens who come together by reason of identity or interest to pursue a common objective.
- *The networks of public communication:* He argues that in order to be politically active, citizens require means to communicate with one another and to debate the type of government they desire for themselves. Civic discourse can take place in various forums, the most important of which are the public communications media, both print and electronic. State or private monopolies of media ownership and public opinion are not conducive to civil society; civil society he indicates is always stronger where there is diversity of media outlets and political views.

Another way to shed light on a rather difficult concept such as civil society is to explain it from the perspective of what it is not. First, “civil society lies beyond the household. While activity in civil society may be motivated by a quest for private advantage, it is not “private” in the sense of being confined to the domestic arena. Instead, it is decidedly “public” in two senses: it is collective action in which individuals join to pursue shared goals, and it takes place in the institutional “commons” that lie beyond the boundaries of the household. Second, civil society stands apart from the state. We can conceive of the state as the realm of the politics of force by which governing elites exert their domination over society. By contrast, civil society is the realm of consent through which citizens may choose to accept or reject the use

of force by state officials. When citizens consent, they perform a hegemonic role, helping to reproduce the prevailing social order (Hoare and Smith, 1971; Salami, 1981 quoted by IDR Reports Vol. 11 No. 6).

### *Civil Society and Human Security*

According to the UNDP Human Development Report 1994 human security “means safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression”, and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily lives”. Human security is assured when ordinary people are able to pursue a safe livelihood on equal terms with others. It focuses on protecting people from dangers and empowering them to develop their full potential and participate in decision-making.<sup>5</sup> There are three levels of security: personal/individual, national, and international. This project argues for the complementary relationship between human and state security. Without the provision of effective national security, citizens cannot be personally secure. And without secure and stable countries and a practice of a body of law whereby countries regulate their interaction, international security would remain elusive.<sup>6</sup>

Post-independence African states have little to show in terms of guaranteeing the individual, communal, and national security of their citizens. In an attempt to consolidate themselves in the face of shrinking resources, most African states resorted to patronizing their elites and soldiers on the one hand; and grossly abused the basic rights and freedoms of their citizens, on the other. The leaders became the predators—killing more of their citizens than any war have done in the history of Africa; terrorizing and maiming those who barely survive the brutality, and squandering the meager resources of their countries.

Africa is inundated with freedom fighters, warlords, and private armies. Armed conflicts perpetrated by these new rebels have claimed about 8 million lives and displaced over 16 million Africans in the last 2 decades alone. Over 95% of war-related deaths in Africa are civilians; and 120 thousand of the estimated global total number of 300,000 child soldiers are active on Africa’s new battle fields which in effect are in homes, villages, and cities. The continent has become poorer with a declining share of global trade from 7% in 1950 to 2% in 2002; from 6% global capital in 1950 to 1% in 2002; and 30% foreign direct investment in the 1980s to 7% in 2002. This grim picture is made grimmer with the apocalyptic HIV/AIDS pandemic claiming the lives of especially Africa’s young men and women. At least 30 million Africans may die by 2010 if nothing is done to halt the spread of the disease. State-centered development and military-centered security have become irrelevant in today’s Africa. No time has human security been under inexplicable threat in Africa as now. Ordinary people no longer see themselves as bystanders and collateral victims of so-called armed conflicts and growing insecurity on the continent. Through organized associations and groupings known as civil society, they are seizing the public space to promote their collective survival, dignity, and livelihood.

### *History of Civil Society in Africa*

History of civil society in Africa can be explained in four phases—pre-colonial, independence, immediate post-independence, and late post-independence periods. The forms of civil society organizations in pre-colonial Africa ranged from welfare associations, agricultural work parties, to credit associations. Hopkins (1973:50, 57, 70) provides empirical examples from pre-colonial West Africa. These associations included craft production guilds which exercised control over entry to a craft, methods of production, standards of workmanship and prices.

The traders' organization exerted control over prices and market routes. They also played the role of negotiating with kings and chiefs over many issues including policies regarding weights and measures, laws governing debt, contract and agency. This can be regarded as the first phase of the history of civil society in Africa.

The second phase of the history of civil society in Africa dates around the period of independence. Evidently, the transition from colonial to independent states in Africa was never a matter of goodwill on the part of the colonial powers. The urge for independence emerged from the so-called new black African middle classes in the colonial states. Prominent amongst them were the Creole Societies that existed in the West African cities. These societies in very meaningful ways formed the seed and nurtured the spirit of Pan-Africanism. As Ronning correctly notes, it 'served as the embryo for the first Pan-African movement, which incidentally also partly formed the background for the emergence of the counter public sphere of much of the West African anti-colonial movement."<sup>7</sup>

The period immediately after independence was one in which the distinction between civil society and the state was blurred. The independence movements were seen as the people's movement, and found it difficult that the newly won political power could be questioned by those who fought for it. Some states pursued the policy of cooptation, dismantling civil society structures. In Guinea for example, both traditional and other civil society structures were destroyed and the state was declared the only framework for social, political, and economic interaction. Others arrogated the role of rural development to the civil society structures that accompanied them in the independence struggle like the *harambee* (self-help) initiative in Jomo Kenyatta's Kenya. This period saw either the withdrawal of civil society into parochialism and apathy, open hostility between civil societies and the state, or cooptation and use of civil society as instrument for rural development and praising singing for the self-entrenched regimes.

Civil society since the end of the Cold War has entered its most vibrant phase. The dominance of neo-liberal democracy and market economy has demanded African states to recognize, respect, and cooperate with their citizens. Regimes that manage the affairs of the state have had to negotiate their legitimacy with their citizens unlike the pre and Cold War period when citizens were bullied to ascribe legitimacy to the state. In addition, the increasing decline of the state to provide social services, its inability to continue to patronize the elite class including the military, and the need to remain favorable to Western donor countries who insist that the African states share the public space with their citizens have widened the space left to be occupied by civil society and increase the rhetoric for cooperation with civil society amongst African governments. Civil society groups on the other hand are not letting this opportunity to escape them. A. Gyimah-Boadi captures the emerging dynamism with African civil society:

"External developments, such as the fall of communism and pressure from foreign donors were important for laying the groundwork for formal democracy. But it was often the resourcefulness, dedication, and tenacity of the continent's nascent civil societies that initiated and sustained the process of democratic opening and political liberalization. In late 1989, civil servants, teachers, and traders in Benin were the first to bring an end to autocracy and economic mismanagement. In Zambia, the Congress of Trade Unions followed suit by successfully challenging the three-decade incumbency of Kenneth Kaunda. In Sierra Leone, the irrepressible resolve of the Women's Forum thwarted the designs of the incumbent military regime to forestall that country's return to democratic rule in 1996. And the damning pastoral letters of such Christian leaders as Bishop Isidore de Souza of Benin, and Archbishop Fanoko Kpodzro of Togo proved highly successful in undermining the authority of the old regimes."

Civil society groups in Africa have sustained this momentum ever since. CSOs in Kenya played a critical role in the dramatic end of the 3 decade political dominance of the KANU, women movements under the leadership of the Women in Peacebuilding Network of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding demanded an end to the brutal dictatorship of Charles Taylor, and the government of Nigeria is yet to succeed with its agenda to remove subsidy on petroleum in the oil-rich country, thanks to Nigeria's vibrant trade and labor unions.

The Economic Commission for Africa launched the African Center for Civil Society on October 24, 1997. The Centre addresses the critical issue of how NGOs and civil society organizations would play a more active and effective role as intermediaries, promoting the interest and priorities of their grassroots constituencies. The Centre was also established to develop and offer core programs to train African civil society leaders and provide on-going technical advisory services. The Centre is to specifically monitor the implementation of the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development, facilitate ECA's work with people's organizations and Non Governmental organizations in formulating and articulating development programs and initiatives that are people centered and self-reliant; and promote policies and institutional arrangements that foster wide spread participatory action.

On 1 December 1997 the OAU/AU called its first civil society conference from 11-15 June 2001 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with focus on OAU/AU-CSO partnership for promoting peace and development in Africa. These developments are yet to translate into concrete partnerships between governments and their civil societies in most African states. At worst, civil society organizations in some member states of the African Union still suffer restrictions. The threats and imposition of bottlenecks and impediments in the way of civil society development in most African states have, however, not deterred the resolve to play their role for the survival of the continent.

For the purpose of this study we will turn our focus to the brief historical developments of civil society in the 8 selected countries: Ghana, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Senegal, Nigeria, Algeria, and Ethiopia.

**Ghana** The Fanti Confederacy was one of the first civil society organizations recorded. It was formed in 1871 by the Fanti educated elites with the cooperation of their chiefs, elders, youth and people, to send a clear message to the British that forts, settlements and governorship of certain Fanti areas could not be traded off by the British to the Europeans without the consent of the indigenous people. In the 1890s the Fantis also formed the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) led by the famous Ghanaian lawyer and Fanti Chief, Mensah Sarbar, to protest against the annexation of native lands by the British.

The 1930s, during the inter-war period, saw a rise in associational life and protest movements. Voluntary self-help organizations, ethnic solidarity movements, and hometown improvement associations surged as part of the process of rapid urbanization and intense social mobilization of that period. The practice of associational protests also continued as society and economy were drastically transformed with the introduction of cocoa in the Gold Coast. For instance, the Nsawam-Aburi Cocoa Farmers Association organized a cocoa hold-up in the nineteenth century to protest against the low producer price paid to cocoa growers by the white cocoa purchasing firms. While manipulations by the colonialists proved effective and the Association failed to maintain the boycott, the incident gave a strong signal of the capacity of the people to organize themselves in protest in their own interests. In 1938, a more sophisticated cocoa boycott was organized with the support of a wide array of social movements in Ghana which went a long way to end the monopolistic stranglehold of imperialist forces on cocoa marketing overseas.

The presence of associational life and protest movement became even more visible and active in the post-World War Two period. Ex-service men who fought the Second World War formed the Ex-Service Men Association to fight for appropriate resettlement from colonial authorities and racial discrimination in the colony. The participation of the black service men in World War Two broke the myth that perpetuated white supremacy. Ex-Service men saw their white counterparts also died in war. Some realized that their physical endurance on battlefields surpassed their white counterpart. Their exposure to the war machine that perpetuated colonial dominance in Africa increased their courage to be open and confrontational about their demands. Demonstrations for equal opportunities with white Ex-service men in the colony became breeding ground for political activism and demand for independence.

The famous 1948 demonstration in Accra which led to the shooting of Sergeant Adjetej and others at the crossroads at the Christianborg Castle in Accra sparked the creation of the National Liberation Movement. Trade unions, youth associations, and literary clubs were mobilized to join the struggle for independence. The trade union movement in particular was highly instrumental in the declaration of mass boycotts (Positive Action) by Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party (CPP) in January 1950 for "self government now;" thus, giving the independence struggle a more radical flavor.

The trend of proliferation in self-help organization has continued in the post-colonial period. This included a variety of quasi non-governmental organizations (QUANGOS) and government sponsored non-governmental organizations (GONGOS) such as the Nkrumah-CPP Young Pioneer Movement. It also included an ever expanding range of new and independent religious groups, home town improvement associations, secondary school alumni groups, professional bodies, youth movements, and ethnic solidarity movements.

A major escalation in the size and importance of the Ghanaian associational realm came in the wake of the decay of the Ghanaian state in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the policy of state contraction imposed by the IMF since the mid-1980s. The period saw a surge in the vertical types of civil organizations such as ethno-regional solidarity movements. Associational life continued to be brisk in the PNDC rule, many associations came to the fore, in addition to ones existing before. Traditional civil society organizations such as the Trades Union Congress (TUC), Ghana Bar Association (GBA), the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies (ARPBs), the Christian Council of Ghana (CCG), the Conference of Bishops (CBC), the National Union of Ghana Students, (NUGS), the University Teachers Association of Ghana (UTAG), the Rotary Clubs, International Clubs, and soccer supporters' clubs were joined by the "born-again" Christian evangelical groups such as the Full Gospel Businessmen's Fellowship and its female counterpart, Women Aglow.

The People's National Defence Council (PNDC) regime of Jerry Rawlings depended significantly on the support from civil society groups. The vitality of civil society groups continued with activists seen in their uniforms marching in parades or engaged in various group and civic activities across the country. An even more notable phenomenon in this context was the emergence of a multiplicity of non-governmental organizations (NGOS) and community-based organizations (CBOS) focusing on various aspects of economic development and specific welfare programs. The latter variety of non-state organizations, especially those purporting to be dealing with the problems of the poor and marginalized communities was to become veritable growth industry since the mid 1980s.

The latest addition to the civil society landscape of the 1990s is independent policy research and advocacy institutions and independent radio and television stations as well as newspapers. These "political" NGOs are focused on the promotion of respect for human

rights and protection of democratic freedoms in particular and the facilitation of democratic consolidation in general. They include Ghana Alert, Institute of Economic Affairs, Center for Democracy and Development and Center for Development of People. Ghana is a concrete example of a thriving democracy that was given birth and sustain by civil society.

**South Africa:** Earlier colonial expansion, stronger settler presence and the need to maintain settler domination, and higher rates of industrialization and urbanization led to the development of a thick network of state structures that could not be found elsewhere in Africa. The development of civil society as an array of institutions, for protecting the interests of diverse groups and associations underwent extreme repression and polarization in South Africa more than any country in the continent. In Apartheid South Africa whites enjoyed the freedom to form associations and exert pressure on the state through institutional channels while associations of blacks and so-called colored were either marginalized and destroyed or co-opted into systems of homeland rule. Social and political organizations, especially revolutionary and progressive organizations, had very limited or no access to the state. They mostly operated underground or outside the state of South Africa.

There are specific landmarks in contemporary South African political history that inform the evolution of civil society. In the 1950s apartheid was defined as a political strategy morally justified by the Dutch Reformed Church. In this period the ruling white minority fortified the fences around them and distanced themselves from the black majority. The 1960s were the decade of intense repression. Opposition movements were banned and their activists were killed, driven underground, imprisoned, or sent into exile. Religious, cultural, and community organizations were the only available channels for expression of dissent though limited.

Two institutions, the Christian Institute and the Black Consciousness Movement, prominently featured during this period. The Christian Institute was the sole dissenting voice within the white community, working from religious and humanist perspectives. The Black Consciousness movement was initially allowed by the State as an alternative to direct political movements. It emphasized psychological and cultural emancipation. By the mid-70s it had become clear that the black consciousness movement was becoming a threat to apartheid. It was violently suppressed including the brutal killing of its leader, Steve Biko.

The 1970s was characterized by the re-emergence of opposition to apartheid. The rise of the black consciousness movement, the Durban Strike wave, the Soweto uprising and the rise of trade unions were particular features of this decade. These events demonstrated the radical shift from passivity of earlier decade to direct confrontation.

Contemporary South African civil society refers to two distinct phases in their evolution. The first dates back to the early 1980s when there was a phenomenal growth in associational life. The distinctive feature of this period is surfacing of a significant part of civil society in the political sphere. The basic contours expressed as opposition between “the masses” and “the regime” formed during this period remains the dominant feature of state-civil society relations in today’s South Africa. The adoption of a new constitution in 1983 was perhaps the most significant political development in the country. As an attempt to cement white domination amidst mounting national and international pressure, the PW Botha’s regime launched its so-called Total Strategy. The government combined co-optation of especially coloureds and Indians and the exclusion of the black majority. It created a tri-cameral parliament to embrace coloureds and Indians as partners in opposition to the overwhelming pressure for democracy and majority rule. Colored and Indians were given the right to vote while Africans were divided into homelands.

The second phase dates back to 1994, where the character and operations of a significant part of civil society fundamentally changed as a result of new opportunities and challenges. Both phases of course neatly coincide with key moments in the evolution of the political system: the first with the liberalization phase, and the second with the democratization phase. Civil society is thus influenced by the political transition in South Africa.<sup>8</sup>

Prior to the liberalization in the early 1980s, the dominant element in civil society was organizations and institutions that were either pro-apartheid and/or pro-business. Agencies critical of the state and the socio-economic system were either actively suppressed or marginalized into an informal existence. The major political contest within civil society seemed to be between pro-apartheid institutions like the Broederbond and N.G. Kerk and liberal oriented pro-business organizations like the institute of Race Relations and the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS).

The relationship between key civil society organizations such as UDP and the African National Congress was so close that they became one and the same thing. NGO policy units in a range of areas such as education, health, minerals and energy, land and agriculture took over the task of shaping ANC policies, and adapting them to the circumstances of the transition period in preparation for the transfer of power in the early 90s. President Mbeki, like most post-transition political leaders, confronts the challenge of re-asserting the political authority of the new democratic state while drawing a clear distinction between civil society and the state. The process is further complicated by the need to reconcile the history of popular politics and mass mobilization with the institutions of liberal democracy. Civil society is also struggling to disentangle itself from the ANC government with which it cooperated for decades to eliminate apartheid.<sup>9</sup>

**Algeria:** Politicized Algerian civil society owes its origins to the pre-revolutionary period when it absorbed much of the French notions of associational life and state-society relations. From the 1920s until the War of Independence, Algerians were allowed to participate in French professional and trade unions and other mass organizations. Through most of Algeria's independent history, civil society and mass organizations have been subordinate to the state-party apparatus and relegated to roles of recruitment and propaganda. From 1968 until 1989, all mass associations were incorporated under the direct administration of the FLN. From the party's perspective, integrating the independent organizations enabled the party to become a true "front," a unique body representing the populace, while simultaneously inhibiting the development of any independent political opposition. Subordinate to the party administration, the associations quickly became engrossed in mobilizing mass support for the party and government and less occupied with pursuing the interests of the groups they represented.

The political crisis of the late 1980s radically altered the dynamic in which the people accepted central control in return for economic security by shifting some of the initiative away from the state and toward civil society. "Associations of a political character" were legalized and allowed to organize, recruit, and demonstrate. In 1989 the legalization of political parties resulted in a large number of independent interest groups emerging as political parties, attesting to the pervasive nature of associational life in Algerian political culture despite government efforts at "de-politicization" and heavy government supervision. Party proliferation was facilitated by a loosening of government regulations. Government authorization became necessary only for those organizations having a "national character," and legalization was extended to any party that did not pose a direct threat to national sovereignty. Hundreds of independent institutions emerged in the years that followed.

**Kenya:** Like other colonial states in Africa, civil society in Kenya started as an offspring of the colonizers. However, through the agitation for political independence, the colonial civil

society faded away. Post-independent civil society in Kenya since then has undergone two significant eras in its historical development. These are directly connected to the political regimes of the Kenyatta and Moi governments.

In an attempt to legitimize the regime, the Kenyatta administration cleverly concentrated power at the center perpetuating the national *harambee* (self-help) movement and tribal welfare associations as the only legitimate channels for popular participation. During this time (1963-1978) the *harambee* movement became the vehicle for development through popular participation, while ethnic organizations expressed particularistic and narrow interest of certain communities. With the coming of the Moi regime in 1978, Kenya experienced a proliferation of civil society organizations (CSOs), which for the first time could “really be distinguished from the state” (Kanyinga, 1995).

Civil society, and in particular the NGO sector, has undergone fundamental changes in post-colonial Kenya. As in the period of colonialism, the state has played a central role in defining the direction of the voluntary sector, especially as relates to its vibrancy. But one thing that is also certain is the fact that civil society organizations have increasingly taken on important tasks in society, and have in their own different ways equally influenced the nature and character of the post-colonial state. It is significant to recognize the role of the international community in empowering civil society, through increased funding to confront the Kenyan State on matters of political space.

Civil society organizations, notably non-governmental organizations, have grown from 125 in 1974 to 400 in 1986, with the figure presently standing at 2,257 although many more may be operating illegally; while it is also suspected that about 60% of those registered are not active. The number of voluntary non-profit organizations in Kenya is also estimated to be over 150,000 (Institute of Development Studies, 2002). A special body, the NGO Coordinating Board, was created by an Act of Parliament in 1990 to oversee the registration and operations of NGOs in Kenya. The NGO Coordination Act became the focal point of NGO-State relations, as NGOs collectively fought government control.

The eventual success of the NGO had important implications for the political reform movement. It allowed NGOs to operate freely and independently from state interference—thus increasing the freedom of actors in civil society and it allowed some NGOs (for example the Greenbelt Movement) to pursue more forthright political actions with a reduced risk of being outlawed.<sup>10</sup> Today NGOs have become such common features in the Kenyan socio-economic and political life that it is not longer acceptable to exclude them from social and public policy discourse, as the society is so “NGO-ised.”<sup>11</sup>

**Uganda.** The emergence of formal civil society associations representing collective interests in Uganda first took place under colonial rule, between 1920 and 1962. From the various civil society organizations that existed during this period, five main categories can be identified. They are: 1. Mass-based Membership Organizations; 2. Elite-led Membership Organizations; 3. Cultural/Ethnic based Organizations; 4. Welfare and Charitable Organizations; and 5. The Media.<sup>12</sup> A close look at the nature of these civil society forms is important in view of the evolution of Uganda's civil society:

Mass-based Membership Organizations: These organizations were formed to promote economic and social interests of peasants and workers. They included peasant-based co-operatives formed in the inter-war years to resist the monopolization of trade in agricultural products by the colonial state and immigrant communities from Europe and Asia. In addition to co-operatives, trade unions were formed in this period (1920-1962) to address labor related issues including low wages and poor working conditions. It was these trade unions that

organized the general strike of 1945 leading to an increase in wages and an improvement in the conditions at work places.<sup>13</sup>

**Elite-led Membership Organizations:** Elite-led membership organizations were formed in Uganda in the colonial period by middle class Africans aggrieved at the colonial policies. These included organizations such as the “Young Men of Buganda”, the “Young Men of Toro”, and the “Uganda African Welfare Association”<sup>14</sup> In addition, some women’s organizations including the ‘Uganda Council of Women” were established during this period. In the main, these comprised middle-class urban women. The women organizations focused on issues such as citizenship, civil education and voting rights (Tamale, 1999).

**Cultural/Ethnic based Organizations:** Cultural/ethnic based organizations seeking to advance parochial interests of groups in the country were also formed during this period. Examples include organizations representing the Buganda Kingdom and other cultural institutions in Uganda.

**Welfare and Charitable Organizations:** During colonialism welfare and charitable organizations were founded often under the auspices of the church, such as Red Cross Society and the Salvation Army and other organizations based in Europe in general and UK in particular. These were distinct from the membership-based organizations in that they acted as philanthropic intermediaries providing welfare services to the poor. In this role, they were the early precursors of the non-governmental organizations that rose to prominence in later years.

**The Media:** In 1918, the first newspaper, the Uganda Herald was started. It published critical articles on the colonial regime and addressed concerns on land tenure; trade by Asians and Europeans; prices of agricultural products and the oppressive character of chiefs. Other newspapers were started in subsequent years, including Ssekanyolya (1920), Munyonozi, the first independent African newspaper (1927), Matalisi (1924), Gambuze, Dobozi Lya Buganda (1928). More newspapers were established in subsequent years such as Emembya Esaze, Uganda Express, Uganda Times, and African Pilot. These newspapers grappled with issues of colonial governance, exposing the exploitative and oppressive nature of its system.

After Uganda's independence in 1962, especially following the abrogation of the country's first constitution in 1967, the existence and operations of civil society organizations was further abridged by the dictatorships, first of Idi Amin's regime and later by Milton Obote. In this epoch Uganda suffered a total breakdown of law and order as well as atrocious violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Press freedom and associational life in the country was very much weakened and a few traditional civil actors including trade unions and co-operative societies were largely inconsequential in impacting on political, socio-economic and other processes within the government's domain. Oloka-Onyango correctly points out that, for the few CSOs that remained in this period, issues of constitutionalism in human rights in particular were not prominent on their agenda.<sup>15</sup>

With the coming to power of President Yoweri K. Museveni in 1986 to end tyranny in Uganda the history of civil society took an important course. With the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and bilateral donors, the government introduced economic recovery programmes and, in the case of CSOs, offered a new lease of life. Consequently, in the post-1986 period, the country has witnessed a rapid proliferation of CSOs, particularly in the form of formal Non-Governmental Organizations set up most often in support of development efforts, including playing the role as intermediary organizations between CBOs and foreign NGOs, or in support of advocacy initiatives. Today the country has over 2,000 registered NGOs, while many unregistered community based organizations

and other informal groups exist country-wide. The registration of NGOs is currently under the NGO Statute of 1989 (The Government has prepared a new law known as the Non-Governmental Organizations Registration Amendment Bill 2000).

**Nigeria.** Prior to colonialism, social movements arising from society and engaged in the reconstruction of the state and society existed all over Africa. The Jihadist movements in West Africa and North Africa are good examples. Indeed it was the Jihadists who established the Sokoto Caliphate in Northern Nigeria. At the dawn of colonial conquests, resistance was organized and coordinated by states existing in the social formations that constituted Nigeria. After colonial conquest the resistance was sustained by civil organizations of both a modern and traditional nature. The Aba and Abeokuta women's movements, the Enugu coal miners, as well as the indigenous press, such as the West African Pilot, students and other nationalist groups continued resistance against the colonial project in Nigeria. However, the relations between civil society organizations and the colonial state were not always antagonistic.

The Colonial Government was sometimes actively involved in the promoting civil associations. The 1935 Cooperative Societies Ordinance was passed with the intention of promoting the formation of agricultural cooperatives. In this way the colonial Government supported its agricultural policy of primary export extraction. Nevertheless, civil society played a critical role in ending colonial rule. The nationalist parties and groups were bolstered by a myriad of civil groups. These were groups of workers (such as trade unions), of women (such as the Federation of Nigerian Women's Societies—FNWS) and of the students and youths (such as Zikist movement). Indeed civil groups became the training grounds for would-be nationalist politicians.

In traditional sphere, civil associations were also active and vibrant. Such institutions included farmers' associations in the south-west, traders' associations in the north of Nigeria and village and community associations throughout the country. After independence, many leaders of civil organizations elsewhere in Africa were absorbed into the new governments of their countries. This was not the case in Nigeria. The nationalists rapidly stepped into the shoes of the colonialists and excluded popular and mass organizations from government. Consequently, civil groups turned into forces of opposition. For the first five years of independence, Nigeria witnessed several workers' strikes and civil strife that set it up for the 1966 coup.

The decade of the 1970s was a period of oil boom and development fervor in Nigeria. In this period the self-help and cooperative movements became important conduits in ensuring that some of the oil revenues trickled down to the grassroots. Substantial proportions of the revenue, however, found its way into the pockets of a small group of elite and into wasteful white elephant projects. In this period trade unions and student associations actively agitated for the interests of their members and their self-declared allies.

The decade of the 1980s witnessed fundamental changes in the nature and development of civil society in Nigeria. More civil organizations were registered during the 1980s than in any other period in the post-independence history of Nigeria. Indeed, the NICEF study on NGOs in Nigeria states that the largest percentage of NGOs currently in existence was registered in this period. NGOs with their high visibility and global networks became the decisive feature of civil society of this period.

There was a proliferation of women's NGOs. Women in Nigeria (WIN) was formed in 1982 in Zaria, northern Nigeria, by radical intellectuals, both women and men, from all over the country. Along with similar organizations, the then emerging WIN injected feminism into the women's movement in Nigeria. This gave the movement additional vibrancy and surge.

Other reasons for the phenomenal growth of women's groups were the United Nations' declaration of the Decade for Women and the Nairobi Conference. The introduction of state sponsored development programs, which targeted women and women's organizations in the 1980s and 1990s also contributed to the growth of women's organizations. The Better Life for Rural Women Project of Mrs. Maryam Babangida and the Family Support Project of Mrs. Maram Abacha are well known examples.

Against the background of the fall in petroleum prices and diminished revenue to the Nigerian state, the 1980s were also significant to the extent that NGOs competed vigorously to obtain funding from international donors. Thus this was a period in which Nigerian NGOs tailored their interventions to donor funding the expectations. The 1980s was also a decade of increasing intervention by the state in both the traditional and modern spheres of civil society. The state dominated by a military president—General Babangida—sought to build legitimacy and negotiate with adversaries by supporting and even creating selected civil associations and institutions in opposition to others. The Babangida Government of 1985 to 1993 supported associations of traditional chiefs and some women's associations while it opposed and even banned associations of workers, students, journalists and other professionals. This did not deactivate civil society. Rather, it experienced an exponential growth and development. The twin problem of economic crisis and the political blunder of cancellation of the result of the 12 June election could not be wished away. Civic action over these problems continued to plague General Babangida's regime until he was forced to give up power.

Similar to the Babangida regime, the Abacha Government, which took power in November 1993 actively sought to create its own constituency in society by encouraging the formation of civil groups that supported it. It also sought support from existing groups by handsomely rewarding those that did not oppose it. Many civil groups fell for the trick and only after it became clear that the regime would not deliver on the burning problems of the Babangida years did some civil groups shift to opposition.

The Abacha regime actively courted some traditional rulers and their associations, where such existed. An allocation of 10 percent of government disbursements to local government was redirected to councils of traditional rulers throughout the country. In addition, the Government's long-term planning committee, the Vision 2010 Planning Committee, had strong interest representation by some groups while it excluded others. The twin problems of the economy and the lack of respect for democratic values proved too difficult for the dictatorship. It continued to exacerbate the mistake of canceling the 12 June 1993 election; and exacerbated the situation with the execution of the leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People a radical civil group in the Niger Delta region. This blunder only served to galvanize more communities in the oil rich Niger Delta into joint the struggle for minority rights, environmental protection and development. By the end of the Abacha period in mid-1998, the youth of the Delta region could be described as insurgent, with all the consequences for the new democratic experiment that was to follow Abacha's death. What Nigeria had at the end of the Abacha military dictatorship was a civil society that was activated and mobilized, vibrant, confident and tested in the most trying periods of Nigeria's recent political experience. It was also a civil society that was bruised by the arrest and detention of its leaders by the banning and repression of some its organizations, by scant resources and low capacity and by the creeping division in vision and strategy. This had an impact on its next role in the transition to democracy and in the current phase that requires democratic consolidation and sustainability.<sup>16</sup>

### CHAPTER THREE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL PLURALISM

The state at its inception was viewed as “plenipotentiary” and civil society as a political construction possessing only those liberties that the polity chooses to grant and modify or revoke at will.<sup>17</sup> Three arguments supported the authority of the state over society. The first argument is traced to Aristotle, who argues that politics must enjoy general authority over subordinate activities and institutions because it aims at the highest and most comprehensive good for human beings. Hobbes offers a second justification. Any less robust form of politics, according to Hobbes, would in practice countenance divided sovereignty and “sovereignty cannot be divided, even between civil and spiritual authorities (Leviathan, “of Commonwealth” Ch. 29). Rosseau and Emile Combes offer the third argument for the absolute authority of the state, “Civic health and morality cannot be achieved without citizens’ wholehearted devotion to the common good. Loyalties divided between the republic and other ties, whether to civil associations or to revealed religious truth, are bound to dilute civic spirit. Emile Combes puts it emphatically, “There are, there can be no rights except the right of the State, and there is and there can be no other authority than the authority of the republic.”<sup>18</sup>

African states which began on a much debased construct of master-colony relation imbibed these principles to their extremes. Politics on the continent at the level of national government engendered the marginalization of the masses of the people. States and governments were deemed as super-structures and end unto themselves. Militarism, extra-constitutional longevity, and the gross abuse of citizens by political elites made the state not only revolting; but one to avoid at all times. The founding fathers who sought to entrench themselves as perpetual “saviours” provided reasons for choosing one party system of politics for Africa. B.J. da Rocha sums up their arguments in the Occasional Papers No. 3 of the Institute of Economic Affairs in Ghana:

- One party system would foster unity and break down tribal barriers and differences
- It would provide a strong government, which was needed to ward off any erosion of the countries’ new independence
- The combination of national unity and strong government would mobilize the people and ensure the rapid economic and social development
- A plurality of parties would create instability because opposition to the ruling party would disrupt orderly government and development

The dismal performance of African leaders in state management, their unbending loyalty to the very colonial masters they fought against for independence, the alienation of citizens from the affairs of the state, and the mindless squandering of the continent’s vast resources are the fruits of totalitarianism. Absolute state dominance has made Africa poor and backward.

The most useful point of departure from totalitarianism through one-party politics at the global level is traced to the Calvinist tradition and most recently through the US liberal democracy. The 14<sup>th</sup> amendment protects the free exercise of religion, freedom of association, and individual liberty. The collapse of Communism at the end of the Cold War leaves liberal democracy and political pluralism led by the United States as the dominant political system.

According to Shapiro, political pluralism understands human life as consisting in multiplicity of spheres, some overlapping, with distinct natures and/or inner norms. Each sphere enjoys a limited but real autonomy. Pluralists understand that this complex mix of human spheres may pose problems of practical governance but argues that such tensions must be acknowledged, negotiated, and adjudicated with due regard to the contours of specific cases and controversy. Associational integrity requires a broad right of groups to define their own membership, to exclude as well as include.<sup>19</sup> As David Nicholls, a leading scholar of political

pluralism, argues, it presupposes a limited body of shared belief: in civil peace, in toleration for different ways of life, in some machinery for resolving disputes and in the ongoing right of individuals and groups to resist conscientiously any exercise of public power they regard as illegitimate.<sup>20</sup>

At the end of the Cold War, political pluralism emerged in Africa as an alternative to all forms of totalitarian politics but not without a fight. As indicated by E. Gyimah-Boadi, "... it was the resourcefulness, dedication, and tenacity of the continent's nascent civil societies that initiated and sustained the process of democratic opening and political liberalisation."<sup>21</sup> African leaders are increasingly becoming more sensitive to the global political system. They have recognized that the future of the continent cannot rest solely with governments. The political space must be redefined as the place where a complex mix of spheres are colliding; not necessarily to guarantee a comprehensive common good, but to limit the chances of doing evil. The era of one-party system and totalitarianism in Africa has proven that "absolute power corrupts absolutely."

African Heads of State and Governments through the OAU/AU have committed themselves to political pluralism through various instruments including the Pan-African Parliament Protocol of 2001; the CSSDCA Solemn Declaration of 2000; the Treaty Establishing the Africa Economic Community of 1991; and the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation of 1990. In the CSSDCA Solemn Declaration African Heads of States affirm that in order to assure the stability of Africa all states be guided by strict adherence to the rule of law, good governance, people's participation in public affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the establishment of political organizations devoid of sectarian, religious, ethnic, regional and racial extremism.<sup>22</sup> They emphatically resolved that "There shall be no hindrance to the promotion of political pluralism."<sup>23</sup> The Heads of States agreed to enhance the process of democratization in Africa by strengthening institutions that will sustain democracy and the holding of free and fair elections. The African states also agreed to "Protect and promote respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, such as the freedom of expression and association, political and trade union, pluralism and other forms of participatory democracy."

### **Assessment of Country Performance**

The eight countries focused on in this study—Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda—have all signed and ratified the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which was adopted by the 36<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union in Lome, Togo on 11<sup>th</sup> July 2000. From the countries named above, Algeria, Ethiopia, South Africa, Uganda, Kenya and Senegal have signed and ratified the protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan African Parliament, adopted by the 5<sup>th</sup> Extraordinary Session of Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Sirte, Libya on 2<sup>nd</sup> March 2001. Although Ghana and Nigeria are signatories to the protocol, they have not ratified the document. In order to assess the performance of the countries under study, the team identified key commitments made by the Heads of States to the promotion of political pluralism and drew out indicators that would measure performance:

<b>Commitment</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
Multi-party Politics (CSSDCA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Registration of political parties is affordable and less complicated</li> <li>• Number and names of political parties</li> <li>• State funding and other sources of funding for political parties</li> <li>• Number of alternation of power or change of government</li> </ul>

Political Tolerance and accommodation (AU Constitutive Act and CSSDCA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Can political parties campaign easily and freely?</li> <li>▪ Does the election commission reflect impartiality and gender balance?</li> <li>▪ Is the judiciary independent?</li> <li>▪ Are there representatives of the opposition parties in the government, in parliament? What percentage in parliament?</li> <li>▪ Can citizens hold rallies and demonstrations and exercise freedom of speech on political and other issues?</li> </ul>
Gender Balance and Empowerment (CSSDCA and the African Charter for Popular Participation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Number of women in parliament</li> <li>▪ Number of women in the cabinet</li> <li>▪ Policy on the empowerment and toleration of women in politics</li> </ul>
Political Institutions (CSSDCA, Constitutive Act)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Presence of an impartial and constitutionally independent electoral commission</li> <li>▪ Vibrant political parties with offices and programs</li> </ul>
Civil Institutions (AEC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Presence of workers, students, trade and other unions</li> <li>▪ Freedom of expression</li> <li>▪ Presence of private media and equal engagement of opposition leaders and other pressure groups</li> </ul>

**Senegal:** Senegal is a democratic and moderate Muslim nation in an unstable region. Senegal signed and ratified the Constitutive Act of the African Union and Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan African Parliament. There are presently 65 political parties, most of which are marginal and little more than platforms for their leaders. The principal political parties, however, constitute a true multiparty, democratic political culture, and they have contributed to one of the most successful democratic transitions in Africa. Another positive aspect of the country's growing democracy is a flourishing independent media, significantly free from state manipulation or informal control. The country has a generally tolerant religious and political culture.

Since the historic presidential elections of February 2000 ushered in the first change of political power through the ballot box, Senegal has become one of the strongest examples of democratic governance in West Africa. The constitutional referendum passed in January 2001 reduced presidential terms from seven to five years, provided special status for opposition parties, enhanced the prime minister's status, and gave women equal property rights with men for the first time in the country's history.

The current President, Abdoulaye Wade, made unprecedented strides towards decentralization and also appointed six female ministers, including Prime Minister Mame Madior Boye, who served until a cabinet shake-up in November 2002. Senegal's new constitution, approved overwhelmingly by voters on 7 January 2001, affirms that elected local government bodies will 'constitute the institutional framework for citizens' participation in the management of public affairs.'

The country is one of the rare cases in Africa in which a change of government has taken place through free and fair elections. What is worth mentioning is the recognition of the key function of civil society in a liberal democracy by President Wade. In practice, the President nominated eleven members of cabinet directly from civil society organizations. In the May 2002 local elections, more than 1,500 women were elected to local offices. In order to prepare the women for the national task, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) provided training sessions for nearly 80 percent of the 1,500 women in the basics of local governance. Women from civil society groups were also invited to participate in the sessions, as a way of solidifying linkages between citizens and their elected officials.

Several radio stations have been established. What is encouraging is the coverage given all currents of opinions. Union rights to organize, bargain collectively, and strike are legally protected, but include notification requirements. Most workers are employed in informal and agricultural sectors. The country's entire small-industrialized workforce is unionized, and workers are potent political force.

Although Senegal is one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income of \$500, its sophisticated democracy defies the argument that democracy is a political system that only thrives in rich countries. After a period of single party rule, it seems that Mr. Senghor wanted to make his country as unique as himself and to give it an aura of democracy. In 1974, he created a strictly controlled multi-party system, with four parties allowed, which had to stick to names and political labels which he, Senghor, designated.

Senegal is a secular republic with a strong presidency, weak legislature, reasonably independent judiciary, and multiple political parties. The President is elected by universal adult suffrage to a 5-year term. The unicameral National Assembly has 120 members, who are elected separately from the President. The Socialist Party dominated the National Assembly until April 2001, when in free and fair legislative elections, President Wade's coalition won a majority (89 of 120 seats). The Cour de Cassation (Highest Appeals Court) and the Constitutional Council, the justices of which are named by the President, are the nation's highest tribunals. Senegal is divided into 10 administrative regions, each headed by a governor appointed by and responsible to the President. The law on decentralization, which came into effect in January 1997, distributed significant central government authority to regional assemblies.

President Wade has advanced a liberal agenda for Senegal, including privatizations and other market-opening measures. He has a strong interest in raising Senegal's regional and international profile. The country, nevertheless, has limited means with which to implement ambitious ideas. The liberalization of the economy is proceeding, but at a slow pace. Senegal continues to play a significant role in regional and international organizations.

However all is not rosy in Senegal. In high-profile cases, there is often considerable interference from political and economic elites. Uncharged detainees are incarcerated without legal counsel far beyond the lengthy periods already permitted by law. Muslims have the right to choose customary law or civil law for certain civil cases, such as those concerning inheritance and divorce. Freedom of association and assembly is guaranteed, but authorities have sometimes limited this right in practice. There are credible reports that authorities often beat suspects during questioning and pretrial detention, despite constitutional protection against such treatment. Reports of disappearances in connection with the conflict in Casamance occur regularly. There are reports of extrajudicial killings by both government forces and MFDC rebels. The government rarely tries or punishes members of the armed forces for human rights abuses. Prison conditions are poor.

**Ghana:** Ghana has signed and ratified both the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Following independence Ghana experience a period of political turbulence with 9 military coups. Under the leadership of Ft. Lt. Jerry Rawlings, Ghanaians committed themselves to multiparty democracy through the 1992 Constitution. The Constitution entrenched the right to form and join political parties. Article 55(3) provides that "Subject to the provisions of this article, a political party is free to participate in shaping the political will of the people to disseminate information on political ideas, Social and Economic programmes of a national character and sponsor candidates for elections to any public office other than to District Assemblies or lower local government units." Article 55(10) enjoins citizens of voting age to participate in political activity to influence the composition and policies of the Ghanaian government. The constitution also speaks to the establishment of a level playing field. Article 55(11) states that "the State shall provide fair opportunity to all political parties to present their programmes to the public by ensuring equal access to the state owned media." The Independent Electoral Commission and its

commissioners are protected by the Constitution as well. No government has the powers to dismiss or change any of the commissioners.

In December 1992, Ghanaians went to the polls for the first time in 11 years. That initial experience was not perfect. Accusations of electoral fraud and malpractices marred the elections with the main challenger to the NDC party, the NPP, accusing the PNDC of having won an election through “a stolen verdict.”<sup>24</sup> Since then, the Ghanaian democracy has improved significantly. Democracy and political pluralism is taking shape in Ghana. In December 2000 Ghana successfully held a third consecutive multiparty election in which all the 9 parties contested. The elections were acclaimed by the international observers to be free and fair with a voter turn out of 74%. Most significantly, the keenly contested election produced the country’s first-ever peaceful transfer of power between political parties with the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) defeating the incumbent National Democratic Congress in races for both the presidency and control of Parliament. An important political milestone was reached in Ghana on 7 January 2001, when the new administration was sworn into office climaxing the smooth transition of government.

Ghana’s political landscape is characterized by the exercise of political tolerance. There is no state inhibition or restriction on the formation and registration of political parties, nor are opposition parties repressed by state laws. As Kwesi Aning observes, the December 2000 elections carried Ghana through a democratic transition and consolidation, which in several years reflected the struggles for democratic accountability, transparency and sustainability with broad support from the different sections of the community. According to Aning, “these conform to the general democratic developments in the 1980s and 1990s, which suggest that the role of the military in politics is receding.”<sup>25</sup> The Independent Electoral Commission played a critical role in winning the confidence of the parties and the citizenry by ensuring transparency and full participation of all stakeholders throughout the electoral process. As indicated by the Deputy Chairman, Hon. David Kangah, “By increasing stakeholders’ understanding of the process and involving them at every stage is the most effective way of eliminating malpractices and discontent.”

As the constitution requires, each party is given free airtime on state radio and television to present their programmes to the public. In addition the state also provides parties leaders with vehicles to facilitate their travels throughout the country. There is an on-going debate on whether or not financial support should be part of state assistance to the political parties. The government has engaged in consultation with a cross section of actors and the public and has come out with a report to be presented to parliament for debate.

*Gender balance in politics:* Gender balance in the political process of Ghana has to be examined critically to get a true picture of participation in governance. Whereas the NPP government has created a Ministry for Women and Children Affairs, it has an insignificant number of women appointed ministers or parliamentarians, compared to the NDC government. The few women in parliament have been subsumed by the power of their male counterparts and are not given the space to represent adequately the views of women. There is surprisingly no women caucus in the Fourth Republican Parliament. The gender imbalance can further be noticed at the District Assembly level. Again, male district chief executives outnumber their female counterparts. During the District Assembly election in 2002 some NGOs and women organizations took it upon themselves to educate and encourage women to contest the election. Many women candidates registered but lost miserably to their men opponents.

*Civil Society Participation in Political Pluralism:* There is no political inhibition for the participation of civil society groups in the political process in Ghana. The political landscape

of the country is inundated with political dissent and protests by civil society groups and policy think-tank. Prominent civil society groups that represent diverse political opinions are the Ghana Bar Association, Christian Council of Ghana, the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), the Center for Democratic Development (CDD), African Strategic Dialogue Research (ASDR), the Institute for Democracy in Ghana among others.

The Ghana Bar Association (GBA) has a distinguished history of speaking out against official abuses and bad governance in Ghana beginning with the Nkrumah administration to the present regime. The GBA has taken several opportunities to place its views before Parliament on a wide array of issues, and to ask MPs to file amendments to a number of Bills. The Association provided very useful services in guiding Parliament during the first term of the Second Republic when there was no opposition MPs in Parliament due to their boycott of 1992 Parliamentary elections.

Civil society groups including the students and workers unions, non-government organizations, civil society organizations and traditional leaders are active participants in the promotion of political pluralism. The Constitution of Ghana allows the space for pluralism to blossom.

**Nigeria:** Nigeria signed, ratified, and deposited the AU Constitutive Act whose objective amongst others is to “promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance”. The country has been the leading advocate for the CSSDCA which emphatically states that “there shall be no hindrance to the promotion of political pluralism.” However Nigeria is barely recovering from decades of political, social, and economic failure.

The country is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and highly diversified society with complex political systems, according to Omo Omoruyi<sup>26</sup> While the emirate states in the North still maintain centuries old traditions of strong monarchies based on Islam, the east seems to operate a semblance of democratic system and the West with its constitutional monarchies.<sup>27</sup> This complexity makes the federated state difficult to govern. The military have intervened in the country’s politics so much so that it has not only become a major actor and force, but was considered the only state institution capable of leading the vast and yet to be built nation-state.

Confrontation between the state and civil society was more intense during Babangida and Abacha’s regimes than any other rulers in Nigerian history. Civil society was seen as a threat to the regimes. As a result, Babangida and Abacha created and entrenched a culture of timidity and fear within civil society. Between June 1993 and late 1994, Amnesty International reported that as many as 200 pro-democracy activists had been killed by state security in Nigeria. Prominent amongst the political casualties were Dele Giwa and Ken Saro-Wiwa including 8 of his fellow environmentalists. Abacha abolished core labour rights, severed union’s tie to international allies, and placed the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and a number of its affiliates under direct state control.

On June 12, 1993, what was expected to transform Nigeria into a civilian and democratic state was aborted. The military persisted following the annulment of the presidential election believed to have been won by Chief M. K. O. Abiola. He was arrested along with other prominent Nigerians such as human rights activist Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti; former head of state General Olusegun Obasanjo, Alhaji Shehu Musa Yar Adua, and others. They were charged with treason and sedition. Two years later, an unknown assassin murdered Kudirat Abiola, social activist and wife of M.K.O Abiola, the presumed winner of the presidential election.

Immediately upon seizing power in December 1993, the Abacha government banned Nigeria's two government-created political parties and firmly established a repressive regime that targeted all political dissents whether from civil society organizations or political parties. In 1995 Abacha renewed political activities. About 70 political groups were founded during this period. 23 applied for official approval and 5 were approved. Abacha was nominated to represent all five of the approved parties in the presidential elections planned for 1998. He died before the general elections. After Abacha's death, Abubakar allowed the free formation of political parties and the five parties approved by Abacha disbanded voluntarily.

Following 16 years of sustained military dictatorships, a new constitution was adopted in 1999 and a peaceful transition to civilian government took place with Olusegun Obasanjo assuming the leadership. That first attempt at democracy was greeted with optimism amongst the 120 million Nigerians and throughout Africa. Nigeria in April 2003 had its second democratic elections. When the Independent National Electoral Commission restricted the registering of more political parties in the 2003 elections the Supreme Court of Nigeria rescinded the commission's party registration rules. That landmark victory inspired confidence in the independence of Nigeria's judicial system that was for decades controlled by the powerful Executive.

There are currently 28 registered political parties in Nigeria. The parties, all of which participated in the 2003 elections, are National Conscience Party (NCP), Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJ), People's Redemption Party (PRP), Green Party (GP), All People's Liberation Party (APLP), Better Nigerian Progressive Party (BNPP), Community Party of Nigeria (CPN), Democratic Alternative (DA), Justice Party (JP), Liberal Democratic Party of Nigeria (LDPN), Masses Movement of Nigeria (MMN), National Action Council (NAC), National Reformation Party (NRP), New Nigerian People's Party (NNPP), New Democrats (ND), Nigeria Advance Party (NAP), Nigeria People's Conscience (NPC), Party for Social Democracy (PSD), People's Mandate Party (MP), People's Salvation Party (PSP) and Progressive Action of Nigeria (PAC).

*Gender balance in the political process:* Nigerian women are to a large extent politically aware. However they have very little participation in politics and in the decision making process of the country. Women are under-represented in government and politics, although there are no legal impediments to political participation or voting by women. The percentage of parliamentary seats held by women in 2001 was a mere 3% of total seats. Between 1994 and 1998 the number of women in decision making positions in government increased very little. Women seriously lagged behind in 1998 with only 6% of the seats at the ministerial level and 4% at the sub-ministerial level.

The under-representation worsens at the state and local levels. Writing on women's political participation in Nigeria, Didi Walson Jack, gives an insight into the low representation and participation of women in the political process in Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta Area:

“Of the elected Local Government Chairman, none are women. The only woman who dared to contest was physically beaten up by supporters of her opponents for attempting to enter a man's world. Of the 24 member House of Assembly only one is a woman. Of the thirteen Permanent Secretaries appointed by government only two are women. Of the eight members representing Bayelsa State at the National Assembly, only one is a woman. Of the two Ambassadorial nominees of the State, none is a woman.”

Elsie Thompson also observes that despite President Olusegun Obasanjo's promise of affirmative action to redress the imbalance it has not been reflected in his appointments. Of

the 46 ministers only five are women. Recently about 106 ambassadors were nominated and only seven were women. The Government created a Ministry for Women affairs and Special Development but this initiative has had little impact as far as political gender imbalance is concerned. In 2000-2001 the government announced a new National Policy on women. Issues the policy attempts to address range from harmful traditional practices and early marriages to economic and political empowerment and gender discrimination in the workplace. With its complex political and legal systems of Shariah, customary, and statutory laws interacting in a federal system Nigeria is a ways from achieving women's political empowerment.

*Workers and Trade Unions:* The history of the relationship between workers' union and the government of Nigeria both under the military and democratic rules has vacillated between antagonism and harmony, confrontation and cooperation. Unions in Nigeria have a long history of dynamism, dating back to the colonial period when they actively involved in the nationalist struggle. At independence Nigeria unions enjoyed widespread freedom. The new Nigerian government ratified ILO conventions 87 and 98, and generally promoted free trade unionism.

In 1988 growing opposition prompted the military government under Gen. Ibrahim Babangida to dissolve the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) executive, and placed the organization under the direct government administrative control, a strategy that ultimately failed. While the NLC itself was weakened by such interventions its affiliates and rank-and-file organizations became centres of opposition to structural adjustment. The NLC's affiliates provided a reliable national support structure for the growing movement for democracy. Thus in 1993 when then dictator Ibrahim Babangida took the long-promised to return to civilian rule the unions remained a significant force for democracy.

After the 1993 elections were annulled by the military government, the NLC became a focus for pro-democracy aspiration. The National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) called a general strike against the government's anti-labor policies. The workers labelled their strike a "Patriotic Struggle" for economic emancipation and accountability in government. By August of the same year the strike had spread to other sectors. The military further promulgated a series of extraordinary Decrees emasculating the unions as an industrial and therefore political force. As would be expected its restrictions put the unions on the defensive.

Powers of unions are still undermined by current government. For example Legislations conferring enormous powers over union affairs on government remain on the books. Thus while some of the post-1993 legislative restrictions have been removed, the labour movement does not yet enjoy the degree of freedom of association it possessed after Nigerian independence in 1960. Moreover it has to rebuild organization and reorder its affairs after years of abuse under government pointed administrators. Labour rights still remain insecure in Nigeria. There continues to be unwillingness on the part of government to discuss workers concerns especially those affecting oil prices. In a democratic climate where opposition political parties are seen to be weak, Nigeria's trade and labor unions remain the bulwark for democracy, though not to the pleasure of the Obasanjo government.

**Algeria:** Algeria is amongst the 53 member states of the African Union (AU) that signed the Protocol of the Pan African Parliament and is one of the 30 countries that ratified the document as of June 16 2004. Algeria is also a signatory to the Constitutive Act of the African Union. During the past two decades, Algeria has faced economic, political, and social crises. The convergence of the three crises makes Algeria a very special case for world politics and

political analysis. Regimes that secured power during the decolonization of the sixties on the basis of strong nationalistic ideology have been threatened by new forms of political opposition. As Prof. Eva Bellin points out, Algeria is a paradigm of this general assertion. 'Since the 1980s the nation-state in Algeria has faced a deep crisis of legitimacy and that crisis is not over.'<sup>28</sup>

The basis for the establishment of liberal democracy became visible in February 1989, when the revised constitution altered the configuration of the state and allowed political parties to compete. Algeria became a multi-party state and adopted a new electoral law. Two months before the elections in October 1991, the government issued new electoral law. The law increased the number of seats in the assembly, redistributed them to favour FLN strongholds, and omitted earlier provisions facilitating the participation of independent candidates. All newspapers were banned, opposition leaders jailed, as the government sought to ensure that the results of the elections would be satisfactory to it and the military. Nearly fifty political parties participated in the first round of the December 26 1991 elections. Sensing defeat of the FLN, the military intervened very conspicuously. It affirmed its unwillingness to see power transferred to a political party, which it regarded as a threat to the security and stability of the state.

The good days withered. Algeria's attempts at democracy and political pluralism failed woefully at this point. As part of the military crackdown following the coup, the news media was once again restricted. Journalists were arrested, harassed, intimidated. Some disappeared or even killed by Islamists. President Benjedid resigned on January 11, citing 'widespread election irregularities' and a risk of 'grave civil instability.' The military then reappointed Sid Ahmed Ghozali as prime minister. Ghozali was also named to head the new High Security Council (Haut Conseil de Securite--HSC), a six-member advisory body dominated by senior military officials. This body assumed full political authority, suspending all other political institutions, nullifying the December 1991 elections results, and postponing future elections.

The HCS was soon replaced by the High Council of State (Haut Conseil d'Etat—HCE), designed as a transitional to have more political 'legitimacy' than the HCS. Former independence leader Mohamed Boudiaf was recalled from exile in Morocco to lead the HCE. On June 29, 1992 head of state Boudiaf was assassinated during a public speech. Following his death, HCE member Ali Kafi was appointed head of state.

There was a constitutional amendment to restore multi-party democracy in 1996. The 1996 Amendment made significant changes to electoral procedures. Among its stipulations, it provided for parliamentary representation for Algerian nationals living abroad, and amended electoral, voting, and campaigning procedures. In addition, the amendment prohibited political parties based solely on religious or regional bases. Parties must file statutes with the Ministry of Interior in order to become legal entities, and rules are included to ensure that parties have a national rather than regional support base. The current electoral system of proportional representation is considered to provide greater political opportunities for smaller opposition parties. All complaints regarding elections are lodged with the Constitutional Council. The Electoral Law governs the elections and the Political Parties Law governs the political parties.

In 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected president in another attempt with democracy. Bouteflika initiated a policy of national reconciliation, which included amnesty and economic reforms such as deregulation and privatization. The law of Civil Harmony, as part of the policy of national reconciliation, was presented to the parliament on July 13, 1999 and later approved via referendum on September 16, 1999.

Algeria has a bicameral parliament, composed of the National People's Assembly (Al-Majlis Al-Chaabi Al-Watani), and the Council of the Nation (Majlis Al-Oumma). Suffrage in Algeria extends to all Algerian nationals, both men and women, over the age of 18. The 380 members of the National People's Assembly hold five-year terms. Of these, 372 are elected from party lists by proportionate representation for parties receiving over 5% of the vote. Candidates are elected by popular vote from 48 multi-member districts or wilayas. Each wilaya elects a minimum of four members. Eight of the 380 seats are reserved for Algerians living abroad. The Council of the Nation is composed of 144 members who hold six-year terms. Of these, 96 are elected indirectly by members of the wilaya assemblies.

*Civil Society and Political Pluralism:* If any one element of civil society has consistently presented a cohesive and substantive constituency, it is the workers' unions. The Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA) is the only national trade union in Algeria. It is an independent organization with a sizable membership base (1.3 million). The latter attribute, in particular, allows the UGTA to exercise considerable influence in politics and policy formulation. Strikes conducted by the UGTA have fully incapacitated a number of industries. Economic reforms that adversely affect workers are met with stiff resistance from the UGTA, sometimes even forcing their abandonment.

From 1989 until January 1992, union activity increased to an intensity not previously witnessed. Splits within the UGTA, the creation of a number of new, smaller, and more active unions-- including the formation of an Islamic labor union--and a rapid rise in the number of strikes and demonstrations have quickly politicized a previously dormant workers' movement. The frequency and size of labor strikes jumped; Ministry of Labor figures placed the number of strikes for 1989 at 250 per month, four times that of the previous year. The growth of the workers' movement illustrates the genuineness of democratization in the period up to the January 1992 coup. Labor has generally not supported economic liberalization, and strikes have hampered a number of the government's free-market reforms. The government's response to and tolerance for increased mass politicization and especially union activity would undoubtedly provide clear evidence of the likelihood for successful democracy in Algeria.

The FLN formed the National Union of Algerian Students (Union Nationale des Étudiants Algériens--UNEA), but party directives had less impact on the UNEA than on other FLN-influenced bodies such as the UGTA. The student union was quite active throughout the 1960s despite government attempts to quell the movement. Strikes, boycotts, and other violent clashes between student groups and government officials continued to upset numerous university campuses until the union was suppressed and dissolved in 1971. The student movement was subsequently absorbed into the more docile National Union of Algerian Youth (Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algérienne--UNJA), a national conglomerate of youth organizations controlled by the FLN. The UNJA was the only youth group to be recognized officially in the list of national associations enumerated in the National Charter of 1976.

One of the most recent sectors of civil society to emerge as an independent movement is that of the entrepreneurs. For most of Algeria's political history, the socialist orientation of the state precluded the development of a class of small business owners and resulted in strong public anti-capitalist sentiment. Economic liberalization under Benjedid transformed many state-owned enterprises into private entities and fostered the growth of an active and cohesive group of professional associations of small business owners, or *patronat*. The *patronat* has maintained almost continuous dialogue with the government, has strongly supported government reforms, and has persisted in its lobbying efforts. The *patronat* consists of well over 10,000 members and is steadily expanding. Some of its member associations include

the Algerian Confederation of Employers, the General Confederation of Algerian Economic Operators, and the General Union of Algerian Merchants and Artisans.

*The Women and Political Pluralism:* Women in Algeria remain relegated to a subordinate position that compares unfavorably with the position of women in such neighboring countries as Tunisia and Morocco. As part of its program to mobilize various sectors of society in support of socialism, the government created the National Union of Algerian Women (Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes-- UNFA) in 1962. A number of new women's groups emerged in the early 1980s, including the Committee for the Legal Equality of Men and Women and the Algerian Association for the Emancipation of Women, but the number of women actively participating in such movements remained limited. Fear of government retaliation and public scorn keep many women away from women's groups.

In the public realm, the government is becoming increasingly receptive to the role of women. In 1984 the first woman cabinet minister was appointed. When the APN was dissolved in January 1992, few female deputies sat in it, and no women, in any capacity, were affiliated with the HCE that ruled Algeria in 1993, although seven sat on the sixty-member CCN. The popular disillusionment with the secular regime and the resurgence of traditional Islamist groups threaten to further hamper the women's movement, but perhaps no more so than the patriarchal tradition of the Algerian sociopolitical culture and the military establishment that headed.

The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria is on a self-described "gradual" transition to gender equality. Algeria acceded to the CEDAW in 1997 with reservations as to primacy of Islamic law over the convention when the two were in conflict. To fulfill its obligations under the CEDAW and the 1995 Beijing Conference, the government has established a Standing Committee under the Ministry of National Solidarity and Family. In the 1999 filing of the initial two-year progress report on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Algerian government argued that improving women's status must be balanced against deeply-held social attitudes.

Women's groups in Algeria have largely focused on improving women's social welfare and reforming the 1984 Personal Code. The Personal Code dictates that women must appear in Islamic court under Islamic law to settle affairs, while the rest of the Algerian legal system is based on French civil law. A husband is a wife's legal guardian under the personal status code. Women receive less inheritance than their male siblings. In their 1999 report to the UN, Algerian officials expressed hope that the Personal Code would be reformed soon. The Ministry of Justice is preparing to integrate it into the Algerian civil code. Women comprised 36% of the Algerian workforce in 1997 according to the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report of 2000. The percentage of women in the workforce had continued to increase despite rising unemployment and a substantial recession. The largest sector of female employment is the civil service. Female illiteracy remains relatively high at 46%, but that is down from 76% in 1980.

*The Press:* The primary function of the news media in Algeria was not to inform or educate but to indoctrinate--affirming and propagating the socialist tenets of the national government, rallying mass support behind government programs, and confirming national achievements. No substantive and little surface-level criticism was levied against the regime, although evaluations of the various economic and social problems confronting the nation were available. Article 55 of the 1976 Constitution provided that freedom of expression was protected as long as it did not jeopardize the socialist objectives or national policy of the regime. The Ministry of Information worked to facilitate government supervision and to inhibit circulation of unauthorized periodicals. Almost all foreign newspapers and periodicals were

likewise prohibited. Television and radio news programs escaped some of the more heavy censorship although they, too, were expected to affirm government policies and programs. Most news broadcasts were limited to international events and offered little domestic news other than accounts of visiting foreign delegations and outlines of the government's general agenda.

In the late 1980s, the situation changed under Benjedid. Independent national news sources were encouraged and supported. The new constitution reaffirmed the commitment to free expression, this time with no qualifying restrictions. New laws facilitated and even financially assisted emerging independent papers. Limitations on the international press were lifted, resulting in a mass proliferation of news periodicals and television programs presenting an independent position to a nation accustomed to getting only one side of the picture.

The liberalization facilitated the creation and circulation of a number of independent national French- and Arabic-language newspapers and news programs. A 1990 law guaranteed salary for the first three years to any journalists in the public sector establishing independent papers. As a result there was an explosion of local papers, journals, and radio and television programs. Journalists have become an important and influential sector of civil society. One program in particular, "Face the Press" (*Face à la Presse*), appearing weekly and pitting national leaders against a panel of journalists, has drawn immense popular enthusiasm. Among the major newspapers are *AlMoudjahid* (The Fighter), the organ of the FLN, published in Arabic and French; the Arabic dailies *Ach Cha'ab* (The People, also an FLN organ), *Al Badil* (The Alternate), *Al-Joumhouria* (The Republic), and *An Nasr* (The Victory); and the French dailies *Horizons* and *Le Soir d'Algérie* (Algerian Evening). As part of the military crackdown following the January 1992 coup, the news media was restricted once again. A limited number of newspapers and broadcasts continue to operate, but journalists have been brought in by the hundreds and detained for interrogating. With the Bouteflika regime the media is again liberalized.

**Ethiopia.** Ethiopia is a signatory to the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan African Parliament, the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The Country has ratified these two documents. According to the National Electoral Board, 65 legally recognized political parties were active in Ethiopia as of April 1997. Of the 65 licensed parties, 7 operate at the national level while 58 are regional. According to Ethiopia's proclamation for party registration issued in 1993, to receive a license a national party should have 1,500 founding members with 40% of them expected to be regular residents of a region and the rest at least permanently living in four regions. A regional political party having 750 founding members with over 40% of them being permanent residents of a region can operate legally after registering and receiving a license.<sup>29</sup>

The state is described as existing with no similarity between the Ethiopian polity and modern concepts of the state. The Ethiopian political tradition is alien to the modern understanding of the state. Political pluralism has not taken roots in Ethiopia. The regime of Meles Zenawi marks the first in the country's history to be formed through elections based on franchise. Meanwhile Journalism in the country is regulated by Press Proclamation NO.34/1992, under which journalist can be jailed on vague charges such as criminal defamation, incitement to violence, or spreading false information.<sup>30</sup> In addition to maintaining the draconian 1992 press law, the Ethiopian government introduced a draft broadcasting law at the end of 1998 that would privatize broadcasting for the first time in Ethiopian history.

The first draft of the bill barred foreigners, political parties, and religious organizations from receiving broadcast licenses. Other troublesome provisions in the bill include a rule stipulating that broadcasting programs cannot "violate the dignity and liberty of mankind, the

rules of good behaviour, or undermine the belief of others.” Moreover, journalists were forbidden to “commit a criminal offence on the security of the state, the constitutionally established government administration, or on the defence force of the country.” Ethiopia is a federal parliamentary republic where despite democratic structures there is no fair chance for the opposition.

Any analysis of the Ethiopian state must begin with a realization that there exists no similarity between the Ethiopian polity and modern concepts of the state. The state, as the term is understood in modern times, is alien to the Ethiopian political tradition and does not carry the same. In the past twenty-five years, Ethiopia has seen the end of centuries old monarchy followed by civil war, a Marxist-Leninist regime and the establishment in 1991 of the present regime. The current government was the first in Ethiopian history to be formed through elections based on popular franchise. Public participation in the political process is still very limited. More than 80 percent of the population of some 58 million people is peasants living in a subsistence economy. Given the long tradition of feudalism and the recent experience of harsh, military rule, there is widespread political apathy among the rural population.

The 1994 Constitution calls for “decentralized Federalism” and one of the principal objectives of decentralization is to bring government closer to the people. The process of decentralization in Ethiopia requires envisaging new roles for people both inside and outside government and for new relationships between government and civil society. This means instituting processes which will lead to greater government accountability, increased autonomy for organizations in civil society, and greater mutuality of trust and shared responsibility between government and citizens’ groups.

*Women and Political Pluralism:* Women are under represented in the Ethiopian politics. Ethiopia is highly patriarchal.

**Uganda:** Uganda signed and ratified the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan African Parliament, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. The political environment in Uganda has improved significantly in the last sixteen years, particularly from the dictatorships and tyranny of General Idi Amin, Obote and their cronies. In the last sixteen years, President Yoweri K. Museveni under the National Resistance Movement has attempted to return the country to the path of democracy and the rule of law.

However, many questions linger on his commitment towards full democracy in light of the current restrictions of competitive politics.<sup>31</sup> Political pluralism is strangled. The National Resistance Movement or NRM operates unfettered. Proponents of the NRM contend that the best political framework which will provide a conducive environment for development without political instability and sectarianism on the basis of tribe, religion, and region that characterized past political regimes in Uganda is the Movement Political System. Within this framework, candidates for political office campaign on the basis of individual merit, as opposed to a political party platform.<sup>32</sup> The new constitution requires the suspension of political parties while the Movement organization is in governance.<sup>33</sup>

The new Constitution also provides for freedom of speech and of the press but there are cases of Government infringement of these rights. The Government controls one television station and Radio Uganda, the radio station with the largest audience. In 1999, President Yoweri Museveni and his ruling National Resistance Movement made it clear that criticism would not be tolerated in the run-up to a referendum on the Uganda political system scheduled for June 2000. Using harassment and discriminatory legislation, the NRM government managed to suppress most independent political activity, including meetings and

public rallies.<sup>34</sup> The proposed non-governmental organizations (NGO) Amendment Bill makes registration for NGOs harder and allows for suspending NGOs that do not conform to any government policy or plan. It gives the government wide ranging powers to interfere with NGO work and suspend associations. NGO leaders can be imprisoned for up to one year if they breach the proposed law.

The NRM Government has organized two sets of general elections for the President, parliamentarians, and local councils. The first presidential elections were in 1996 and the most recent were in 2001 and 2002. Both elections were under the no-party arrangement and candidates competed on the platform of “Individual merit.” However it was clear during the elections which candidates were for the Movement and who weren’t. In the presidential elections President Museveni won and stated that the Movement had indeed won the elections in spite of the fact that political parties did not officially compete therein. In the Parliamentary elections the Movement candidates won the majority of the seats.

Some CSOs participated in the Election process mainly in the area of civic education and election monitoring. Their post-election reports indicate that there were many irregularities especially concerning the voters’ register. The elections were also marred by increased levels of violence and intimidation of voters; vote rigging; poor management of the electoral process and the deployment of the army and security agencies at polling stations. CSOs criticized the increasing level of violence during elections and the deployment of security agencies at polling stations. Election Observers from Norway have added their voice to the situation and, in their words:

“Elections of MP’s to Uganda’s 7<sup>th</sup> Parliament were conducted amidst political turmoil and a legal framework that most outside commentators considered favorable to the ruling regime... It is becoming clear that the Movement functions as a political party in a context where other parties’ possibilities to campaign are severely curtailed by law.”

*Women in Political pluralism:* The Government of Uganda has put in place several measures to enhance women’s status. Since 1988, the country has had a Ministry responsible for women issues. The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development is the national machinery charged with the responsibility. The 1995 constitution emphasizes equality of women and men of Uganda and calls for affirmative action for all marginalized groups. The National Gender Policy of 1997 emphasizes gender mainstreaming in the planning process at all levels of national development. The Local Government Act 1997 provides for women to form one third of the seats on Local Councils at every level.<sup>35</sup>

The Government has also developed the National Action Plan on women (1999), to achieve equal opportunities for women by empowering them to participate in and benefit from, the social economic and political development.<sup>36</sup> Currently, more than 56 women are in parliament by affirmative Action contributing to almost a quarter. The Vice President of Uganda is a woman. Available data indicates that there are over 17,000 persons in strategic decision making position in Uganda, 39% of whom are women.<sup>37</sup>

The intriguing title of Sylvia Tamale’s study, *When Hens Begin to Crow*, sets the pace for rich and fascinating study of gender and politics in Uganda. “Wali Owulide ensera ekokolima?” (“Have you even heard a hen crow?”) as Tamale explains, was shouted at a woman candidate during the 1996 Ugandan general elections.

“Female chickens do not normally crow. At least popular mythology claims that they cannot. Hence, in many African cultures, a crowing hen is considered an omen of bad

tidings that must be expiated through the immediate slaughter of the offending bird. The message was clear: Women have no business standing for political office.”<sup>38</sup>

Culture remains the largest obstacle to equitable treatment of women, whether they are politicians or rural agriculturists. As Tamale states, “... policies such as affirmative action provides the space for women’s entry into politics and a potential for change. But the contradictions of implementing such policies under existing patriarchal structures... [means that].. hens may begin crowing but they will continue to lay and hatch from eggs (the old patriarchal order)”<sup>39</sup> Female parliamentarians are subjected to sexual harassment from their colleagues, ridicule in parliamentary debates and the media, the burden of double and triple duty, and the reminder that for most of them their presence in parliament is tokenism.

The absence of legitimate outlets for political views confines the role of CSOs. Civil society cannot play an intermediary role between the citizens and competing recipients and performers of political influence. The Movement’s support to individuals instead of to policies and organizational political processes does hardly promote a democratic political culture.<sup>40</sup>

**Kenya:** Kenya is a signatory to the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan African Parliament. These African instruments commit the Kenyan State to citizens’ participation in governance. The critical question is whether political pluralism, in view of these commitments, has been entrenched in actual governance. A large part of Kenya’s political history is dominated by a one-party system. The Kenyan African National Union (KANU) remained the lone political party for decades. The death of the country’s first President, Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 opened the way for Daniel Arap Moi to assume the presidency. Contrary to the democratic culture, Moi was elected unopposed as president in the 1979 single party elections.

The Kenyan State qualified as an authoritarian state under Moi. The clampdown, harassment, and censorship on independent and critical press in dictatorships was not absent in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi. The 1982 constitutional change effectively made the state a *de jure* one-party system, thus prohibiting multi-party democracy. By the measure of the constitution, the formation of opposition political parties was legally barred.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, the rights of Kenyan electorates were clearly negated by the queer introduction of the queue voting electoral system in 1988.

While Moi may have succeeded to clamp down on party politics and the media civil society groups and the churches remained the most visible and articulate for political pluralism. Organizations such as the Law Society of Kenya, a professional lawyers’ body, and the University of Nairobi Student Union were prominent in the struggle along with the Churches. Most of the NGOs who dared to confront the Moi regime ended up taking a low profile as Moi became vicious. The churches remained the sole actors against Moi’s totalitarian regime. The churches survived Moi’s wrath particularly because of their large constituency and international links (Sabar-Frieman, 1997:29). Sabar-Frieman cites a Clergy who explained the motivation of the churches to press on with the demands for reform in Kenya:

“The absence of other organizations of a political nature that can confront the excesses of the state means that the church is the only nationwide body which because of its institutional strength and its sense of obligation for public morals and social justice can speak and act in implicitly political ways. The social evils of our time: Corruption, political patronage in employment, interference of the state with basic human freedoms, electoral rigging, detention without trial, torture, gagging of the press etc. are so great... that Christians with any compassion cannot be indifferent to or complacent

about the effects of such evils upon human lives in Kenya” (The Nairobi Law Monthly, Cited in Sabar Friedman, 1997:30).

In the last few years leading to the end of Moi’s tyranny a number of civil society organizations joined ranks with the churches. Both civil society and religious groups pressed for opposition unity so as to end Moi’s regime. In response to these demands, leaders of DP, Ford-Kenya and the National Party of Kenya launched the National Alliance for Change (NAC). Another alliance evolved soon after the formation of NAC. The new alliance, Ford People’s Coalition, comprised several parties that had initially distanced themselves from NAC parties. However alliance was forged.<sup>42</sup> This collaboration culminated into “people’s commission of Kenya” or what came to be known as *Ufungamano* Initiative.<sup>43</sup>

The selection of Mwai Kibaki as the presidential candidate to oppose incumbent President Moi’s preferred successor-Uhuru Kenyatta can be credited to the vigilance of the Kenyan churches and civil society. Building upon the new democratic change and space is the onus of the people for political pluralism to be sustained in post-Moi Kenya.

Women and Political Pluralism: In 1999 the Ministry of Home affairs together with women’s groups, non-governmental organizations, and parliamentarians drafted a Women’s Equality Bill. The Bill seeks to make provisions for equal treatment of all citizens irrespective of their gender, and end all forms of discrimination. The Bill could not pass during Moi’s leadership. President Moi, some Christians and the majority of the Muslim society in Kenya rejected the Bill. The President claimed that the Kenyan Constitution already provided for equal rights for each and everybody in the country and there was not need for an extra legislation to secure women’s rights.

Current regime has reactivated debate on the draft Bill. Muslim activists in Kenya renewed their objection to the bill, claiming “it is based on Western values” and would thus entangle Muslim values.

**South Africa:** South Africa signed and ratified the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan African Parliament and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. South Africa’s political party system underwent radical transformation in the early 1990s when previously illegal parties were unbanned and participated in the April 1994 elections. The country’s democratic space has widened since the end of the white-racist supremacy rule. Multiparty politics is firmly rooted. The main political parties are African National Congress, South African Communist Party National Party, Inkatha Freedom Party, and Freedom Party. Other political parties are the Democratic Party, the Pan Africanist Congress, African Christian Democratic Party, Sports Organization for Collective Contributions and Equal Rights (SOCCER), the Keep It Straight and Simple Party (KISS), the Women’s Rights Peace Party (WRPP), the Worker’s List Party (WLP), the Ximoko Progressive Party (XPP), the Africa Muslim Party (AMP), the African Democratic Movement (ADM), the African Moderates Congress Party (AMCP), the Dikwankwetla Party of SouthAfrica (DPSA), the Federal Party (FP), the Luso-South Africa Party (LUSAP), and the Minority Front (MF).

Civil society in South Africa has been a bastion of resistance. When the main opposition movements- the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress-remained banned in the 1960s, civil society became the terrain on which anti-apartheid forces had to operate. Two major umbrella bodies were founded in 1983 to challenge the strategy of the South African government, and in particular the elections to the tri-cameral parliament and the formation of black local authorities. These were the National Forum and the United Democratic Front.<sup>44</sup>

The most significant event that shaped the terrain on which political developments unfolded in the 1980s was the adoption of a new constitution in 1983. Prime Minister P.W. Botha's total strategy, which formed the background for subsequent events, was an attempt to restructure racial and political relations on new foundations. It combined co-optation of certain groups and exclusion of others, in order to cement white domination against the 'total onslaught' that threatened it from within and without the country. The creation of a tri-cameral parliament was meant to ensure that 'minority' groups colored and Indians would join whites in opposing democracy and majority rule. While urban Africans remained excluded from the central political system, they were supposed to be incorporated through the creation of Black local authorities in their townships. The bulk of the African population, however, was to be excluded together through their physical relegation to the status of citizens of nominally independent states, which were recognized by no country other than South Africa.

The period between February 1990 and the first democratic elections in April 1994 witnessed profound changes in the strategy of the South African government. The National Party government moved from outright repression to negotiations with major opposition forces, in an attempt to reach agreement on the mechanisms of transition to democratic rule. These changes necessitated a re-orientation on the part of all actors engaging the state, including civil society organizations, in order to be able to take part in shaping the emerging political system.<sup>45</sup>

With the unbanning of liberation organizations in February 1990, the ANC assumed a leading role in the negotiation process, acting as a counterpart to the ruling national party. As it became clear that the ANC was likely to head a new government, civil society organizations began to assess their relationship to it. In the 1980s many of them worked together with the UDF and considered themselves as allies of the ANC. However, relationship that was taken for granted before 2 February 1990 would undergo transformation during the period. The ability of civil society actors to influence the transition process was to a large extent a consequence of their previous role in the anti-apartheid struggle of the 1980s, but the transition period was characterized by new relationships and alignment of forces as well.

Looking at the history shared by the ANC and allied civil society organizations, one could expect them to develop close and mutually beneficial relationship once the ANC took power. The brain drain of activists into various state bodies was regarded in this vein as positive, with the potential of strengthening ties between civil society and the new government. This hope appeared to have been realized to an extent, as some ANC members of parliament give consistent support for a strong role of civil society in public policy making, and for combining representative and participatory democracy in order to build a unique South African model of democracy.

The media in South Africa is also highly sophisticated and independent. There are no inhibitions on the participation of women in the political process.

## **Conclusion**

We have indicated in this chapter that throughout Africa, the wind of change is blowing. From the era of one-party rule and authoritarianism of the Cold War, liberalised political order is setting in. Multiparty democracy, the rule of law, and the interaction of multiple political ideas are energizing African politics. All of the countries in this study have tested the culture of multiparty democracy and liberalism. In Ghana, Senegal, and South Africa liberalised political order is becoming the norm. Equally, political tolerance and accommodation of opposition political parties, student and workers unions, civil society and non-governmental organizations, traditional and religious leaders are constitutionally guaranteed.

In Nigeria multiparty democracy is still new. The country's leaders still pursue politics with adversarial competitiveness. While Nigeria may have made significant improvement in its budding multiparty democracy with over 28 political parties participating in the second general elections of the Third Republic compared to 3 in the 1999 elections, there are sad cases of political assassinations, inter-party bickering, squabbles, and the destruction of lives and properties. It is important to mention, though, that number of election-related deaths in 2003 dropped significantly compared to previous general elections in the country's history. What still lingers in Nigeria's liberal democratic order is the perennial flagrant election rigging and vote buying.

Ethiopia's first attempt is not significant enough for the country to break-away from its feudal systems that span several centuries. Political tolerance is out of the question and the intimidation of the media, students, workers unions, and opposition leaders is rampant. Uganda's NRM is resistant to change although the popular opinion in Uganda is that the country must return to multiparty democracy. Civil society organizations only thrived in Uganda when they provide basic services and avoid confrontation with the NRM government. Kenya has just broken away from the one-party rule of KANU in 2003 with the rainbow coalition headed by Mwai Kibaki emerging as the country's first president from the opposition. However, political tolerance is also very limited. Cases of political assassinations are still heard in Kenya.

Strengthening democracy and building the culture of political tolerance will ensure peace and security in African states. Commitments to political pluralism by the 8 governments under study are yet to be fully delivered. We however recognize the progress so far.

## CHAPTER FOUR: POPULAR PARTICIPATION

Citizen participation, according to Lucky O. Imade, is the core of the democratic process. It engenders a new sense of citizenship. As Brian Atwood argues, “the challenge in newly established democracies is to decentralize political power through citizen participation in each and every one of the municipalities throughout the country.” There are in general four main ways in which CSOs may attempt to influence public policy: collaboration, confrontation, complementary activities, and/or raising awareness. The particular action that NGOs take will reflect not only their preferences, but the political context in which they operate. In a country wide survey conducted in Nigeria titled, *Citizens and Governance: Civil Society in the New Millennium*, respondents described the role of the state in providing an enabling environment for citizens’ participation in public affairs as providing the necessary enabling environment that permits the citizens to construct a good society. These include maximum inclusive style of governance, drastic reduction of mass poverty, government tolerance of alternative views and constructive criticisms, a decisive war on illiteracy and ignorance as well as a single minded and rigorous promotion of women in society.”<sup>46</sup>

In 1990 the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation was adopted at a landmark conference in Arusha, Tanzania. The Charter asserts, “African countries must realize that more than ever before, their greatest resource is their people and that it is through their active and full participation that Africa can surmount the difficulties that lie ahead.” The Charter concludes, “The principles of popular participation, equal opportunity and equitable access to resources for all people must underlie all development objectives and strategies.”<sup>47</sup>

Given the central role of women in development, the Arusha Conference called for the elimination of biases particularly with respect to the reduction of the burden on women and taking positive action to ensure their full equality and effective participation. The Conference recommended that national policies be established to enable honest and open dialogue between African Governments, grass-roots organizations and NGOs in order that the experience of grass-roots participatory development informs national policy-making.

The CSSDCA Solemn Declaration affirms that the “active and genuine participation of citizens of every country in the decision-making processes and in the conduct of public affairs must be fostered and facilitated.” It also notes that “... popular participation, equal opportunity, transparency in public policy-making and partnership between government and peoples are necessary for the achievement of development.” The CSSDCA therefore affirms that the “principles of popular participation, equal opportunity and equitable access to resources for all people must underlie all development objectives and strategies.” The Heads of State agreed in the Solemn Declaration to “encourage the participation and contribution of Civil Society in our states in the efforts to bring about further democratization in our continent.” They also agreed to “give special emphasis to the empowerment of women to enable them actively and independently participate in activities aimed at promoting economic development.” The Heads of State further note that stability requires that “States be guided by strict adherence to the rule of law, good governance, people’s participation in public affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the establishment of political organizations devoid of sectarian, religious, ethnic, regional and racial extremism.”

In the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan African Parliament, the Heads of States alluded to the establishment of the Pan-African Parliament as a common platform for African peoples and their grass-roots organizations to be more involved in discussions and decision-making on the problems and challenges facing

the Continent. Included in its objectives, The Constitutive Act of the African Union seeks to “Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, and good governance.”

In order to ensure the full participation of the African people both in the governance of African States and the African Union, the Heads of States approved the establishment of the Pan-African Parliament and the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council. Article 3(G) of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community emphasizes the principles of “Accountability, economic justice and popular participation in development.” Chapter 13 Article 72 (1) of the Treaty affirms that member states “agree to ensure the full participation and rational utilization of their human resources in their development efforts with a view to eliminating other social scourges plaguing the continent.”

There are no ambiguities in the commitments made by the African leaders in these documents. The Study observes coherence and further emphasis on one instrument by the other. It is the implementation of the instruments at the national level in the countries under review that is of concern. We identify the following as key commitments with their accompanying indicators for measuring performance:

Commitment	Indicators
Literate and Aware Citizens (Arusha)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rate of Literacy</li> <li>• Government programs for literacy and numeracy</li> <li>• Rate of popular participation</li> </ul>
Public Dialogue with the populace (CSSDCA, Arusha)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Well defined framework to engage the public</li> <li>▪ Media and access to it by the populace</li> <li>▪ Public debate and the frequency</li> </ul>
Women Empowerment (CSSDCA and the African Charter for Popular Participation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Number of women associations</li> <li>▪ Number of women in parliament</li> <li>▪ Capacity building programs for women</li> <li>▪ Government Policies on Women Empowerment</li> <li>▪ Women sensitive development programs</li> </ul>
Youth (CSSDCA, Arusha)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Policy on Youth Empowerment</li> <li>▪ Public debates in schools</li> <li>▪ Rate of Police Interference in youth participation in public discourses</li> <li>▪ Policy on protecting youths from forced military services and forced labors</li> </ul>
Decentralization of Development Strategies and processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Poverty Reduction Strategies</li> <li>▪ Development Planning (Rural Development Ministries and the level of public participation)</li> <li>▪ Decentralization policies</li> </ul>

**Uganda.** Government of Uganda has created a unique framework that brings together various stakeholders including civil society organizations (CSOs) in particular to participate and contribute to policy planning and priority setting as a way of enhancing pro-poor planning. There has been increased participation of CSOs in various policy processes and have gained valuable insights and experiences into public policy planning. CSOs have increasingly participated in public policy planning and formulation and have engaged in dialogue with Government and donors in various policy processes. NGOs, CBOs, Private Sector and Individuals are also very active in working to eliminate gender inequalities through promoting better services for women, raising awareness and empowering women about the need for gender equity and equality, and undertaking advocacy and lobbying.<sup>48</sup>

The drafting process of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda which provides that “every Ugandan has a right to participate in peaceful activities to influence the policies of Government through civic organizations” (Article 38(2), is an excellent example of public participation in Uganda. Although the NRM Government initiated the constitutional reform process, many civil society groups influenced the process. For instance the NUDIPU advocated for the provisions in the Constitution addressing the rights and interests of persons with disabilities, the Uganda Law Society was concerned with the issue of the rule of law, the Foundation for Human Rights

Initiative commissioned 3 lawyers from Makerere University in July 1993 to study the Bill of Rights of the draft Constitution and identify inconsistencies and contentious issues as regards human rights protection and state's compliance with the obligations towards its citizens, NOTU participated in the consultative exercises and made submissions to the Uganda Constitutional Commission regarding state violations of workers' rights, etc.<sup>49</sup>

The Uganda Debt Network (UDN) is a lead Network that facilitates the participation of ordinary people in public affairs especially as it relates to development. UDN is a pro-poor organization advocating for reduced and sustainable debt levels, accountability and effective use of national resources for the benefit of all the people of Uganda. The Network which was established in 1996 is an advocacy and lobbying coalition of NGOs, institutions, and individuals. Since its formation UDN has been involved in various activities aimed at strengthening the capacity of civil society to engage Government and to influence policy planning in Uganda.<sup>50</sup>

According to Dicklitch's analysis, NGOs in Uganda tend to play a complementary role rather than consciousness-raising, confrontational or collaboration-oriented roles. Complementary activities usually result in gap-filling roles. This reflects both the relative youth of NGOs, but also the nature of the NRM regime which Dicklitch characterizes as "a pseudo-democracy embodying co-optive and populist tendencies that seeks to maintain control over the Ugandan polity and society, including NGOs".<sup>51</sup>

Limitations imposed on NGOs, CSOs, and other social actors by the NRM are a major hindrance to the development of an effective and democratic civil society. In addition, the involvement of CSOs in policy process is largely with limited impacts and is often cosmetic. This is because first there is no systematic involvement of the CSOs in this process; they are given little or no time to prepare for comprehensive interventions. In another report conducted by DFID it was observed that:

"CSOs engagement with government in policy processes has been increasing, and it is widely perceived that there has been an opening of space for this to occur, especially at national level. Nonetheless, although engagement is often through structured and defined processes, the basis on which engagement takes place is often unclear or contradictory. There is little discussion or analysis of which groups constitute legitimate participants in processes and why. Inclusion in policy processes is unpredictable and civil society often relates with the state on the basis of clientelism or patronage."<sup>52</sup>

The definition of NGOs and CSOs in Uganda is also problematic. It restricts the kinds of public activities which NGOs and CSOs can engage. The NGO Act defines NGO as "a Non-Governmental Organization established to provide voluntary services including religious, education, literary, scientific, social or charitable services to the community or any part thereof."<sup>53</sup> The NGO Registration (Amendment) Bill 2000 further restricts the space for NGOs and increases the control of the state. New provisions on non registration of NGOs whose objectives are in "contravention of any government plan, policy or public interest"; new punitive penalties and fines for individuals in NGOs; new NGO registration Board composed of State officials and security organs."<sup>54</sup>

In addition to the above limitations in public participation in Uganda the policy to involve NGOs and CSOs is not sector-wide and does not spread to all ministries. Besides, the NRM Government perceives CSOs and NGOs as tools for the furtherance of Government policies to the rural communities. The capacities of many CSOs to engage the state are also very limited. CSOs in Uganda lack advocacy, policy analysis, and networking skills. Both the DFID and NORAD reports point out that there are certain policy issues on which there is no debate and are considered no-go areas for CSOs. It is implied amongst CSOs how much

public engagement and debates on government issues that the NRM would tolerate and most CSOs in Uganda prefer to tow a cautious line with the Government.<sup>55</sup>

**South Africa:** The legacy of an obtuse bureaucracy ruling over large masses of subjects who were not regarded as citizens still lingers in the new South Africa and informs efforts of the ANC Government to break away from the past. The ANC Government is making deliberate efforts to involve civil society organizations in public affairs. The closeness of the ANC to civil society organizations during the apartheid struggle and the movement of key civil society leaders to the ANC government make civil society participation in public affair a natural process in South Africa. Civil society organizations engage the state critically focusing on policy making, delivery, and monitoring.

Following the national elections in 1994 the newly established government embarked on a variety of development programmes intended to improve the general standard of life for all South Africans, but with particular emphasis on creating equal access to basic services for those communities which had been systematically denied these by the previous government. The government committed itself to greater decentralization of decision making and participation of local citizenry in decision making processes in order to promote development. The setting-up of local government structures started with the Local Government Negotiating Forums and was given legal status with the adoption of the Local Government Transition Act of 1994.

The government has undertaken three initiatives to create an enabling environment for civil society's participation in public affairs: First, the security environment was reorganized. Repressive legislations were repealed and a climate permitting public scrutiny and protest was firmly established. Second, a Non-Profit Act was passed that officially recognized civil society. The government also provides incentives in exchange for accountability within the NGO system. A Directorate for Non-Profit Organizations is established in the Department of Social Welfare to coordinate the audit of NGOs and CSOs. The State also demonstrated the willingness to partner with NGOs in policy development and service delivery. Third, the government created an enabling fiscal environment to financially sustain the NGO and CSO sector. Legislation to facilitate a flow of resources to NGOs was established and the 1978 Fundraising Act which limited NGOs capacity to raise funds was repealed.<sup>56</sup>

Successful government-civil society interactions include the cooperation and frequent consultation between the Welfare Forum, composed of civil society stakeholders, and the Department of Welfare. In the fields of delivery, and to a lesser extent, policy making, government and civil society have started a productive and cooperative relationship, though decision-making powers and control over finance remain in the hands of the state.

However, participation of CSOs in public decision-making is always seen as a way of bolstering the role of the state under ANC leadership, rather than as (potentially) contradicting, challenging, or forcing it to re-think its policies. The focus on participation does not reflect recognition that civil society forces may play a progressive role independently of or even in opposition to the ruling party. While NGOs find the Government's policy development stage fairly consultative with the NGO and CSO community, it is often a matter of who one knows that determine whether one was included in the process. NGOs and CSOs also alleged that while there are policy frameworks, institutional and monitoring systems for their implementation are lacking.

**Kenya:** Post-independence civil society in Kenya has experienced two eras of historical development closely attributable to the political regimes of the country's two presidents, the Kenyatta and Moi governments. In a bid to legitimize the regime, the Kenyatta administration

concentrated power at the center perpetuating the national *harambee* (self-help) movement and tribal welfare associations as the only legitimate channels for popular participation.

During this time (1963-1978) the *harambee* movement became the vehicle for development through popular participation while the ethnic organizations expressed particularistic and narrow interests of certain communities. With the coming of the Moi regime in 1978, Kenya experienced a proliferation of civil society organizations, which for the first time could “really be distinguished from the state” (Kanyinga, 1995).

The role of civil society in public affairs in Kenya had been one of antagonism. Fowler identifies three basic strategies that states in Africa have used to control popular participation in public affairs especially through NGO and CSO structures: legislation, administrative co-optation, and political appropriation. All strategies were deployed by the Moi regime to stifle the participation of civil society in public affairs. Under the legislation category the Moi Government used actual or threat of deregistration, refusal to grant registration, and the drawing of new legislation to control popular participation. In 1990 the Government passed the NGO Act. The Act established the NGO Board which in essence was the NGO Government arm whose main function was to monitor the registration and activities of NGOs in the country. The 1990 NGO Act is described as one of the most articulate and far reaching attempts by the state to control NGOs.

Preceding the NGO Act were events of CSOs' confrontation with the Moi Government. In 1987 a number of NGOs mainly the churches, had openly opposed the implementation of the new electoral system of queue-voting and thus directly challenged the authority of the regime. In another incident in 1989, the leader of the Green Belt Movement, Professor Wangari Mathae, sought a court injunction to stop KANU, the ruling party, from building a sixty-storey building at Kenya's famous Uhuru Park. Never before had an NGO challenged the state and the ruling party to the extent of suing in a court of law (Ndegwa, 1994:24-25, 1996:28; Weekly Review, 11<sup>th</sup> April, 1997). That same year the Government announced its intention to create a directorate to co-ordinate NGOs while making certain their activities was compatible with national interests.

The Moi regime made no significant effort to foster popular participation. In fact it systematically fought against popular participation. It was critical of the media, it snubbed the Women Equality Act, was engaged in open confrontation to silence civil society. The government even went to the extent of employing propaganda to tarnish the reputation and standing of some prominent NGOs and CSOs. The use of political appropriation by the state with the objective of co-opting NGOs has also been tried in Kenya. The end of the Moi regime especially through popular participation presents an opportunity that never existed in the political history of Kenya.

**Ghana:** In Ghana the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development is the focal ministry for citizens' participation in decision-making and development. The decentralization process which was introduced in 1988 is the main forum for participatory governance in the country. The rationale for decentralization is that it makes possible a greater participation by the people in decision-making and implementation. The main features of decentralization in Ghana are set out in Article 240 of the 1992 Constitution which states that “Ghana shall have a system of local government and administration, which shall, as far as practicable, be decentralized.” Article 241 divides Ghana into districts for the purpose of decentralization and establishes the District Assembly as the highest political authority in the district having deliberative, legislative, and executive powers.<sup>57</sup>

Following the bottom-up approach in development the Unit Committees were set up to be the first step of grass root democracy, through which people of a particular locality make their input in decision making and the development of their area. The second stage, after the Unit Committee, is the Area Council which weaves issues from the various Unit Committees together. The District Assembly which is the pivot of local governance prioritizes the needs of the various communities and allocates funds for their implementation. The Districts assemblies receive grants from government known as the Assemblies Common Fund. The Constitution under Article 252 has established the District Assemblies Common Fund. This fund is paid by quarterly installments, not less than five percent of the total revenue of Ghana for the benefit of District Assemblies for development.

The media is one of the mediums that have facilitated the active participation of citizens especially in conduct of public affairs in the Fourth Republic. There is a proliferation of radio stations, TV and Newspapers in the country. The radio stations, some of which broadcast in local languages, educate citizens on issues of governance. These stations invite government officials to discuss on air topical issues, explain government decisions and policies to the public. During these talk- shows callers phone in to contribute on the issue in question. These contributions have affected government's decisions in some cases and not in others. For example when the NPP government wanted to sell off the Ghana Commercial Bank the concerns raised by the public through these radio stations nation-wide made the government to put on hold its plan. However government did not heed the public protest against the increase in tariff rates for water and electricity.

Generally, Ghana has thrived significantly in terms of the promotion of popular participation. The presence of women's movements both in the public and private sectors, the political visibility enjoyed by youth and student unions, the decentralization of government decision making processes and the relative ease with which NGOs, CBOs, and CSOs can operate in Ghana are ample proof that popular participation is thriving in Ghana's buoyant democracy. However there are rooms for improvement. High rates of unemployment and illiteracy still undermine citizens' participation processes. Even though the District Assemblies through the Unit Committees are supposed to ensure active participation of citizens in governance they have not over the years performed to expectation. B.J. da Rocha in his article "Decentralization as An Aspect of Governance" mentions human, structures and programs, the extent of devolution, funding and revenue mobilization, probity and accountability as some factors which have an impact on the effectual function of decentralization.<sup>58</sup>

Indeed there is hardly any document or speech relating to governance or development in Ghana that does not include the participation of civil society. However in practice the level of partnership with civil society in the design and implementation of such programs is very minimal. In the few situations where government has consulted civil society the latter's contribution or input is mostly ignored. This was the case in the protest of the TUC against the National Insurance Scheme Bill that was passed by Parliament in the latter part of the year. Even though the TUC suggested to government in their meeting, alternative ways to fund the scheme government went ahead to fund it from the two and half percent deduction from workers salary it proposed initially. This sparked off protest by workers union and NUGS claiming they were not consulted. To the TUC government only informed them about the Bill. The TUC is still fighting to change the bill before it is passed into law.

**Ethiopia:** The 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia instituted radical reform of governance structures. It devolved significant responsibilities from the center to nine regional administrations. The goal of the new Constitution is to bring government closer to the people so that they participate in public affairs. Ethiopia's ambitious Constitution faces numerous obstacles including centuries old tradition of feudalism, poverty, high level of illiteracy, and

political intolerance. The Ethiopian government does not tolerate the population meddling in public affairs. The attacks on academic freedom have now degenerated into a wholesale assault on civil society in Ethiopia. Ethiopian security forces have used excessive force in dealing with student protests and are using the protests as an excuse for cracking down on all government critics. Attacks by security forces on Addis Ababa University, in Ethiopia's capital, have led to 41 deaths, hundreds of injuries, and the detention of over two thousand students and scores of government critics in April, 2003.<sup>59</sup>

Human rights groups including Human Rights Watch have criticized the Ethiopian government for "muzzling educators and students with a policy of harsh repression that includes extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and widespread denials of freedom of opinion and association." Being an intellectual can be a risky business in Ethiopia. Students and teachers often among the most politically active elements of society are frequent victims of human rights violations including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest, and denial of freedom of association and expression.<sup>60</sup> Civil society is at a rudimentary state of development following years of oppression against any who would challenge the former governments. Although Ethiopia is a federal state nearly all of its regions are still governed by the centuries old feudal systems. Members of the public have few opportunities for participating in decisions affecting them. Our study shows that attempts at decentralization and popular participation were prompted as a result of international pressure. The World Bank in mid-2000, for example, entered into partnership with the government to promote the decentralization of municipalities.

**Nigeria.** During the colonial period, Nigeria had a unified administrative structure in which there was devolution of power to administrative organs of the three regions. Unitary institutions were dismantled in the terminal colonial period and a federal structure of government established. It was a true federation in the sense that the component units, regions, were powerful with significant independent sources of revenue and clear areas of competence. There are three tiers in the Nigeria governance system: Local Government, State and the Federal Government. The Local Government is the starting point of decentralization and provides the opportunity for citizens' participation in decision making at the grass root level. The local and state governments are independent of the federal state in terms of prioritizing development. Representatives of the state and local government who are elected to form part of the federal act as the voice of the citizens at the local and sub national levels.

Nigeria has remained "formal" federation since then but there has been a significant shift in the content of its federal structure. The Character of Nigerian federalism has been shifting towards a unitary administration. The presence of successive military regimes since Nigeria's independence has to a large extent inhibited the citizens' genuine participation in the governance of the country and the conduct of public affairs.

The return to civilian rule in 1999 raised a ray of hope for an inclusive democracy in the country. However, even though some liberties have been granted, Nigerians are yet to feel a true sense of participation in the governance of their country. There is still an imbalance in gender participation in decision making with a high male dominance. The unfair distribution of resources and the disparity in development between the North and the South has continued to create a sense of 'not belonging' in some Nigerians.

Even the 1999 Constitution which is regarded as the basis for participatory democracy in Nigeria has been challenged by the ordinary people. This is because the Constitution was promulgated by military decree and therefore does not reflect the views of the citizens in terms of governance. Besides, the Constitution is flawed in many respects: first it was not

subjected to any rigorous public debate; second, it was not voted upon or adopted through a process-led constitutional approach but drafted by a few hand-picked elites. The Constitution is silent on key issues vital to the survival of Nigeria as a nation. For example controlling the military, language, human rights, citizenship, constitutionalism, political restructuring, gender, federalism, just to name a few.<sup>61</sup>

A research conducted by IDEA to assess democracy in Nigeria since the current transition revealed this concern:

“The common trend running through the various sections of the assessment report is the need to negotiate new relations between the state, civil society and the private sector. It calls for continuing and widened dialogue in Nigeria to arrive at a new compact for social justice that is broad-based, consensus oriented and that people can identify with and claim as their own. Such a social pact it is argued should inform the agenda for the review of the 1999 Constitution. The current Constitution was promulgated by military decree and its legitimacy is contested by significant sections of the Nigerian society. The overriding issue expressed throughout the consultations for the International IDEA assessment is the need for an inclusive and participatory constitutional development process as an essential nation-building, for consolidating democracy and for the foundation for the rule of law.”<sup>62</sup>

*Women in Popular Participation:* Over the years, Nigerian women have been sidelined when it comes to decision-making on national issues. The country is dominated by men and the society regards male children more favorably and men have important status than women. In some parts of the country women continue to be harassed for social and religious reasons. Purdah, the Islamic practice of keeping girls and women in seclusion from men outside of the family continues in part of the far north. Nigerian women have higher illiteracy rates than men; have the lowest school enrolment rates; and have one of the highest maternal and infant mortality rates in the world. Between 1995/2000 the adult economic activity rate was 48% for women and 87% for men (UN the World's Women); in 1999 the female labour force accounted for 36.5%. This underprivileged status has tremendously affected women's active participation in decision-making right from the home to the national level.

The Constitution of Nigeria requires Government to provide free, compulsory and universal primary education; but in most cases this is not provided. For social and economic reasons girls are discriminated against in access to education in many parts of the country. The cumulative effect of such discrimination is a high number of illiterate women who cannot participate effectively in the governance of their country.

During the writing of the 1999 Constitution women requested for a 30% representation in elective or appointive post. Their request was not reflected in the constitution when it finally came out. When the transition to civil rule began in July 1998, the issue of the Constitution to be operated by Nigeria arose. A panel for national consultation was set to elicit the opinion of the populace on the Constitution. The Nigerian women took up the challenge and organized the first ever women summit in Nigeria. A political agenda for the Nigerian women was presented to the panel requesting for at least 30% of elective or appointive posts for women. When the 1999 Constitution was released the issues was again omitted.

Popular participation in public affairs in Nigeria is still found wanting. The country is still recovering from decades of military dominance. Policies, decrees, and laws promulgated by the military in order to alienate CSOs and suppress popular participation, are still on the books. This is not to say that the Obasanjo Government is not making effort. The President had his first ever civil society dialogue in 2003 and an autonomous agency that would serve to interface government with civil society has been established. Another ray of hope in the

new democratic dispensation in Nigeria is the alacrity with which the press exposes the credibility and responsibility of the acts of elected officers to the benefit of transparency, accountability, and probity. The exposure of certificate forgery of former speaker Buhari and the bringing to light of former senate president Chief Okidigbo's corrupt acts are classic examples of investigative journalism at its best.

**Algeria:** From independence until 1989 Algeria was governed as a socialist state. The FLN Government actively established and controlled the students, workers, and women unions and movements. The 1989 Constitution removed the commitment to socialism. The unique and historic character of the FLN and the military's role as 'guardian of the revolution' were also eliminated. The 1989 Constitution passed with a 75% approval. The military that controlled the country since independence undermined the 1989 Constitution and in 1992 return the country to military dictatorship.

Algeria has a bicameral parliament, composed of the National People's Assembly (Al-Majlis Al-Chaabi Al-Watani), and the Council of the Nation (Majlis Al-Oumma). Suffrage in Algeria extends to all Algerian nationals, both men and women, over the age of 18. The 380 members of the National People's Assembly hold five-year terms. Of these, 372 are elected from party lists by proportionate representation for parties receiving over 5% of the vote. Candidates are elected by popular vote from 48 multi-member districts or wilayas. Each wilaya elects a minimum of four members. Eight of the 380 seats are reserved for Algerians living abroad. The Council of the Nation is composed of 144 members who hold six-year terms. Of these, 96 are elected indirectly by members of the wilaya assemblies.

The FLN formed the National Union of Algerian Students (Union Nationale des Étudiants Algériens--UNEA), but party directives had less impact on the UNEA than on other FLN-influenced bodies such as the UGTA. The UNJA is the only youth group to be recognized officially in the list of national associations enumerated in the National Charter of 1976.

As part of its program to mobilize various sectors of society in support of socialism, the government created the National Union of Algerian Women (Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes-- UNFA) in 1962. A number of new women's groups emerged in the early 1980s, including the Committee for the Legal Equality of Men and Women and the Algerian Association for the Emancipation of Women, but the number of women actively participating in such movements remained limited.

In the public realm, the government is becoming increasingly receptive to the role of women. In 1984 the first woman cabinet minister was appointed. When the APN was dissolved in January 1992, few female deputies sat in it, and no women, in any capacity, were affiliated with the HCE that ruled Algeria in 1993, although seven sat on the sixty-member CCN. The popular disillusionment with the secular regime and the resurgence of traditional Islamist groups threaten to further hamper the women's movement, but perhaps no more so than the patriarchal tradition of the Algerian sociopolitical culture and the military establishment that headed it.

The most recent legislative elections, held in 1997, were a political setback for women. The cabinet headed by Prime Minister Ali Benflis, formed in August 2000 and reshuffled in May 2001, has no female members, while the previous cabinet had two. Women comprise only 11 of the 380 members of the lower house of the parliament, but President Bouteflika recently appointed the first female provincial governor and the first two female presiding judges in Algerian history. Women examining judges were increased in number in August 2001 from 15 to 137, out of a total of 404. All major political parties include women's divisions. The government has implemented anti-poverty and contraception programs to improve the status

of women. According to the World Bank, the total fertility rate (births per woman) has fallen from 6.7 in 1980 to 3.5 in 1998.

**The Press:** The primary function of the news media in Algeria was not to inform or educate but to indoctrinate--affirming and propagating the socialist tenets of the national government, rallying mass support behind government programs, and confirming national achievements. Article 55 of the 1976 Constitution provided that freedom of expression was protected as long as it did not jeopardize the socialist objectives or national policy of the regime. The Ministry of Information worked to facilitate government supervision and to inhibit circulation of unauthorized periodicals. Almost all foreign newspapers and periodicals were likewise prohibited. Television and radio news programs escaped some of the more heavy censorship although they, too, were expected to affirm government policies and programs. In the late 1980s, the situation changed under Benjedid. Independent national news sources were encouraged and supported. The new constitution reaffirmed the commitment to free expression, this time with no qualifying restrictions. New laws facilitated and even financially assisted emerging independent papers. Limitations on the international press were lifted, resulting in a mass proliferation of news periodicals and television programs presenting an independent position to a nation accustomed to getting only one side of the picture.

The flourishing environment for the media was interrupted in 1991 with the overthrow of the Benjedid Government. Restrictions on press freedom were reinstated. Under the administration of Bouteflika press freedom is gradually being restored. Journalists have become an important and influential sector of civil society. One program in particular, "Face the Press" (*Face à la Presse*), appearing weekly and pitting national leaders against a panel of journalists, has drawn immense popular enthusiasm. Among the major newspapers are *AlMoudjahid* (The Fighter), the organ of the FLN, published in Arabic and French; the Arabic dailies *Ach Cha'ab* (The People, also an FLN organ), *Al Badil* (The Alternate), *Al-Joumhouria* (The Republic), and *An Nasr* (The Victory); and the French dailies *Horizons* and *Le Soir d'Algérie* (Algerian Evening).

**Senegal:** Trained in the French administrative tradition, Senegal's founding fathers led by President Senghor showed a strong preference for a unitary state. However indigenous governance traditions that are rooted in the philosophy of decentralization and people's participation, declining economy, inadequate financial resources to continue patronage politics, an ineffective and overly centralized bureaucracy increased popular discontent against the government and forced it to re-think its governance structure. The outbreak of what became known as the '*malaise paysan*' in 1968 initiated a period in which the rural masses lost confidence in government and defied its policies regarding agricultural production.

Intense political pressure forced the government to initiate administrative reforms. The 1972 reform established rural communities (communaute rurale-CR); each CR comprised of a number of villages theoretically linked by a sense of social, economic, and ethnic solidarity. The CR councils are responsible for development programs in rural villages. There are 320 CR with residents between 10 and 15 thousands persons and includes between 30 and 40 villages. The elected CR Councils range in size from 20 to 32 members. On 4 April 1992 the Diouf government announced their commitment to increase opportunities for popular participation by creating strong regional governments throughout Senegal and implementation of this plan began in 1997. The law on decentralization, which came into effect in January 1997, distributed significant central government authority to regional assemblies.<sup>63</sup>

Senegal's new constitution, approved overwhelmingly by voters on 7 January 2001, affirms that elected local government bodies will 'constitute the institutional framework for citizens' participation in the management of public affairs.' The current Government of President Wade emphasizes public participation in the affairs of the state. In practice, the President nominated eleven members of cabinet directly from civil society organizations.

Wade demonstrated his commitment to women's empowerment and participation in public affairs by appointing a woman as Prime Minister. She however was affected by the 2002 government shake up. In the May 2002 local elections, more than 1,500 women were elected to local offices. In order to prepare the women for the national task, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) provided training sessions for nearly 80 percent of the 1,500 women in the basics of local governance. Women from civil society groups were also invited to participate in the sessions, as a way of solidifying linkages between citizens and their elected officials. Several radio stations have been established. What is encouraging is the coverage given all currents of opinions. Union rights to organize, bargain collectively, and strike are legally protected, but include notification requirements. Most workers are employed in informal and agricultural sectors. The country's entire small-industrialized workforce is unionized, and workers are potent political force.

Although the CRs were created for the purpose of initiating and promoting rural development efforts and to increase people's participation, the reality is different. Critiques of successive governments in Senegal argue that the decentralization attempts have been politicised. The decentralization efforts have been designed to help maintain the regime in power while satisfying donor demands for democratization. The opposition parties also join in the popular participation and decentralization campaign to develop a local power base and the long-term possibilities for redistributive reform at the national level. Wade's propaganda for popular participation shows the extent to which politicians are exploiting this popular demand to participate. The CRs are dominated by local elites linked to political parties especially the ruling party of the day.

Besides it is argued that the effectiveness of any form of decentralization and the promotion of popular participation depends heavily on improvements of human and financial resources. The government of Senegal is faced with a serious dilemma. Unemployment is extremely high and little real economic growth has been experienced in the last decade. There is little to show for people's participation but the rhetoric goes on and the international community is endeavouring to continue to empower local actors to remain active in public affairs. We must conclude on an optimistic note that 30 year effort to make Senegal a democratic nation where the voices of ordinary people influence public policy has reached a point that successive government may be unable to reverse. This for African standards is a huge success.

## CHAPTER FIVE: CIVIL SOCIETY-GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS

The views on what constitutes a partnership range from any type of cooperation or initiative aiming at cooperation between at least two parties to the highest level of cooperation where two parties enter an agreement as equal partners. Partnering with CSOs has become a common strategy for all development multilateral organizations. Effective partnership is one in which parties complement one another. It begins with identifying and strategically combining comparative advantages to produce synergistic outcomes. African leaders have realized the value of partnering with civil society organizations and groups. The Constitutive Act of the African Union calls for the “Promotion of cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples.” The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation calls for implementing “people-centered development strategies by extending more economic power to the people and greater participation and consensus-building in the formulation and implementation of economic and social policies at all levels.” The Arusha Charter makes clear that “Popular participation equal opportunity, transparency in public policy-making and partnership between government and peoples are necessary for the achievement of development.” African leaders affirmed that partnership, trust, transparency between leaders and citizens are critical to ensure sustainable development.

We identify the following as key commitments with their accompanying indicators for measuring performance in government’s attempts are fostering partnership with civil society organizations.:

Commitment	Indicators
Strategy for Partnership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy or programs for partnership</li> <li>• Development co-operations with CSOs</li> <li>• Types of partnerships</li> </ul>
Structures for Partnership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Are there government agencies established to foster partnership with CSOs</li> <li>▪ Are there government funds for CSOs</li> </ul>
Women’s involvement in Partnership with Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Number of women associations active in partnership with government</li> <li>▪ Capacity building programs for women</li> <li>▪ Government Policies on partnering with Women in development</li> <li>▪ Women sensitive development programs</li> </ul>
Power Structure of the Partnership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Government’s perception of partnerships with CSOs</li> <li>▪ CSOs’ perception of partnership with government</li> </ul>
Decentralization of Development Strategies and processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Poverty Reduction Strategies</li> <li>▪ Development Planning (Rural Development Ministries and the level of public participation)</li> <li>▪ Decentralization policies</li> </ul>

**Uganda:** Uganda depends heavily on development partners and the World Bank and IMF for its fiscal budget and development initiatives. The heavy reliance perhaps explains Uganda’s decentralization program. The Uganda government is one of the most decentralized in Africa with the proliferation of NGOs who contribute significantly to development initiatives. In the context of high and rising unemployment; low productivity; sharp socio-economic inequities; high corruption levels; the deepening of poverty amongst the poorest of the poor; rising number of orphaned children an high external debt servicing ratios; the government of Uganda is increasingly debilitated in its ability to address the needs of its population especially those that live in the rural country side. Thus, CSOs have come to play a crucial role in providing basic services including food, health, education, and clean water. It is in this area—as opposed to that of democratization, governance and human rights—that the Government of Uganda has actively albeit randomly encouraged partnerships with CSOs.<sup>64</sup>

The partnership between Government and CSOs is essentially aimed at requiring CSOs to complement it in the provision of services mostly to rural and poor communities. As far back

as back as 1994, the World Bank pointed out that there is an increasing reliance on NGOs and Community Based Groups (CBG) to shoulder the burden of socio-economic development aimed at poverty alleviation because of the institutional decline of governments and the relative proximity of CSOs to the poor and rural communities.<sup>65</sup> Most African Governments like Uganda are increasingly recruiting CSOs as sub contractors to deliver much needed services to the rural poor.

For example on the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA) the government of Uganda is officially engaging CSOs to perform the task of service delivery and policy advocacy. The PMA document outlines the basis of a PMA-CSO Partnership Principles. It states that<sup>66</sup>:

- Government expects to continue to support the empowerment of organizations, targeting women, youth and local communities and also ensure their participation in agricultural modernization;
- Public sector resources will be used in building the capacity of the civil society, and facilitating their participation in public sector activities;
- Government will contract CSOs in the delivery of public sector activities;
- Civil society organizations are expected to integrate and harmonize their programs with those of other PMA players especially at local government level, to allow for ease in monitoring and impact of their activities;

CSOs are also partnering with government in other areas including the Poverty Action Funds in Uganda.

**South Africa:** The Government of South Africa pays serious attention to civil society participation in development and the eradication of poverty. It recognizes that “owing to their affinity, empathy, and proximity to the broader populace civil society organizations have always proved to be effective in meeting the basic needs of the population they serve.”<sup>67</sup> To allow the partnership in development between government and CSOs to work effectively, government urged NGOs to form an umbrella body, to allow an effective flow of communication and interaction between them and government. SANGOCO was thus established in August 1995, with a mission “to promote civil society by uniting and strengthening the NGO sector to enable it to influence development policy and advocate programs that meet the needs of the poor in the best possible way, at the least cost.”<sup>68</sup> SANGOCO’s advocacy work has included campaigns such as the war on poverty and inequality, the Apartheid Debt Campaign, and the poverty Hearings, all of which focused on improving the living conditions of the poor. It has sought to create an enabling environment for the NGO section, following in the footsteps of the Development Resources Center, and its initiative to develop an enabling environment for NGOs during the transition period.

The South African government also established the National Development Agency (NDA) as the statutory body that promotes CSO-Government partnership. Its mandates include providing financial support for projects or programmes that directly improve the asset base of poor communities; identifying and supporting civil organizations to work to eradicate poverty; establishing a credible database of partners, and promoting communication between policy makers and civil society organizations. The NDA seeks to ensure strong independent civil society in which all people can thrive.<sup>69</sup>

With a well defined structure and a CSOs friendly government one should assume that all is well with the CSO-Government partnership. Unfortunately, NGOs, CSOs, and CBOs still

complain of bias, concentration of development activities in Rural Development Program local offices, and cosmetic involvement of CSOs in implementation of development program. Suffice to state however that CSO-Government Partnership is well defined and functional in South Africa more than the other countries studied in this project.

**Kenya:** The 1960s and 1970s represented a unique phase in Kenya's history. Like many other African states emerging from colonialism, Kenya had to grapple with the contradictions of development generated by the colonial state. Some of the burning development questions revolved around political equality, social justice, freedom from want, and the provision of equal economic opportunities as laid out in Sessional Paper NO. 10 of 1965 (Republic of Kenya, 1965). Accepting the enormity of the development problem, Government actively encouraged self-help efforts in the generation of development noting that, "in a country short of resources every method that increases the allocation of resources to development must be utilized." (Republic of Kenya, 1965:36). Self-help in Kenya has strong roots in African traditions and has therefore important potential for development. This was to mark an important beginning in the role of *harambee* in Kenya's development process. Being voluntary, *harambee* became part and parcel of the voluntary sector activities in Kenya.

As a development strategy, *harambee* has been given varying interpretations. Seen in the light of patron-client relations, it acted as a forum through which the peasants could extract resources from the centre in exchange for providing the elite patrons with political support (Ng'ethe, 1979: 344-345; Holmquist, 1984: 174-179; Barkan and Holmquist, 1986:1; Barkan, 1992:177).<sup>70</sup> Kenya is yet to develop a structure through which government could channel development funds to civil society organizations. The bulk of support for service delivery that CSOs and NGOs undertake is direct funds from development partners.

**Ghana:** Although CSOs and NGOs have proliferated in Ghana and are actively participating the country's development programs, there is not comprehensive policy framework for government's cooperation with civil society organizations. Only recently did the government of Ghana embark on policy design that will inform its relationship with civil society organizations. In the preamble of the document the Government recognized the role of CSO, NGOs, and CBOs in the field of health, education, rural an urban development, environment, and population. The pledges to recognize and support the independence of the non-profit sector, recognize the diversity of NGOs and CSOs and the fact that their activities embrace all aspects of development; provide funding either directly through grants or indirectly through tax relief, develop, in consultation with CSOs, a code of good practice, etc.

Chapter 5 (21) and 6 (37) (1) (2) (3)) of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic (1992) define a conducive political framework for building partnership relations between Government and non-profit organizations. These chapters however fall short of specifying the institutional framework for managing partnership relations. This Draft Comprehensive Policy Framework for the Non-Profit Sector in Ghana once approved would go a long way to deepen relations between Government and its most strategic partners, CSOs and NGOs.

**Nigeria:** Civil society and government relations in Nigeria varied from one regime to the other. Under military regimes the governments were not keen on building partnership with civil society and the private sectors unless the partnership was to serve its parochial interest. Similar to the Babangida regime, the Abacha Government, which took power in November 1993, actively sought to create its own constituency in society by encouraging the formation of civil groups that supported it. An allocation of 10 percent of government disbursements to local government was redirected to councils of traditional rulers throughout the country. In addition the Government's long-term planning committee, the Vision 2010 Planning committee, had strong interest representation by some groups while it excluded others." (Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) for Nation-Building, pg203).

The Obasanjo government acknowledges that civil society and NGOs can contribute to solving social problems and has created space for their existence and active participation. Just as in the 1980s the number of civil society organizations in Nigeria has increased in the last couple of years. Despite strain relationship between the government and workers union over petroleum prices, there are many other associations who are collaborating with the government to nurture and sustain the fragile democracy. For example the human rights community has taken up the challenge to initiate the process towards rewriting a legitimate constitution and has produced draft alternative models for debate. Others have published draft electoral bills for public hearing key provision of which were incorporated in the final Act. The Human Rights Law Service (HURILAWS) in collaboration with the Nigerian Bar Association organized a one-day workshop on the National Action Plan for Justice Sector Reform in Nigeria, with the support of the National Center for State Courts...Participants were drawn from Civil society, Judiciary, Nigerian Bar Association and the Academia.

Nigeria has no well defined policy for the engagement of civil society organization in partnership. In 2003 the Government invited civil society organizations to its first joint dialogue. That meeting proposed the setting up of a bureau to be responsible for CSOs and NGOs and the development of a policy framework that would the relationship between civil society organizations and the Nigerian Government.

## **Conclusion**

Considering the size of NGOs and their resource base, is a partnership between the state, private sector and NGOs possible? NGOs tend to be small, operate on a small scale and in an intense manner. How secure do they feel going into partnership with a mountain such as the state and the private sector? The fear of these two giants taking up their own space and that of NGOs is ever real within civil society. There are other fears too. NGOs take time to build relationship with communities. NGOs believe in mobilization and awareness raising; they move at the pace of the community. These are processes to which neither the state nor the private sector devote time.

When it comes to women's organizations partnering with the state or the private sector, the challenges are many since most states are hostile to women's rights issues. The very important and serious work of trying to lobby for legal reforms and constitutional amendments, which could raise the status of women, is usually undermined with frivolous statements from government officials.

Most states in Africa believe that NGOs should be confined to humanitarian work; they have no right to address human rights and governance issues. The state argues that issues of peace are political and should be left to the politicians. There is also a belief that NGOs are under the political influence of donors and do not have agendas of their own. They therefore dance to the tune of their foreign friends and masters.

Pressures from multilateral development partners, declining economies, and rapidly developing non-profit sector make partnering with NGOs and CSOs and unavoidable task for African governments. However, it is the genuineness of governments to engage CSOs and NGOs in a long-term and comprehensive way that is lacking. Most governments still see the partnership as one of expedience so as to remain in the good books of the development partners. Those who have realized that genuine partnership with NGOs and CSOs is productive are already experiencing and appreciating the fruits.

## **CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Confrontation and mistrust developed between the state and its citizens during the infamous one party is receding. Throughout the continent's history ordinary citizens have always been at the forefront for socio-political change. Popular participation, political pluralism, and civil society and government partnerships are not gifts to civil society. Citizens throughout African fought both their governments and international actors to earn them. We contend that cooperation between the state and citizens is central and germane to good governance, democracy, and rapid social and economic advancement. The African leaders themselves in numerous documents pledged their commitment to increase cooperation with their people and to open and diversify the political space. Essentially the AHSI is attempting to remind the leaders of their commitments and to recognize those who have made good their promises to their people and to the entire continent.

From our study it was pleasing to note that none of the 8 African states studied remain in the remote state of totalitarianism. Dynamic and positive changes are taken place. In some rapidly while others gradually. Some of the countries like Algeria and Ethiopia experienced intermittent period of civil society engagement and alienation in the last decade. South Africa was rated as the most advanced in delivering on all the benchmark although there are more to be desired. Ghana and Senegal are progressing with political pluralism and popular participation but poverty and the lack of clear policy frameworks for civil society engagement undermines their attempts at deliberate cooperation with civil society. Uganda seems to be the most decentralized but the government still does not tolerate confrontation. It insists that civil society groups are to complement government efforts in service delivery. The Movement System has undermined political pluralism. Ethiopia and Algeria are yet to recover from their feudal and communist pasts. Repression of civil society groups is common in both countries.

A common denominator in these countries is the proliferation of NGOs and CSOs. To a large extent the growth of CSOs in all the countries is facilitated by development partners who argue for the support of this sector in order to directly impact the development of the poor. In all the countries except South Africa there is not government policy and institutional framework to support CSOs and NGOs so as to sustain the sector. The sector depends entirely on donor support from outside the continent. Besides, the sector lacks very important skills such as advocacy, policy analysis, coalition building, etc. Skeptics say that governments are reluctantly cooperating with whatever is called civil society just to remain in good books with development partners and once this element is removed African governments would easily regress into the years of totalitarianism.

Recommendation (To be developed)

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> Members of the AHSI are the Institute for Security Studies, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding,
- <sup>2</sup> Bratton, Michael. Civil society and Political Transition in Africa, IDR Reports (Volume 11 Number 6) Institute for Development Research. 1994. p.2
- <sup>3</sup> Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Oxford: The International African Institute/James Curry, 1999 (African Issues) (Cited from Report of a Study on the Civil Society in Uganda, July 2002 by Nanna Thue, Apollo N. Makubuya, and Maureen Nakirunda).
- <sup>4</sup> Human and State Security in Africa—A Conceptual Review, p.17.
- <sup>5</sup> Final Report of the Commission on Human Security, <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/outline.html>.
- <sup>6</sup> Human and State Security in Africa—A Conceptual Framework for Review
- <sup>7</sup> Ronning, Helge, Colonialism and Civil Society in Africa (Professor, Department of Media and Communication, University of Oslo)
- <sup>8</sup> State-civil society relations and public participation in post-Apartheid South Africa (Paper to be presented at the public participation conference 24-25 July 2003, Durban)
- <sup>9</sup> Johnson Krista, State and Civil Society in Contemporary South Africa: Redefining the Rules of the Game, in Thabo Mbeki's world; Univ. of Natal Press, Aug. 2002. p.1
- <sup>10</sup> NGOs and the State in Kenya. Qustia Media Ameica, Inc. ([www.questia.com](http://www.questia.com))
- <sup>11</sup> Civil Societies in the South. ([www.valt.helsinki.fi](http://www.valt.helsinki.fi))
- <sup>12</sup> Nana Thue, Apollo...
- <sup>13</sup> Barya and Bazaara, 2000 (Quoted by Thue, Makubuya & Nakirunda, Report of a Study on the Civil Society in Uganda. P.20)
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid p.20
- <sup>15</sup> Thue, Makubuya & Nakirunda p.23
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